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FOREWORD
This study presents some “stylised facts” regarding the relationships
observed between fiscal variables and the economy’s cyclical fluctua-
tions. Rather than attempting to test a particular theory or model, it uses a
simple and well defined theoretical and statistical framework to arrange
and present the basic features of fiscal policy which seem relevant to es-
tablishing its possible relationship with fluctuations in economic growth.
When, some years back, O.J. Blanchard was reviewing progress in
macroeconomics from 1975 onwards (“New Classicals and New Keynes-
ians, the Long Pause“, September 1991, Saint Louis Fed Conference on
Business Cycles), he argued that one of the areas in which progress had
been least satisfactory was in the “development of convincing data de-
scription methods“. This paper aims to help fill this gap, specifically as far
as the relationships between fiscal policy and the stabilisation of econom-
ic fluctuations are concerned.
From a theoretical standpoint most economists nowadays accept that
economic policies must be formulated with a view to the medium term
and enjoy credibility among private agents in order to be effective. This
involves limiting the authorities’ discretion by some kind of rule, compli-
ance with which can easily be monitored by such agents. Yet in practice
there is very substantial disagreement over the nature of such rules and
their potentially adverse consequences from the point of view of econom-
ic stabilisation. This disagreement is particularly intense in the case of the
European countries which are planning to establish economic and mone-
tary union, relinquishing the use of monetary policy and the exchange
rate for stabilisation purposes, because the setting of strict rules for fiscal
policy may prevent it exerting its stabilising effects. Specifically, it is
feared that rules limiting the size of the general government deficit and
debt may also undermine the stabilising capacity of fiscal policy, the only
policy available to the national authorities to cushion the impact of asym-
metric shocks which affect their economies. To discuss this problem two
questions need to be answered first. What stabilising effects has fiscal
policy had? And what has their magnitude been?
The usual procedure when trying to assess the stabilising effects of
fiscal policy in the past is to estimate a more or less complex model of the
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national economy and to perform counterfactual simulation exercises.
Ideally, the model will distinguish between endogenous variables (whose
values are determined within the model) and exogenous variables
(whose values are predetermined from outside the model). The latter in-
clude variables which can be controlled by the authorities and used as in-
struments of economic policy. Counterfactual exercises attempt to an-
swer questions of the type such as what would have happened in the
economy represented by the model if certain exogenous variables had
had certain hypothetical values instead of the values actually observed.
The answer to this type of question permits a hypothetical causal connec-
tion to be established between the objectives of economic policy, formu-
lated in terms of the values desired for the model’s endogenous vari-
ables, and the instruments which the authorities can control.
The approach used in this study is different. It is based on the fact
that the stabilising effects of fiscal policy are reflected in the values actu-
ally observed in the available statistical series, and that they may be
quantified by a simple statistical procedure to measure the simultaneous
fluctuations of the variables. The main limitation of this procedure is that it
does not provide a causal explanation of the observed events. When, for
instance, it is said that taxes on income have a stabilising effect on fluctu-
ations in private-sector gross disposable income, this does not mean that
these taxes are a variable directly controlled by the fiscal authorities,
which can be used as an instrument to attain their stabilising or other ob-
jectives. The decisions of the fiscal authorities on the variables they con-
trol (such as legal tax rates) are combined with the decisions of other
economic agents on other variables under their control (such as wages)
and with other factors outside the control of any agent in particular (such
as climate) to produce the values actually observed of the relevant en-
dogenous variables (such as income and the revenue from the taxes
levied on income). The procedure used here does not permit these influ-
ences to be separately identified, nor the degree of responsibility of the
tax authorities for the final result to be evaluated. Nonetheless, it is capa-
ble of establishing whether the interaction of all the factors has, in the
past, given rise to adjustments to tax revenues which have had a stabilis-
ing effect on the fluctuations in private-sector disposable income. This ef-
fect cannot be attributed to a single cause, nor is any explanation of why
and how it has arisen given here. Answers are only given to questions as
to whether the stabilising effect existed and what its magnitude was.
These questions are answered in this paper using a very elementary
approach, accessible to anyone with a basic knowledge of macroeco-
nomics (the simplest Keynesian model) and statistics (the ordinary least
squares regression model). Chapter I offers the theoretical and statistical
background, which acts as an introduction for defining the stabilising ef-
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fects of fiscal policy and sets out the method used for estimating them.
Chapter II gives the historical background to economic policy since 1960,
as a general reference for subsequently examining the stabilising effects
of fiscal policy in specific countries. The subsequent chapters respective-
ly present the stabilisation policies applied in the main industrialised
countries (United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and United King-
dom) and in Spain in recent decades, and the method proposed for esti-
mating the stabilising effects of fiscal policy in these countries. The final
chapter draws the main conclusions of the paper in the form of “stylised
facts“ to be explained by economic theory.
All the statistical information used is from the AMECO data base of
the Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs of the Euro-
pean Commission, including the forecasts made by its Technical Services
in November 1996 for the years 1996 and 1997.
In conducting this work I have benefited from the co-operation and
comments of many people. I should like to thank José Luis Malo de Moli-
na, José María Bonillla, Pilar L’Hotellerie-Fallois and Julia Salaverría,
who so helpfully read the chapters and offered useful advice. Javier Val-
lés, Olympia Bover, María de los Llanos Matea and Juan José Dolado re-
vised the econometric results and prevented many mistakes being made.
Several others read and discussed parts of the text with the author, en-
hancing its content: José Manuel González-Páramo, Rafael Padilla, Isa-
bel Argimón, Francisco Martí, Angel Luis Gómez, Ana Buisán, Esther
Gordo, José Manuel González Mínguez, Joaquín Zamorano and partici-
pants in various seminars hosted by the Banco de España Research De-
partment, CEMFI and the Economic Analysis Department of the Faculty
of Economics at the Madrid Complutense University. María Luisa Comín
and María Jesús Núñez bore patiently with me, typing out successive
versions of the text. Jesús Briones assisted with the data base. José
Antonio Carro and Rafael Martínez were responsible for the charts.
I gratefully acknowledge them all.
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ITHEORETICAL AND STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK
OF THE ANALYSIS
I.1. Introduction
To understand the stabilising effects of general government eco-
nomic operations it is essential to consider the repercussions of such
operations on the other sectors of the economy. Given the multiplicity
and complexity of these operations when viewed in the National Ac-
counts statistics, it would seem worthwhile first to review elementary
economic theory in order to present, in an abstract and simplified man-
ner, the key aspects of the interdependence of the various sectors and
the determination of the macroeconomic equilibrium resulting from their
decisions as to consumption, investment, public spending, tax, etc. This
chapter sets out a simple theoretical model to present the central ideas
on which analysis of the stabilising effects of the fiscal policy implement-
ed by general government turns. It further specifies the statistical and
accounting framework in which the variables to be analysed are defined
and quantified. The fiscal policy stabilisers are also defined, and a
method, which will be applied in the following chapters, is proposed for
their estimation.
Fiscal policy involves determining public revenue and spending in or-
der to attain objectives relating to efficiency, redistribution and stabilisa-
tion. Here we analyse only its stabilising effects on private-sector income
and aggregate demand. General government has two main functions: the
redistribution of national income and wealth through taxes and transfer
payments, and the provision of non-market services for the community
via purchases of goods and services. In consonance with these functions,
two types of fiscal policy stabilising effects are distinguished: that on the
economy’s private-sector disposable income and that on the economy’s
aggregate expenditure.
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Income redistribution operations may directly help to stabilise private-
sector disposable income, which may be a desirable objective in itself, as
long as private agents prefer to have a stable flow of income to spend
that is not subject to cyclical fluctuations. If private-sector demand and
spending are stable functions of the sector’s disposable income, then the
stabilisation of this income indirectly helps to stabilise demand and aggre-
gate output. General government consumption and investment opera-
tions may also directly help to stabilise the economy’s aggregate spend-
ing and total demand in real terms, thus ensuring the stabilisation of the
economy’s output, employment and income.
The stabilisation of aggregate income or demand is not an end in it-
self, but is an intermediate objective to enhance social well-being. From
the macroeconomic standpoint, however, it is not possible to use a social
well-being function representing individuals’ preferences in order to eval-
uate the stabilising effects of fiscal policy. Nor is it possible to distinguish
whether individuals prefer that fiscal policy stabilise private-sector dispos-
able income or the aggregate demand of the economy, or to estimate the
cost in terms of the efficiency of the redistribution or stabilisation of in-
come. These key aspects of fiscal policy are not taken into account here,
because our sole intention is to describe the sign and the magnitude of
these effects, without analysing their consequences on social well-being,
or the rules guiding the agents’ decisions, or their discretionary or auto-
matic nature.
Insofar as possible, this study seeks to be self-contained and accessi-
ble to anyone with a basic knowledge of macroeconomics. It begins with
an elementary explanation of the analytical foundations that support the
empirical approach used to describe the stabilising effects of fiscal policy.
Special emphasis is placed on the importance of using an equilibrium
model, and a statistical framework adapted to this model, for understand-
ing these effects.
I.2. Economic theory and statistical framework
The theoretical model set out in this chapter [Samuelson (1948)] is
the most basic version of the Keynesian macroeconomic models, since it
will assume that the supply curve of the economy is a horizontal straight
line, and, accordingly, there are no changes in prices, and the values of
GDP at current prices and of the other macroeconomic variables coincide
with their respective values at constant prices. This is a notable simplifi-
cation, but useful for an initial approach to the stabilising aspects of fiscal
policy which we wish to address. It will also be assumed that the national
economy has two sectors which group all agents (the private sector and
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the public sector), who carry out economic operations among themselves
and with the rest of the world to attain their objectives, subject to budget
constraints. The public sector is formed by all those agents whose objec-
tives and criteria for decisions are established by the political authorities.
The economic decisions of these agents are reflected in the values of
the variables which appear in their budget constraints, and therefore the
first step in analysing their behaviour is to study the characteristics of
these constraints and their changes over time. In the statistical system
used by nearly all countries, budget constraints are the income, use of in-
come and capital accounts of institutional sectors. These accounts will be
further simplified by leaving out the less important operations and aggre-
gating others in order to obtain a simple accounting structure, where only
the most relevant operations are shown. Such simplifications are useful
for a closer understanding of a basic aspect of macroeconomic analysis,
namely the relationship that should exist between accounting equilibria
and economic equilibria. These are the key concepts that guarantee the
internal consistency of the statistical system of data collection and of the
theoretical system that studies the behavioural relationships of agents.
The accounting and statistical framework for classifying information
pertinent to macroeconomic analysis is the system of national accounts.
Although the history of social and national accounting goes back several
centuries, a closer reference dates from 1953, the year when the first
System of National Accounts of the United Nations (SNA) was published,
since used as the basis for unifying the global statistics of nearly all coun-
tries. In 1970 the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts
(ESA) was published. Based on the SNA, it was adapted to the charac-
teristics and needs of the members of the European Economic Communi-
ty, providing a consistent and detailed set of accounts and tables with
systematic, comparable and, insofar as possible, complete records of the
economic activity of European countries. In practice, these records en-
compass a vast quantity and variety of economic flows between a large
number of units and agents residing in the same country or in the rest of
the world. The essential function of any system of national accounts is to
classify this immense variety of economic agents and flows in a limited
number of economic categories. These categories are defined within a
general framework to reflect the workings of the economic system in a
meaningful way that can be used in economic analysis, forecasting, and
evaluations of economic policy decisions. For most European countries,
the uniform statistical series for the analysis of fiscal policy begin in 1970.
There are of course longer series on general government economic and
financial transactions, but they are not integrated in the conceptual frame-
work of the national accounts, nor are they necessarily compiled in a uni-
form manner. By contrast, the series used here to study the stabilising ef-
13
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DIAGRAM I.1
SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
Y = GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
RAS = COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES OF THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY
TPM = TAXES ON PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
SUB = PRODUCTION AND IMPORT SUBSIDIES
E = GROSS OPERATING SURPLUS OF THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY
EPB = GROSS OPERATING SURPLUS OF THE PUBLIC
SECTOR
EPV = GROSS OPERATING SURPLUS OF THE PRIVATE
SECTOR
TRP = CURRENT TAXES ON INCOME AND WEALTH
COT = SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS
TRC = MISCELLANEOUS CURRENT TRANSFERS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
YDPB = DISPOSABLE INCOME OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
YDPV = DISPOSABLE INCOME OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
CN = NATIONAL CONSUMPTION
CPB = GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
CPV = PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
AN = NATIONAL SAVING
APB = PUBLIC SAVING
APV = PRIVATE SAVING
IN = GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY
IPB = GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT
IPV = PRIVATE INVESTMENT
TRK = CAPITAL TRANSFERS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR TO
THE PRIVATE SECTOR
X = EXPORTS
M = IMPORTS
SOCRM= BALANCE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS WITH THE
REST OF THE WORLD
CNFN = NET LENDING (+) OR NET BORROWING (–) OF THE
NATION
CNFPB= NET LENDING (+) OR NET BORROWING (–) OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR
CNFPV= NET LENDING (+) OR NET BORROWING (–) OF THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
VPN = CHANGE IN LIABILITIES OF THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY
VAN = CHANGE IN ASSETS OF THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY
VPPB = CHANGE IN LIABILITIES OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
VAPB = CHANGE IN ASSETS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
VPPV = CHANGE IN LIABILITIES OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
VAPV = CHANGE IN ASSETS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
AFNN = NET FINANCIAL SAVING OF THE NATION
AFNPB = NET FINANCIAL SAVING OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
AFNPV= NET FINANCIAL SAVING OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Private sector General government National economy Rest of the world
INCOME INCOME INCOME CURRENT OP.
E R E R E R E R
TRP EPV TRC EPB SUB E X M
COT RAS SUB TRP RAS
TRC TPM TPM
COT
YDPV YDPB Y SOCRM
USE OF INCOME USE OF INCOME USE OF INCOME
E R E R E R
CPV YDPV CPB YDPB CN Y
APV APB AN
CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL
E R E R E R E R
IPV APV IPB APB IN AN SOCRM
TRK TRK
CNFPV CNFPB CNFN CNFN
FINANCIAL FINANCIAL FINANCIAL FINANCIAL
VA VP VA VP VA VP VA VP
VAPV VPPV VAPB VPPB VAN VPN VPN VAN
AFNPV AFNPB AFNN AFNN
SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS: ABBREVIATIONS OF VARIABLES
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fects of fiscal policy do offer a greater guarantee of comparability over
time and space, because they were jointly estimated in each country un-
der the national accounts methodology (ESA, 2nd edition, 1979).
Any theoretical model that is specified for application to reality should
be accompanied by the corresponding accounting model that defines the
variables used in the theoretical model, the method of measuring them,
and the relationships of internal consistency which they must satisfy (ac-
counting equilibrium). For the theoretical model used here, an appropriate
accounting framework is the one presented in Diagram I.1, where all op-
erations not considered essential were eliminated. Also, for the time be-
ing, we shall aggregate in a single variable (T) the total revenue or taxes,
in the broad sense, of general government (T=TPM + TRP + COT +
EPB), and in another variable total net transfers (TR=TRC + SUB + TRK).
By consolidating vertically in the above diagram and separately the ac-
counts of the private sector, general government, the national economy
and the rest of the world presented in the diagram, we obtain the follow-
ing budget constraints:
Private sector
Y + TR –T – CPV – IPV = CNFPV = VAPV – VPPV [I.1]
Public sector
T – TR – CPB – IPB = CNFPB = VAPB – VPPB [I.2]
National economy
Y – CPV – CPB – IPV – IPB = CNFN = VA – VPN [I.3]
Rest of the world
X – M = VAN – VPM [I.4]
I.3. Behaviour functions
The behaviour functions of the agents are obtained on the basis of
the decisions they take in seeking to achieve their objectives, subject to
the pertinent budget constraints. For the private sector, the only function
that will be included in the model is the consumption function:
CPV = A + b× YDPV [I.5]
According to this equation, private consumption depends on a positive
constant (A), which is called autonomous consumption, and on the marginal
propensity to consume (constant b, which is also assumed to be positive
but less than one) multiplied by the private sector’s disposable income
(YDPV), which is defined in this model by the following account identity:
YDPV = Y + TR – T [I.6]
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For the public sector, the model will only specify the determination of
total revenue (T) as a proportion of GDP (Y): 
T = t Y [I.7]
t being a positive constant and less than one, representing the tax rate, or
tax burden in the broad sense.
For purchases of goods and services abroad, the following import
function will be assumed:
M = m Y [I.8]
m being a constant, assumed positive and less than one, called the
propensity to import.
The specification of these three behaviour functions completes the
depiction of the model. The rest of the variables are considered exoge-
nous. Note that the decisions taken separately by the agents are interde-
pendent: private consumption depends on GDP and on the taxes and
transfer payments of the public sector; taxes and imports also depend on
GDP, which in turn depends on private consumption. The agents’ deci-
sions are therefore mutually dependent, and the analysis of the condi-
tions under which these decisions are compatible with each other is what
is known as equilibrium model analysis.
I.4. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
The equilibrium condition of this model may be expressed in the
known form:
Y = CPV + CPB + IPV + IPB + X – M [I.9]
This expression says that the aggregate supply of the economy, rep-
resented by GDP (Y) on the left-hand side of the equation, is equal to the
aggregate demand of the economy, represented on the right-hand side of
the equation by the sum of the demand for private consumption (CPV)
and government consumption (CPB), gross capital formation (the sum of
private investment IPV and government investment IPB), and net exports
(X-M). As an accounting identity, this equation is always verified a poste-
riori. However, when the variables in this equation are substituted by the
behaviour equations that determine the values of these variables in the
model, said accounting identity is no longer certain by definition, and it
17
can only be verified for the equilibrium values that solve the model. Mak-
ing the pertinent substitutions yields:
Y = A + b [Y + TR – tY] + CPB + IPV + IPB + X – mY [I.10]
Y = A + CPB + IPV + IPB + X + bTR + [b(1 – t) – m] Y [I.11]
On the left-hand side of this equation is the supply-side GDP, and on
the right-hand side are the components of aggregate demand, according
to the model’s behaviour equations, having grouped in the last term all
the factors that depend on the value of GDP (Y).
Representing the right-hand side of this equation graphically, we ob-
tain an aggregate demand curve of the economy (AD), as shown in Fig-
ure I.1, in terms of Y. Note that aggregate demand is a straight line that
crosses the vertical axis of the value:
DA (0) = A + CPB + IPV + IPB + X + bTR [I.12]
This means that, for a hypothetical value of Y=0, aggregate demand
would be positive and would take the specific value corresponding
t othe intersection of the aggregate demand curve and the vertical axis.
Also, for positive and increasingly higher values of Y, the aggregate
demand curve also takes increasingly higher values, because added to
the original value when Y=0 is the effect of the term that depends on
GDP: [b(1-t)-m] Y. Thus, when GDP at current prices takes the value Y1,
the aggregate demand of the economy takes the value
A D ( Y1)=A+CPB+IPV+IPB+X+bTR+[b(1–t)–m] Y1 . When Y increases by
one unit, AD increases by [b(1–t)–m] units, and thus the slope of the ag-
gregate demand curve is [b(1–t)–m]. In Figure I.1 it was assumed that
this slope is greater than zero, although this is not necessarily so, as we
shall later see.
In addition, if a straight line with an inclination of forty-five degrees
(45º) is drawn from the original point, as the one in Figure I.2, we obtain a
graphic depiction of the aggregate supply curve of the economy (AS).
This curve is relatively trivial because it only says that, if GDP at current
prices (Y, on the horizontal axis) takes a certain value (let’s say Y1), then
the aggregate supply of the economy (AS, on the vertical axis, which
should have the same scale as the horizontal axis) takes the same value
(AS1=Y1). Note that the slope of this supply curve is exactly equal to one,
which means that, if GDP increases to Y2, the aggregate supply of the
economy will also increase by the same amount to AS2=Y2, i.e. it holds
that Y2 – Y1 = AS2 – AS1.
Supply and demand curves may be used to analyse how equilibrium
is reached, i.e. a situation in which the supply and demand of the econo-
my are equal and the decisions of all agents are mutually compatible. Be-
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ginning with the graphical examination of equilibrium, the point where ag-
gregate supply and demand are equal is the intersection of the curves of
supply (AS) and demand (AD), as shown in Figure I.3, Y* being the equi-
librium value resulting from GDP. For values lower than GDP, demand is
greater than supply (AD is greater than AS), and for values higher
thanY*, demand is less than supply, and thus a disequilibrium of a differ-
ent sign exists in each case.
From the algebraic point of view, to arrive at the equilibrium value Y*,
the value for which the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the equa-
tion (I.11) coincide must be found. This is achieved by grouping on the
left-hand side the dependent terms of Y, later finding the value of Y*:
Y – [b (1 – t) – m] Y = A + CPB + IPV + IPB + X + bTR
Y [1 – b (1 – t) + m] = A + CPB + IPV + IPB + X + bTR
A + CPB + IPV + IPB + X + bTR
Y* = ————————————————— [I.13]
1 – b (1 – t) + m
The conditions for equilibrium to exist in this model, i.e. for the model
to have a solution with economic significance, are that the slope of the
aggregate demand curve [b(1-t)-m] be less than unity (a condition that is
met because it was assumed that the range of variation in the constants
b, t and m was the interval encompassed between zero and one), and
that the numerator on the right-hand side of the equation [I.13] be posi-
tive. Under these conditions, the value of Y* will be positive from the alge-
braic standpoint, because it is the quotient of two positive numbers, and
from the graphical point of view because the aggregate demand (AD)
curve will cross the aggregate supply (AS) curve at a positive value. This
is guaranteed because the AD curve will start from the vertical axis with a
positive value (equal to the right-hand side numerator in [I.13]), and its in-
clination will be less than that of the aggregate supply curve (which is uni-
ty) and will therefore end up crossing it. The same conditions that ensure
the existence of equilibrium guarantee that the equilibrium is unique,
since the curves of aggregate supply and demand will cross only once
because they are straight lines.
In short, the equilibrium equation [I.13], which solves the model pro-
posed in this section, allows us to find the equilibrium value of GDP at
current prices once the values of the exogenous variables and the mod-
el’s parameters are known. Exogenous variables are those whose value
is determined outside the model to distinguish them from the endogenous
variables, which are determined by the equilibrium relationships within
the model. The parameters are exogenous variables of a particular type
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that determine the form of the agents’ behaviour functions. The variables
included in this simple model are the following:
Exogenous variables
A, autonomous consumption of the private sector
IPV, private investment
CPB, government consumption
IPB, government investment
TR, public-sector transfers to the private sector
X, exports of goods and services
Parameters
b, marginal propensity to private consumption
t, tax rate
m, propensity to import
Endogenous variables
Y, gross domestic product
CPV, private consumption
T, public revenue
M, imports
YDPV, gross disposable income of the private sector
YDPB, gross disposable income of the public sector
YDN, gross disposable income of the nation
APV, gross saving of the private sector
APB, gross saving of the public sector
AN, gross national saving
CNFPV, net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of the private sector
CNFPB, net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of the public sector
CNFN, net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of the nation
Therefore, for each set of values that is specified for the exogenous
variables and the parameters of the model, equation [I.13] provides the
equilibrium value of GDP, which is the basic endogenous variable. Sub-
stituting this value in the behaviour equations and in the budget con-
straints of the sectors formulated earlier, we obtain the equilibrium values
of the rest of the model’s endogenous variables.
To examine the cyclical fluctuations of the economy and the basic
concepts of fiscal policy (multipliers, automatic stabilisers, and cyclical
and trend budget balances), a dynamic model is needed. Its structure
must incorporate the adjustment processes of the endogenous variables
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unleashed as a result of changes in the exogenous variables and param-
eters of the model. But, before introducing the dynamic adjustment pro-
cesses in the model proposed, it is important to have a good grasp of the
equilibrium’s characteristics by performing various exercises in compara-
tive statics. The comparison of the values of the endogenous variables in
two different equilibria resulting from changes in the values that are spec-
ified for the exogenous variables and parameters of the model is known
as comparative static equilibrium analysis. This type of analysis only con-
siders static equilibrium solutions, and does not go into the dynamic pro-
cess that makes the economy move from one equilibrium state to anoth-
er, nor does it examine the equilibrium stability conditions.
I.5. Static equilibrium and multipliers
The possible comparative static exercises in this model are of two
types: a) when an exogenous variable other than a parameter changes,
with the other exogenous variables and parameters remaining constant,
the intersection of the aggregate demand curve and the vertical axis [val-
ue AD(0) in Figure I.1] changes, but the slope of the curve is not altered,
thus producing a parallel upward or downward shift in the entire AD
curve, with an upward or downward change in the equilibrium value Y*,
respectively, and b) when a parameter of the model changes, with the
other exogenous variables and parameters remaining constant, the slope
of the aggregate demand curve changes, giving rise to an increase or a
decrease in the equilibrium value Y*.
Looking again at equation [I.12], which determines the AD(0) point
where the aggregate demand curve crosses the vertical axis, it can be
seen that all the exogenous variables listed above appear as addends.
An increase in any of them will cause a parallel upward shift in the AD
curve, giving rise to an increase in the equilibrium GDP (Y*); conversely,
a reduction in any of these exogenous variables will cause a decrease in
the equilibrium GDP. As to the parameters, the slope of the aggregate
demand curve, [b(1–t)–m], is found to increase whenever the marginal
propensity to private consumption increases (b), and it diminishes when
there is an increase in the tax rate (t) or the propensity to import (m).
Changes in the parameters in the opposite direction of those considered
will of course have contrary effects.
Focusing our analysis on the effects of the variables of fiscal policy,
we shall first consider the consequences of an increase in government
consumption (CPB). If, starting from an initial equilibrium position (Y1*),
determined by a set of specific values of exogenous variables and pa-
rameters, the value of government consumption increases from CPB1 to
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CPB2, with the initial values of the other exogenous variables and param-
eters remaining constant, then a new equilibrium (Y2*) is reached. The
initial equilibrium was:
A + CPB1 + IPV + IPB + X + bTRY1* = —————————————————
1 – b (1 – t) + m
and the final equilibrium will be:
A + CPB2 + IPV + IPB + X + bTRY2* = —————————————————
1 – b (1 – t) + m
To determine the change produced in the equilibrium GDP, the sec-
ond expression is subtracted from the first, yielding:
CPB2 – CPB1Y2* – Y1* = ————————————
1 – b (1 – t) + m
an expression in which all the exogenous variables of the numerator,
whose value remained constant under the hypothesis, disappear. The
change in the equilibrium GDP (Y2* – Y1*) is equal to the hypothetical
change in government consumption (CPB2 – CPB1) multiplied by the
constant:
1
KCPB = ——————————— [I.14]
1 – b (1 – t) + m
This constant KCPB is called the government consumption multiplier,
because, for the most usual values of the parameters (b, t, m), it is veri-
fied that b (1–t) is greater than m, while the denominator of the above
quotient is less than one, and, therefore, KCPB is greater than one. In this
case, the increase in the equilibrium GDP is a multiple of the increase in
government consumption. From the standpoint of the graphical analysis
of the equilibrium, Figure I.4 illustrates how the increase in government
consumption produces a parallel upward shift in the aggregate demand
curve of the economy from the initial AD1 position to the final AD2 posi-
tion, and therefore it holds that AD(0)2 – AD(0)1 = CPB2 – CPB1, i.e. the
vertical distance between both aggregate demand curves is equal to the
increase in the hypothetical government consumption. Note, however,
that the distance Y2* – Y1*, which represents the increase in the equilibri-
um income on the horizontal axis, is greater than the vertical distance be-
tween the aggregate demand curves.
Following the same steps set out above, it may be deduced that in
this model the government investment multiplier, as well as the multipliers
of private investment, private autonomous consumption and exports, are
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equal to the government consumption multiplier. By contrast, the public-
sector transfer multiplier (KTR) is less than all the others and equal to:
b
KTR = ——————————— [I.15]
1 – b (1 – t) + m
The economic explanation that KTR is less than KCPB lies in the fact
that, as will be seen more clearly when analysing the multiplier process
with a dynamic focus, direct spending on goods and services by the pub-
lic sector initially has a more expansionary effect on aggregate demand
than do the transfer payments to the private sector.
To conclude this comparative static equilibrium analysis, Figure I.5
shows what the effects of a decrease in the tax rate would be: the slope
of the aggregate demand curve would increase, but its intersection with
the vertical axis would not change. The initial curve AD1 and the final AD2
curve start from the same point, but the latter has a larger slope, causing
an increase in the equilibrium GDP, which would move from Y1* to Y2*.
We shall not analytically deduce the impact of the changes in the param-
eters on the equilibrium GDP. It will suffice to bear in mind the graphic
depiction in Figure I.5 to recall the qualitative effects of these changes,
especially those in the fiscal policy variables.
I.6. The dynamic multiplier process and equilibrium stability
As noted, after examining the public spending multipliers in the frame-
work of comparative statics, an analysis of their dynamics requires speci-
fying the characteristics of the adjustment process that allows moving
from one equilibrium position to another. Recall that, in the model studied
here, it was assumed that prices would not change, but rather the aggre-
gate supply of the economy was perfectly elastic and aggregate demand
automatically determined the aggregate supply of goods and services.
This drastic hypothesis may be understood as an extreme case in which
the prices of the economy are very rigid in the short run (the assumption
is in fact that they remain fixed), whereas all the adjustments induced by
the changes in aggregate demand are integrally passed through to the
amounts and, therefore, to the aggregate supply and the level of econom-
ic activity. In accordance with this hypothesis, it is assumed in the analy-
sis by stages of the dynamic process explained below that supply adjusts
in each stage to the level determined by demand.
Consider the adjustment process between the initial equilibrium and
the final equilibrium examined earlier when setting out the consequences
of an increase in public consumption. Starting from the initial equilibrium,
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the government decides to raise expenditure on current goods and ser-
vices by 100 monetary units, with the other exogenous variables and pa-
rameters of the model remaining constant. The immediate consequence
(in the first stage) of this increase in public spending will be an increase
of the same amount in aggregate demand, which will be automatically
passed through to aggregate supply, and therefore GDP will increase by
100 monetary units. But the adjustment process does not stop here.
In this first stage, as a result of the increase in GDP, there will be an
increase of 100 – 100t = 100 (1–t) in the disposable income of con-
sumers, 100t being the additional taxes received by the general govern-
ment sector due to the increase in GDP, as seen in the first line of Dia-
gram I.2. In addition, since the disposable income of consumers has
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risen, consumers will increase their consumption by b[100(1–t)], where b
is the marginal propensity to consume. This higher consumption has a
further expansionary effect of a magnitude b[100(1–t)] on aggregate de-
mand. However, part of the initial growth in aggregate demand will not re-
sult in an increase in domestic production, but will be filtered towards
imports, which will expand in a proportion of m with respect to the in-
crease in GDP, as shown in the last column of Diagram I.2. Therefore, at
the end of the first stage, GDP will have in fact increased by the amount
that private consumption, [100(1–t)]b, has grown, less the amount by
which imports have increased, 100m, i.e. 100[b(1–t)–m], with a second
stage -analogous to the first- then beginning.
It should be noted that the increases in GDP (D Y) of aggregate de-
mand (D AD), public revenue (D T), private-sector disposable income
(D YDPV), private consumption (D CPV) and imports (D M), which take
place in the second stage and appear in the second line of Diagram I.1,
are all equal to those reflected by each of these variables in the first
stage (first line of Diagram I.2), but multiplied by a constant p=b(1–t)–m,
which is precisely the slope of the aggregate demand curve. Thus, for in-
stance, GDP will increase by 100p at the end of the first stage, by 100p2
at the end of the second, and so on in a logical infinite process. Therefore
the total increase in GDP will be:
DY= 1 0 0+1 0 0 p+1 0 0 p2 +1 0 0 p3 +…=100 (1+p + p2+p3+… ) [ I . 1 6 ]
The series of increases which appear in brackets on the right-hand
side of the expression [I.16] will have a limit whenever the value of the
constant p is less than one (and greater than minus one), because in this
case p2 is greater than p3, p3 is greater than p4, and so forth, and thus the
increases reflected in GDP in each of the logical stages discerned in the
process will be increasingly smaller. As a result, the series of increases in
GDP will have a limit whenever the slope (p) of the aggregate demand
curve is less than one (in absolute terms), this being the stability condi-
tion of the model for the dynamic adjustment process which was defined.
It can now be concluded that the condition for the model’s equilibrium to
exist and to be unique and stable is that its parameters (b, t, m) have val-
ues which determine a slope in the demand curve of less than one (and
greater than minus one).
Figure I.6 illustrates this dynamic adjustment process, which allows
moving from the initial equilibrium (Y*1) to the final equilibrium (Y*2) as a
consequence of the increase in government consumption. The initial ef-
fect of this increase is, as seen above, a parallel upward shift in the ag-
gregate demand curve from AD1 to AD2, 100 being the vertical distance
between both curves (indicated by the first line on the left between
A S and AD2), which is the magnitude of the increase in government
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spending. With the new aggregate demand, if GDP were to remain con-
stant at its initial value Y*1, there would be an excess in demand of exact-
ly the 100 units by which government consumption increased. But, follow-
ing our hypothetical adjustment rule, GDP in real terms will adjust
upwards (with prices remaining invariable) to absorb this excess demand
of 100, moving from Y*1 to YA = Y*1 + 100.
However, when GDP reaches YA, there is still an excess of aggregate
demand (the AD2 curve is above AS in the vertical line drawn over point
YA), because the increase of GDP to YA has induced a rise in the dispos-
able income of consumers (even though part of the increase in gross in-
come is absorbed by taxes) and greater private consumption. The excess
demand which subsists will be 100 p (this being the vertical distance plot-
ted by the second step), and it will correspond to the induced increase in
private consumption 100 b(1–t), minus the portion of national demand
that filters abroad by expanding the imports 100m; i.e. 100p=100[b(1–t)–m].
Following the adjustment rule assumed for the dynamic process, GDP
will now grow to YB=YA+100p=Y*1+100+100p=Y*1+100(1+p).
This dynamic process of the multiplier will continue until GDP has
reached a new equilibrium value:
1
Y2* =Y1* +100 (1+p +p
2 +p3 +…) = Y1* +100(———) [I.17]1 – p
DIAGRAM I.2
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT
CONSUMPTION MULTIPLIER
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Note that the equality of the terms which appear in brackets in the ex-
pression [I.17] establishes the link joining the static multiplier of government
consumption and the dynamic process that has just been studied. Thus:
1
1 +p +p2 +p3 +…= ———
1 – p
because:
(1– p) (1+p +p2 +p3 +…) = 1– p + p – p2 + p2 – … = 1
Therefore, on the basis of expression [I.17], we can write:
100 CPB2 – CPB1Y2* – Y1* = ——— = ————————— [I.18]
1 – p    1 – [b (1– t)– m]
this being the formula that was obtained by deducting the static multiplier
from government consumption.
Before concluding this analysis of the public spending multipliers,
three observations are in order. The first refers to the explanation of why
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the transfer multiplier is less than that of government consumption and in-
vestment. If we review the description of the dynamic process of the mul-
tiplier, we see that the initial impact of an increase in direct public spend-
ing on goods and services is passed on integrally to GDP. By contrast, if
the transfers were increased by the same amount that government con-
sumption was assumed to rise (by 100 monetary units), the initial in-
crease in aggregate demand (and in GDP) would not be 100, but only
100b, because the private sector will spend on consumption only a part b
of the increased transfers which it receives. It follows that the multiplier
effect of the transfers is equal to this same part b of the multiplier effect of
direct general government spending on goods and services.
The second observation is that the multipliers which were obtained
from the model depend on the specific hypotheses which were formulat-
ed to define it. This observation is important, because, in speaking of fis-
cal policy multipliers, it should always be borne in mind that their values
depend on the structure of the model used.
The third observation is that the model’s stability condition, which may
be expressed by saying that the elasticity of the aggregate demand curve
with respect to GDP must be less than one, may also be used to define
the stabilising or destabilising nature of the components of aggregate de-
mand. Consumption, investment and exports help to stabilise aggregate
demand if their elasticity with respect to GDP is less than one. By con-
trast, imports, since they enter by subtraction in the calculation of aggre-
gate demand, will have a stabilising influence on aggregate demand if
their elasticity with respect to GDP is greater than one. An alternative way
of expressing these same definitions without using the concept of elastici-
ty is to say that consumption, investment and exports will have stabilising
effects if their weight with respect to output declines when output increas-
es and vice versa. Imports will have stabilising effects if their weight in
output increases when output increases and vice versa.
I.7. Automatic stabilisers and cyclical and trend budget balances
To introduce the analysis of the economy’s cyclical fluctuations and
the concepts of automatic stabilisers of the trend budget balance and the
cyclical budget balance, it will first be provisionally assumed that govern-
ment consumption and investment are equal to zero in the previous mod-
el (CPB=0;IPV=0). Hence the general government budget constraint:
CNFPB =T – TR =tY – TR [I.19]
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In Figure I.8, this budget constraint is shown for a given level of trans-
fers TR, which will remain constant. When it is assumed that Y = 0, then
CNFPB = –TR. Therefore the intersection of the straight line representing
the budget constraint [I.19] will cross the vertical axis in the value –TR.
When Y has positive values, the taxes T = tY are greater than zero, and
they grow as Y grows, in a proportion of t, which is the slope of the
straight line CNFPB.
In Figure I.7, on the one hand a straight line (Y) is shown that starts
from the original point and has an inclination of 45o. On the horizontal
axis the values taken by GDP are measured and, via this straight line of
45o, said values may be moved to the vertical axis. The function of the
straight line Y in this figure is therefore analogous to that of the aggregate
supply curve in the previous figures. On the other hand, the same figure
shows the straight line YDPV which corresponds to the equation that de-
fines in the model the determination of private-sector disposable income:
YDPV =Y +TR – T =Y(1 – t) + TR [I.20]
When Y=0 is assumed, then YDPV=TR, and thus the intersection of
the straight line YDPV with the vertical line occurs at the value TR, which
was assumed to be given and constant. As Y grows, the private sector’s
disposable income increase in a proportion of (1–t), i.e. for each unit that
GDP increases, private-sector disposable income increases by this unit
minus the proportion t which the general government sector collects as
taxes. Therefore, the slope of the straight line YDPV is (1–t). At the point
where the 45o and the YDPV lines cross, it is verified that TR=T=tY*, al-
though the compliance of this equation is neither a necessary condition
nor sufficient for the model’s equilibrium.
Assuming now that the average equilibrium value of GDP over time is
Y*, this GDP value corresponds, as seen in Figure I.8, to a budget equi-
librium situation, in which CNFPB*=0, with general government transfers
to the private sector equal to the exact amount collected in taxes TR=tY*.
Consequently, as seen in Figure I.7, for average GDP equilibrium Y*, the
disposable income of the private sector takes this same average equilibri-
um value: YDPV* = Y*. Therefore, if GDP were to remain constant at val-
ue Y* over time, the budget balance would always be balanced and the
private sector’s income would permanently coincide with the GDP equilib-
rium value. From a macroeconomic perspective, that is, ignoring the re-
distribution and efficiency effects derived from the fact that those paying
taxes and those receiving transfers are not the same people, the role of
general government is practically nil in this specific case of the model, in
which there is no government consumption or investment, and equilibri-
um GDP coincides with the value that balances government revenue and
expenditure.
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However, if it is assumed that GDP may fluctuate over time following
a cyclical pattern around its average equilibrium value Y*, it is possible to
understand the significance of automatic stabilisers in smoothing fluctua-
tions in private-sector disposable income. Suppose that, due to some
cause exogenous to the economy (cyclical swings in international mar-
kets that cause similar swings in the level of exports, for instance), GDP
fluctuates continually and uniformly, reaching a maximum value YE in pe-
riods of expansion and a minimum value YD in periods of depression, as
shown in Figure I.7.
At the peak of a cyclical upturn, when GDP reaches value YE, private-
sector disposable income will not exceed the value YDPVE, because tax-
es will grow with GDP but transfers will remain constant, leading to the
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emergence of a cyclical balance with a surplus (CNFPBE is greater than
zero). Symmetrically, when the trough of a depression is reached and
GDP reaches the value YD, private-sector disposable income will have
declined to a lesser extent (stopping at the value YDPVD), because taxes
will be reduced with the fall in GDP, and, since transfers remain constant,
the cyclical budget balance will reflect a deficit (CNFPBD is less than
zero, as seen in Figure I.8).
These cyclical fluctuations over time are depicted schematically in
Figures I.9 and I.10. Figure I.9 shows the trends in GDP (on the broken
line Y) and private-sector disposable income (on the solid line YDPV)
over a typical cycle, illustrating the lesser cyclical impact of the swings on
disposable income than on GDP. Figure I.10 depicts the trends in the
cyclical budget balance over this typical cycle. Note that the fluctuations
of CNFPB conform to those of Y and of YDPV, and thus the cyclical bud-
get balance will tend towards a surplus in expansion phases and towards
a deficit in periods of depression. But note too that, because the budget is
balanced by assumption when GDP takes its average equilibrium value,
the budget disequilibria associated with the business cycle will tend to be
offset over time. The budget balance obtained when GDP takes its trend
equilibrium value (in this case Y*) is called the trend budget balance. In
this respect, in the example analysed here, the trend budget balance
(CNFPB*) can be said to be balanced.
If, starting from the example described, public expenditure on con-
sumption or investment, which had been assumed to be nil, is in-
creased, with all other things remaining constant, the straight line CNF-
PB that appears in Figure I.8 will shift in parallel downwards from
C N F P B1 to CNFPB2, as shown in Figure I.11. The budget will then re-
flect a trend deficit whose value will be the same as the amount of the
hypothetical increase in public expenditure. The new straight line
C N F P B2 will cross the vertical axis in the value –CPB–IPB–TR and will
have the same slope (t) as the previous one, since the tax rate will not
have varied. The vertical distance between both straight lines is
CPB+IPB and, in the new situation, when GDP takes its average equi-
librium value Y*, the trend budget balance will be negative (CNFPB* is
now less than zero).
With the new hypotheses on public expenditure, the cyclical budget
balance will reflect as before a surplus in expansion phases and a deficit
in periods of depression. But now the total or effective budget balance will
only reach a surplus in the period of maximum expansion in GDP, as
seen in Figure I.12, and this will not suffice to offset the greater budget
deficits recorded in periods of depression.
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I.8. Definition of the stabilising effects of fiscal policy
As already noted, general government performs two main functions in
the economy: the redistribution of income and national wealth, through
taxes and transfers, and the provision of non-market services for the
community, through investment and consumption expenditure. In its in-
come redistribution function, fiscal policy has stabilising effects if, through
the tax and transfer system, it ensures that private-sector disposable in-
come fluctuates over the business cycle to a lesser degree than national
income, i.e. if it smooths the fluctuations in private-sector disposable in-
come, helping to support it in recessive phases and to limit its growth in
expansionary phases. In its function as a provider of non-market services
time
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for the community, fiscal policy has stabilising effects if, through general
government investment and consumption, it ensures that national de-
mand fluctuates over the business cycle less than private-sector demand,
helping to support national demand in recessions and to limit its growth in
expansions.
To elucidate this notion of the stabilising effects of fiscal policy, the
case of personal income tax may be considered. This tax has a stabilis-
ing effect on disposable income (after tax) if the latter fluctuates to a less-
er extent than initial income (before tax). The effect occurs when the tax
is progressive, i.e. when its elasticity with respect to initial income is
greater than one or, in other words, when the average tax rate increases
with initial income: both are alternative characterisations of the concept of
tax progressivity. Either of these two characterisations may be applied to
macroeconomic analysis to define the stabilising effects of public revenue
on private-sector disposable income. Besides affecting private-sector dis-
posable income through public revenue (and transfer payments), fiscal
policy also affects aggregate demand in the economy through general
government consumption and investment expenditure. To define the sta-
bilising effects on aggregate demand a formula analogous to the above
formula for revenue is used: public expenditure on goods and services
has a stabilising effect on aggregate demand if its elasticity with respect
to output is less than one or, in other words, if its weight with respect to
output diminishes as the latter increases and vice versa.
Accordingly, the following definition may be formulated: public rev-
enue has stabilising (neutral or destabilising) effects if its weight in output
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is an increasing (constant or decreasing) function of output; public expen-
diture has stabilising (neutral or destabilising) effects if its weight in output
is a decreasing (constant or increasing) function of output; the budget
balance (revenue less expenditure) has stabilising (neutral or destabilis-
ing) effects if its weight in output is an increasing (constant or decreasing)
function of output.
Formally, the above definition may be generalised as follows. Let
V(Y) be an arbitrary differentiable function expressing the dependence of
any variable V on the level of output Y. Differentiating the average func-
tion (V/Y) with respect to Y yields:
d (V/Y)/dY = (V' – V/Y) (1/Y) = (e –1) (V/Y) (1/Y) [I.21]
where V’ is the derivative dV/dY and e = (dV/dY)(Y/V) is the elasticity of V
with respect to Y. The stabilising effects of variable V depend on the sign
of the derivative [I.21]. The term (V’-V/Y) will be called the cyclical sensi -
tivity of variable V with respect to output Y, and as Y>0, the stabilising ef-
fects of V depend on the sign of its cyclical sensitivity, which is equal to
the product of the value of V/Y and its elasticity less one. Consequently, if
V represents an item of public revenue or the budget balance, it will have
stabilising, neutral or destabilising effects, according to whether its cycli-
cal sensitivity is positive, nil or negative. If V represents an item of expen-
diture (public or private), it will have stabilising, neutral or destabilising ef-
fects, depending on whether its cyclical sensitivity is negative, nil or
positive. Hereafter, we shall speak of the cyclical sensitivity of a variable
and its stabilising effect without distinction.
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Before explaining the method which we shall use to estimate the sta-
bilising effects of fiscal policy, two warnings should be given regarding its
interpretation. First, it must be pointed out that according to the above
definition the stabilising effects of public revenue and expenditure do not
depend on the level of these variables, but on the changes therein rela-
tive to the changes in the level of economic activity. Consequently, the
stabilising capacity of fiscal policy is independent of the average level of
the budget balance over the business cycle. Second, it should be noted
that according to this definition the stabilising effect of a variable is al-
ways relative to the fluctuations observed in the level of economic activi-
ty. Such effect says nothing about the scale of the fluctuations or their
long-run trend. Thus, for instance, a tax may stabilise private-sector dis-
posable income in relation to fluctuations in initial income without this im-
plying stabilisation of initial income over time, in the same way that a pro-
gressive tax may redistribute income, making the distribution of
disposable income more equal than that of initial income, without this
guaranteeing that initial income will be distributed more equally in the fu-
ture. In the same vein, government consumption, for example, may help
to smooth fluctuations in aggregate demand in the current period, without
affecting the causes of such fluctuations in the level of aggregate demand
in the future.
The stabilising effects of fiscal policy as defined here are a character-
istic of the economy’s equilibrium that is reflected in the adjustments in
fiscal variables in relation to the fluctuations in real output, i.e. in a rela-
tionship between endogenous variables. If an exogenous source of insta-
bility is assumed to exist, the dynamic equilibrium of the economy may
follow an unstable or explosive path, and at the same time fiscal policy
may have stabilising effects in each period. As our purpose here is to
study the stabilising effects of fiscal policy in the framework of macroeco-
nomic equilibrium, it may be useful to give one last, complete and simple
example of the stabilising effects that can be expected to be observed in
a stationary equilibrium and in an unstable equilibrium.
Let us take an economy in which the private consumption function is
C = 0.8 (Y-T), the investment function is I = 0.2Y and the imports function
is M = 0.2Y. Exports (X) are exogenous, as are public expenditure (G)
and revenue (T), which are assumed to be constant and equal (G = 10 =T ) .
The budget balance will therefore always be balanced. If exports are as-
sumed to fluctuate (with the income of the rest of the world, for instance)
between 16 and 20 around an average of 18, the output of the economy
will fluctuate between 90 and 110, and despite the nil cyclical sensitivity
of the budget balance, this is the result of public expenditure with stabilis-
ing effects on aggregate demand (because this expenditure reflects neg-
ative cyclical sensitivity) and of public revenue with destabilising effects
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on private-sector disposable income (because it also reflects negative
cyclical sensitivity of the same magnitude as that of expenditure). In this
economy, exports are by assumption the destabilising element that in-
duces GDP cycles, but private consumption also contributes to desta-
bilise equilibrium, whereas investment and imports are neutral, and public
expenditure is the only stabilising element that smooths the fluctuations in
output. Note that the origin of the pro-cyclical change in the weight of pri-
vate consumption in output lies in the destabilising influence exerted by
the constant tax on private disposable income, because the hypothetical
consumption function has unitary consumption elasticity with respect to
private-sector disposable income. It is easy to check that the cyclical fluc-
tuations in GDP around their average are 10%, as are those in invest-
ment and imports, whereas the fluctuations in exports and private con-
sumption – like those of disposable income – are somewhat more than
11.1%.
To illustrate the existence of the stabilising effects of fiscal policy in
an economy on a path of unstable equilibrium, the above example may
be enriched by explicitly introducing a dynamic structure. The easiest
method is to assume that investment has an accelerator mechanism of
the type incorporated in the following investment function, dependent on
lagged private consumption:
I = 0.2Y + a [C – C(–1)] [I.22]
where a is the accelerator coefficient and C(–1) is the previous year’s pri-
vate consumption. The equilibrium output continues to depend on the val-
ue of exports (Y* = 5X + 10) and is not affected by the new form of the in-
vestment function, which is only relevant for the dynamic adjustment
outside the equilibrium position, because the accelerator coefficient a
only begins to function when current consumption C differs from the pre-
vious year’s consumption C(–1). With this new investment function, the
shift from one equilibrium position to another is not instantaneous or auto-
matic, but follows a dynamic process governed by the equation in first dif-
ferences:
Y = [(X+2)/(0.2 – 0.8a)] – [0.8a/(0.2–0.8a)] Y(–1) [I.23]
The stability or convergence of the dynamic process depends on the
values of the accelerator and the multiplier (which in this example is 5),
because it is necessary for the coefficient of Y(–1) in the expression [I.23]
to be less than one. Therefore the process will be convergent if a is less
than 0.125, but if a is equal to 0.125 the process will be stable, generat-
ing a cycle of constant amplitude around the equilibrium, and if a is
greater than 0.125 the process will be divergent, generating cycles of in-
creasing amplitude around the equilibrium.
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Assuming a = 0.15 and starting from the initial equilibrium with X = 18
and Y = 100, exports increase to X = 20, and the new equilibrium Y = 110
cannot be attained, and instead the economy will fluctuate around this
new equilibrium with increasingly ample cycles. In this case, only the lim-
ited elasticity of supply and the growing external imbalance would be ca-
pable of restraining the explosive fluctuations in aggregate demand. How-
ever, the instability of aggregate demand could be allayed if fiscal policy
were able to stabilise the fluctuations in private-sector disposable income,
reducing the value of the multiplier until its interaction with the hypotheti-
cal accelerator (a = 0.15) makes the dynamic process governing the
economy’s adjustment converge between the two equilibria.
If the tax system is changed, substituting the fixed tax by a progres-
sive tax of the type
T = 0.2Y – 10 [I.24]
the value of the multiplier will be reduced to (1/0.36), a little more than
half its previous value. The equilibrium value of output will now be Y = (18
+ X)/0.36, and assuming X = 18, the result is Y = 100. If exports increase
to X = 20, the new equilibrium will be approximately Y = 105.56, and the
dynamic adjustment process will be governed by the equation 
Y = [(18 + X)/(0.36 – 0.64a)] – [0.064/(0.36 – 0.64a)] Y(–1)[I.25]
and will be convergent. The budget balance, which was initially balanced,
will reflect a slight surplus in the new equilibrium and will record pro-cycli-
cal fluctuations in the convergence process, characterised by cycles of
decreasing amplitude. If the positive and negative shocks to exports are
altered over time, as assumed in the first example, the economy will fol-
low a convergent cyclical pattern whose development may be very com-
plex. Note, however, that the dynamic adjustment process in this new
economy will be divergent if the accelerator becomes greater than
0.28125. In this case, fiscal policy helps to stabilise private-sector dispos-
able income and aggregate demand in each period, but the fluctuations in
these variables are of increasing amplitude and follow an unstable path,
which will only be restrained by restrictions not formally included in the
model, such as supply or external sector constraints. It may therefore be
concluded that the existence of stabilising effects in an economy in each
period does not presume that the economy’s behaviour will remain con-
vergent or explosive over time.
In the theoretical analysis of the stabilising effects of fiscal policy a
distinction is easily made between discretionary effects, produced by a
change in the variables controlled by the authorities (for instance, the
substitution of a fixed tax by a progressive tax in the example just given),
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and automatic effects that occur because of fluctuations in the level of
economic activity, with the variables controlled by authorities remaining
constant. Nonetheless, in applied analysis it is very difficult, if not impos-
sible, to separate the two types of effect. Here our thesis is that the stabil-
ising effects of fiscal policy, whether discretionary or automatic in origin,
are reflected in the fluctuations actually observed in fiscal variables with
respect to fluctuations in output, and that they may be identified and esti-
mated through a simple statistical procedure, which is set out in the next
section, although this procedure does not tell us their origin or their trans-
mission mechanism. 
This study is concerned with the effects produced by the adjustments
in fiscal variables in the short run. It does not analyse the impact of such
adjustments on future economic growth or on its fluctuations, nor does it
address the problem of the sustainability of the fiscal policies applied.
Broadly speaking, fiscal policy is understood to have stabilising effects on
the business cycle if the changes observed in general government rev-
enue and expenditure help to smooth the influence of the business cycle
on private-sector disposable income and on the aggregate spending of
the national economy. This notion of a stabilising fiscal policy differs from
the policy associated with discretionary interventions by the authorities to
ensure that the economy remains permanently on a desired path.
If economies functioned in the manner of an automatic mechanism,
responding predictably to economic policy measures, it would not only be
possible to smooth cyclical fluctuations but to eliminate them altogether. It
is now generally accepted that this is not an attainable objective, and
economic theory has created models showing us that cyclical fluctuations
are a consequence of the rational behaviour of economic agents rather
than an undesired deviation from a path of stable equilibrium. Cyclical
fluctuations of the level of economic activity may at the same time be a
property of its dynamic equilibrium and, nonetheless, have undesirable
consequences from a social or political point of view, just as a competi-
tive equilibrium may imply unequal income distribution according to cer-
tain criteria. Fiscal policy may attempt to modify these undesirable fea-
tures of an economy by following a set of more or less discretionary
criteria and rules of conduct, which private agents will bear in mind, view-
ing them as restrictions, when taking decisions to attain their own particu-
lar objectives. This study seeks to find out whether the criteria and rules
of conduct guiding the authorities in the performance of their functions, in
combination with the decisions of other economic agents and with exoge-
nous factors of all kinds, have had stabilising effects on the fluctuations
actually observed in economic growth. It will not examine what these crite-
ria or rules were at any given time, nor whether their application was auto-
matic or discretionary: its aim is solely to find out what the results were.
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I.9. Method of estimating the stabilising effects of fiscal policy
The basic series for estimating the stabilising effects of fiscal policy
are those of current values of the variables which appear in the general
government accounts, expressed as percentages of GDP at current
prices. Two things are achieved by taking these ratios as a reference: a)
the magnitudes of the fiscal policy at current prices are deflated by the
GDP deflator (v = V/p), and b) these deflated magnitudes are expressed
in terms of their weight with respect to GDP at constant prices (v/y). In
this study the cyclical sensitivity of the variables will be estimated directly
from the national accounts series, applying the definition set out in the
previous section. The equation to be estimated is obtained by expressing
the cyclical sensitivity of a variable V, defined in the expression [I.21], as
follows:
d (V/Y) = (V' – V/Y) (dY/Y)
To estimate the cyclical sensitivity the following approximation is
used:
d (V/Y) = (V/Y) – (V–1/Y–1) = (v/y) – (v–1/y–1)
i.e. the dependent variable of the equation to be estimated will be the an-
nual change in the weight with respect to output of variable V, whose
cyclical sensitivity it is wished to evaluate. It can thus be said that the an-
nual change in the nominal variable V, deflated by the GDP deflator (p),
and expressed as a percentage of GDP at constant prices (y), is the de-
pendent variable of the equation to be estimated, which will be consid-
ered a function of GDP at constant prices v = v(y). Consequently, the in-
dependent variable of the equation will be the rate of change of GDP at
constant prices:
d Y/Y = (y – y–1) / y–1
In correlating the change in the weight of a «real» variable (v=V/p) in
“real” GDP (y) with the rate of change of «real» GDP, we are estimating
the real cyclical sensitivity of this variable and not its nominal cyclical sen-
sitivity, although said variable in nominal terms (V) depends on nominal
GDP (Y). To illustrate the difference between the real and nominal cycli-
cal sensitivity of a variable, we may examine the combined effect that the
progressivity of income tax and inflation exert on the estimation of the
real cyclical sensitivity of this tax (see Figure I.13). Let us assume the tax
is levied on nominal income (T = A + bY, A<0, 0<b<1) and that the latter
increases from Y0 to Y1, partly as a result of the growth in prices from p0
to p1 and partly due to the increase in real income from y0 t  y1. The tax
rate goes from t0 o t1. If the tax were only levied on the increase in real
income, the tax rate would go from t0 to r, because income at constant
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prices rose from p0y0 to p0y1. The increase in the tax rate from tr to 1 is
due to the combined influence of tax progressivity and inflation. If the in-
crease observed in the average tax rate (t1–t0) were correlated with the
relative increase in nominal income (Y1–Y0)/Y0, we would be estimating
the nominal cyclical sensitivity of the tax, defined by the function T. If, in-
stead, it were correlated with the rate of change in real income (y1–y0)/y0,
we would be estimating the real cyclical sensitivity of the tax, defined im-
plicitly by the straight line Test (1), which is greater than the nominal, due
to the increase in the tax rate that induces inflation through the progres-
sivity of the tax. The “real” weight of the tax went from t0 to t1, while “real”
income went from y0 to y1. The fact that part of this change may be ex-
plained by the effect of inflation, rather than by a change in the tax regu-
lations, for instance, will not be taken into account in estimating the real
cyclical sensitivity of this variable, nor will a distinction be drawn between
automatic and discretionary changes in fiscal policy.
In short, the equation used to estimate the cyclical sensitivity of a
variable V will be of the type::
(v/y) – (v–1/y–1) = a [(y – y–1)/y–1] + C + u
a being the estimated cyclical sensitivity coefficient, C a constant and u
the error term. Both the dependent and the independent variables so de-
fined can be expected to be stationary. The main reason for estimating
the cyclical sensitivity of a variable directly, instead of its elasticity with re-
spect to GDP, lies in the fact that such sensitivity expresses the relation-
ship between the changes in this variable as percentages of GDP and the
real rate of growth of output; therefore, the cyclical sensitivities of differ-
ent variables may be added and subtracted, which is not possible with
elasticities. This additivity characteristic is useful insofar as it makes it
easy to express the cyclical sensitivities of the aggregates and balances
in terms of the cyclical sensitivities of their components, preserving the
accounting relationship which exists between the original series in the na-
tional accounts framework and thus facilitating the interpretation of the
relative stabilising effects of the different variables.
To place the analysis of the stabilising effects of fiscal policy in the
proper context, it is necessary to consider the problems of economic
growth and the economic policy decisions taken by governments to cope
with these problems and to attain their objectives. To this end we shall
describe in broad strokes what these problems have been and the stabili-
sation policies taken in the countries studied. The development of busi-
(1) Test is the line that goes through the point of the line t0*, which corresponds to the
value p0y0 of the horizontal axis, and through the point of the line t1*, which corresponds to
the value p0y1 of the horizontal axis.
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ness cycles is related to the changes in the structure of demand, which in
turn depend on the changes in the distribution of national income. Ac-
cordingly, the cyclical adjustments in income and in consumption and in-
vestment expenditure by sector are ultimately reflected in the relationship
between their net lending or net borrowing and the growth of the econo-
my. The dynamics of the business cycle are basically associated with
fluctuations in private investment, which expands aggregate demand in
upturns and contracts it in downswings. The reactions of the other com-
ponents of demand tend to perform the function of offsetting or stabilising
the fluctuations in private investment. Thus the relative weight of invest-
ment in national demand increases during expansion phases, at the ex-
pense of the weight of private and government consumption. Considering
the internal composition of GDP from the viewpoint of demand, when the
expansion of the relative weight of investment is not totally offset by the
contraction of the relative weight of consumption (or that of exports,
which is generally not very sensitive to the domestic cycle), the relative
weight of imports in output adjusts to cover the difference.
Briefly stated, private-sector decisions to increase real investment in
a cyclical upturn may be financed by increasing private and public saving,
thus avoiding a current-account deficit, or by resorting to external saving
if the increase in domestic saving is not sufficient to finance the invest-
ment and, as a result, national demand is greater than GDP and there is
a current-account deficit. The opposite occurs in cyclical downturns. Pri-
vate investment contracts, probably because productive capacity is per-
ceived to be more than enough to meet the observed or forecast de-
mand. It is then no longer necessary to sustain such a high proportion of
private and public saving in relation to output as in the expansion phase,
but instead it is possible to reduce it and to adjust current demand to pro-
ductive capacity. These cyclical adjustments do not presume that private
investment or any other demand component is the cause of the fluctua-
tions in the level of economic activity. The intention here is not to investi-
gate the causes of business cycles, but only to describe the contribution
of fiscal policy to their stabilisation.
To study the stabilising effects of fiscal policy in the main industri-
alised countries, the accounting framework described above is used. All
the statistical information is from the AMECO data base of the Directorate
General of Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission,
including the estimates for 1996 and the forecasts for 1997 made by its
Technical Services in November 1996. The series available in the data
base used are not entirely homogeneous, and small differences persist
between the aggregates and balances and the additions and subtractions
of their components. To maintain strict additivity, a criterion of always us-
ing the aggregate or the balance resulting from adding and subtracting the
components was applied, although the differences in the estimates are in-
42
variably negligible. The same approach will be followed in the analysis of
the stabilising effects of fiscal policy in each of the countries studied.
First, we shall examine the cyclical sensitivity of total general govern-
ment revenue and expenditure, as well as that of their balance [net lend-
ing (+) or net borrowing (–)], by means of simple regressions of the annu-
al changes in their weight as percentages of GDP at current prices on the
annual rate of change of GDP at constant prices. These regressions al-
low an overall assessment to be made of the stabilising or destabilising
influence of fiscal policy.
Second, we shall study the stabilising effects of the income redistribu-
tion operations performed by general government, through its revenue
and current transfers, on the gross disposable income of the rest of the
sectors making up the national economy. These effects are associated
with the cyclical sensitivity of the respective income redistribution opera-
tions, and are estimated by regressing the annual changes in each of the
variables as percentages of GDP at current prices (or, in other words, the
changes in the current value of the variable, deflated with the GDP defla-
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tor, as percentages of GDP at constant prices) on the annual rates of
change of GDP at constant prices.
Third, we shall analyse the stabilising effects of decisions (public and
private) to spend on goods and services in relation to the gross dispos-
able incomes of both sectors, i.e. the consumption/saving and invest-
ment/borrowing decisions of general government and other resident sec-
tors and their impact on the national economy as a whole. As in the case
of income redistribution operations, the stabilising effects of the different
sectors’ consumption and investment expenditure at current prices on ag-
gregate spending are associated with the cyclical sensitivity of the re-
spective variables, and are estimated by regressing the annual changes
in these variables at current prices as percentages of GDP at current
prices (or else the current value of the variable, deflated with the GDP de-
flator, as percentages of GDP at constant prices) on the annual rates of
change of GDP at constant prices. As is later shown, the inertia in the
movement of prices or deflators and the rigidity of relative prices ensure
that the stabilisation of spending at current prices is almost entirely
passed through to demand and output at constant prices. The difference
between the cyclical sensitivity of a component of demand at current
prices and at constant prices depends solely on changes in the deflator of
that component relative to the GDP deflator. To the extent that prices (de-
flators) fluctuate less than amounts (volume indices) and that there are
no sharp changes in relative deflators, one would not generally expect
significant differences between the estimate of the stabilising effects of a
demand component measured one way or the other.
In describing the cyclical sensitivity of the variables analysed, the
same type of graphic depiction in panel form, consisting of charts whose
variables are related in accounting terms, will be given for all cases. Each
panel will be presented according to the chapter and the order in which it
appears in the text, and the charts of the variables will be so named and
will be presented in two columns. The left-hand column will show the cur-
rent values of the variables as percentages of GDP at current prices, with
the sole exception of the rate of change of GDP at constant prices. The
right-hand column will show, through lines, the deviations – from the
average of the period analysed – of the annual changes as percentages
of GDP of these same variables, measured in the right scale, and,
through vertical bars, the deviations – from the average of the period
analysed – of the annual rate of change of GDP at constant prices, mea-
sured in the left scale. The left-hand column will illustrate the structure
and the trend of the original series of the variables studied. The right-
hand column will give an idea of the relationship between the deviations
which have just been defined, a relationship referred to as the cyclical
sensitivity of the variables. Hereafter, to abbreviate, we shall speak of
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fluctuations in these variables and of fluctuations in growth to denote
these deviations – with respect to the average in the period – in the annu-
al variations of each variable as percentages of GDP and of the annual
rate of change in GDP at constant prices, respectively.
As noted, the stabilising effect of any variable is estimated on the ba-
sis of simple ordinary least squares regression. In this regression what
we are interested in studying is the sign and the magnitude of the esti-
mated coefficient and its stability over the sample period, as well as the
value resulting from the correlation coefficient. The estimates were made
with the Eviews programme of MICRO TSP for windows, and the estima-
tion routine involves the following steps: first, the most important charac-
teristics of the series (average, median, extremes, standard deviation,
normality of the histogram, etc.) are examined, and the augmented Dick-
ey-Fuller test is applied to check their stationarity. The ordinary least
squares regression is then run to find the value of the cyclical sensitivity
coefficient of the variable analysed, as previously defined. The t-ratio is
used to evaluate its significance, and the adjusted coefficient of determi-
nation is used to evaluate the growth relationship. Once the significance
of the estimated coefficient of cyclical sensitivity has been studied, its sta-
bility over the sample period is analysed through a recursive estimation
based on ordinary least squares and by running the pertinent tests (RSS,
or residual sum of squares, prediction of the next period, etc.).
To evaluate the significance of the estimated coefficient, the charac-
teristics of the regression’s residuals are analysed, and, more specifically,
various tests (Q, Breusch-Godfrey, ARCH) are run to determine the pos-
sible existence of autocorrelation between them. In the most frequent
problem, involving the existence of significant first-order autocorrelation
(absolute value of the coefficient greater than one divided by the square
root of the number of observations included in the estimate), a correction
is made by introducing an AR(1) term in the initial equation, whereby the
equation becomes non-linear and it is estimated by applying a Marquardt
algorithm for non-linear least squares. This correction is purely statistical,
but it allows us to find out whether the previously estimated value of the
coefficient, its t-ratio and correlation change when the residual autocorre-
lation is smoothed, because the interpretation of these values does not
change. When there are more complicated autocorrelations between the
residuals of the original regression, an analogous procedure is followed,
since there are no limits on introducing AR and MA terms in the specifica-
tion of the equation. The objective of this ARMA modeling is to find a par-
simonious representation of the process that determines the residuals, so
that the initial autocorrelation is sufficiently smoothed, providing a more
reliable valuation of the estimated coefficient of cyclical sensitivity. How-
ever, this correction is not always possible, because the roots of the AR
45
and MA polynomials occasionally have a module of less than one, indi-
cating that the autoregressive process is explosive or that the moving av-
erage process is not invertible.
The structure of the tables which summarise the results of the estima-
tions will also be the same for all the countries studied, and they are num-
bered according to the chapter and the order in which they appear. They
provide information on the average change in each variable over the peri-
od analysed, the scale of its fluctuations and its cyclical sensitivity. The
first two columns in the tables show the average and the standard devia-
tion of each of the dependent variables in the estimated regressions (an-
nual changes as percentages of GDP of the different items of govern-
ment revenue and expenditure, components of demand, etc.). Also
shown, as memorandum items, are the average and standard deviation
of the independent variable of these regressions (annual rate of change
of GDP at constant prices in all cases). The third column gives the esti-
mated coefficients of cyclical sensitivity, the fourth the t-ratios of these co-
efficients, the fifth the Durbin-Watson statistic, and the sixth the adjusted
coefficient of determination.
To summarise, the changes in the variables used for the analysis and
their graphic depiction are the following: a) the original series are drawn
from the AMECO data base, measured in national currencies at current
prices (all variables) and constant prices (GDP and demand compo-
nents); b) percentages of GDP at current prices of all the variables mea-
sured at current prices (which figure on the left-hand side of the charts in
the next chapters) and the percentages of GDP at constant prices of the
demand components measured at constant prices; c) the annual rate of
change of GDP at constant prices, which will be the independent variable
in all the regressions; d) the annual changes in the variables as percent-
ages of GDP, which will be the dependent variables in the regressions,
and e) for the representation on the right-hand side of the charts in Chap-
ters III to IX, the deviations of the variables in the regressions from the
average in the period: the rate of change of GDP at constant prices (the
independent variable, represented by vertical bars, measured in the left
scale of the charts) and the annual changes in the dependent variables
(represented by lines, measured in the right scale of the charts). In the
charts where the components of demand appear, the gray line refers to
the variables at current prices and the black line to the variables at con-
stant prices.
II
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK: ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND STABILISATION POLICIES (1960-1995)
The characterisation of the stabilising effects of fiscal policy in the
main industrialised countries and Spain, addressed in Chapters III to IX,
is best understood against the general backdrop of the growth and stabili-
sation problems encountered by their economies. Although the specific
problems of each country are dealt with in the introduction to these chap-
ters, the more general problems evidenced to a greater or lesser extent in
all the countries in question are described in the present chapter.
II.1. Economic growth and stabilisation policies in the sixties
In November 1961, at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers of
the OECD, the member countries set the objective of increasing their to-
tal national production by 50 % in the period 1960-1970. In establishing
this target, the Council emphasised that orderly, sustained growth would
require price stability, as well as adequate equilibrium in international
payments. By May 1970 it was clear that the growth target set in 1961
had been surpassed, having reached 55 %, representing a compound av-
erage growth rate of around 4.5 % annually. A number of structural
changes made this wave of economic prosperity possible, while also
helping to ensure more stable growth. Among others, these changes in-
cluded the rapid shift in labour away from agriculture to industry and to
services in particular – with unprecedented gains in productivity, greater
in agriculture than in industry, and greater in industry than in services–
and the moderate increase in the weight of public spending in output,
which proved compatible with continued high saving and investment
rates.
Projections for the seventies pointed towards a quickening in eco-
nomic growth to 5.3 % annually, signifying 65 % to 70 % growth in the
47
GDP of the OECD as a whole in the decade. But, even though the growth
targets for the sixties had been met and the outlook was promising, the
same could not be said of the other goals established in 1961: a) eco-
nomic fluctuations had eased but were still a cause for concern; b) price
stability was far from being achieved; c) within each country, the fruit of
economic growth had been unequally distributed, with poverty persisting
in certain sectors and geographical areas; d) there was a growing gap
between industrialised and backward countries, and aid to developing
countries had hardly risen, and e) the significant imbalance in trade and
international payments had unleashed frequent monetary crises. 
The fluctuations in economic growth had similar origins in all coun-
tries. While demand and output grew rapidly, the authorities allowed the
expansion to continue unchecked until strong pressures on the labour
market, unacceptably high price rises and, in many cases, balance-of-
payments deficits emerged. Strict measures were then taken to curb the
growth in demand, and these restrictions prevailed until production sta-
bilised and unemployment rose. The authorities then swiftly reversed
their restrictive measures and allowed the expansion to begin again.
Thus the view was that, during both the upturns and the downswings in
the business cycle, the measures required by the situation were nearly al-
ways taken too late and were set in motion too slowly. This succession of
stop-go measures naturally had undesirable repercussions for private in-
vestment planning and for smooth wage growth; it also distracted the at-
tention of economic policy-makers, who were busily intervening in the
economy rather than focusing on medium-term objectives. Given the po-
litical and institutional obstacles that made any rapid or agile line of action
in this field difficult, the delay in the authorities’ response invariably led to
problems.
In addition to the disparity in growth associated with cyclical fluctua-
tions, the two other problems of the sixties were inflation and trade imbal-
ances. Inflationary trends became increasingly pronounced, and prob-
lems of price escalation arose whenever the expansion in demand was
allowed to run beyond productive capacity or to hit bottlenecks in the
labour market. It was believed that a more agile and timelier manipulation
of aggregate demand through temporary economic policy measures
would help to allay price tensions. But monetary and fiscal policies alone
were not enough to guarantee orderly growth, and this led governments
to resort to other measures as well, such as incomes and structural poli-
cies (employment, regional and sectoral measures, and policies aimed at
improving the play of competition). But incomes policies also failed to pro-
duce the expected effects. On the one hand, as long as the level of de-
mand remained very high, incomes policy invariably proved too weak to
resist the pressure of market forces. On the other hand, conflicts arose
between the notion of efficiency and what social partners considered fair -
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to ensure efficiency required some wages to grow beyond the average
that governments recommended or considered acceptable, while the oth-
er wage-earners did not want to accept lower growth in their own earn-
ings. When strict guidelines were set, the wage drift produced by various
items and channels ultimately caused wages to overshoot the limits set,
because wage-earners invariably rejected the effects of an incomes poli-
cy that weighed exclusively on earned income. Also, as a general rule,
the sectors where productivity gains were more pronounced found it intol-
erable that their real earnings were growing more slowly than their pro-
ductivity. In the area of structural policies, provisions aimed at training or
recycling workers in sectors characterised by rising unemployment were
frequently enacted, as were policies to protect or restructure obsolete in-
dustries and to enhance the play of competitive mechanisms in order to
eliminate structural rigidities and imbalances.
As to the distribution of the fruit of economic growth within each coun-
try, society became increasingly sensitive to the costs exacted by this
growth in terms of pollution, environmental degradation and over-populat-
ed cities, while at the same time expectations were high in areas such as
education, health and social security. The basic dilemma facing all ad-
vanced economies was how to reconcile relatively stable economic
growth with the provision of a social security network for people less
favoured by the country’s overall prosperity. This fragile balance was in-
evitably upset by frequent deviations in one direction or another. After the
years of buoyant economic growth in the fifties and sixties, there was a
heightened awareness that some groups in society had remained on the
sidelines of prosperity and that the resources existed for meeting their
more pressing needs, which caused redistributive public spending pro-
grammes to be broadened. The intention was to guarantee a minimum
level of well-being for all citizens, seen as an individual right for which the
State was responsible, and countries aspired to create welfare states
without undermining economic efficiency, trusting that the trend growth in
productivity would continue unchanged. But the experience of the more
advanced countries suggested that such programmes, when made exten-
sive to the entire population, tended to erode the incentives to work and
to save. This was true both in the case of the poorer members of society,
who became permanently dependent on welfare benefits, falling into what
are known as the unemployment and poverty traps, and in the case of the
affluent, who had to pay higher tax rates and looked for ways to ease
their tax burden. The outcome was ultimately a decline in productivity and
growth [Boskin (1987)].
Meanwhile, the development gap between rich and poor countries
was also cause for concern and a potential source of economic and politi-
cal instability in a world divided by the cold war, and where many coun-
tries had only recently gained political independence and were debating
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between a market economy and Soviet-style socialism, while fuelling na-
tionalisms that sharpened their identity. Competition between the industri-
alised countries for the control of natural resources – especially oil and
other raw materials – and the increasingly low prices of these resources
on international markets in relation to manufacturing prices intensified the
economic dependence of new nations on the richer countries, dashing
their expectations of development. The oil crises of the seventies were a
dramatic symptom of this situation of economic disequilibrium and politi-
cal conflict.
Lastly, it also became clear that the imbalances in international trade
relations and payments were a threat to harmonious economic develop-
ment, because the measures taken by an individual country or group of
countries to rectify their trade deficits created the risk of causing a con-
traction in world trade and production unless the effects were offset by
the application of expansionary measures in economies with surplus bal-
ances. Throughout the sixties payments imbalances were a persistent
problem, setting off several short-lived monetary crises of a speculative
nature. There were two main sources of disequilibria: fluctuations in de-
mand in the short run, for which the more systematic application of stabili-
sation policies was recommended, and the divergence between domestic
and export prices, for which the remedy suggested was greater attention
to the role of exchange rates as a corrective for these imbalances. The
restrictions imposed on national policies by the international monetary
system of fixed exchange rates were viewed by some countries as an ob-
stacle to economic growth and by others as a source of imported infla-
tion. The incompatibility between the policies applied by the main industri-
alised countries and the potential for output growth in conditions of price
stability led to the crisis of the Bretton Woods system, paving the way for
even greater disequilibria and the slowdown in economic growth in the
seventies.
The intrinsic weakness of the Bretton Woods system, in which the
dollar became the de facto reserve currency, was underscored by R. Trif-
fin in 1959 (see Gold and the Dollar Crisis. The Future of Convertibility,
Yale University Press, 1960, Chapters VI and VII). If demand for reserves
grew faster than the gold available to meet this demand, then only a
growing supply of dollars – the only convertible currency – could cover
the difference. But if the United States provided the necessary liquidity to
the system, incurring a persistent balance-of-payments deficit, a problem
of lack of long-run confidence in the dollar’s convertibility would arise, un-
dermining the system’s stability and possibly causing its collapse. Such
was the course of events in the sixties, whose milestones are outlined be-
low (see H. James, International Monetary Co-operation since Bretton
Woods).
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In mid-1960 the total external liabilities of the United States exceed-
ed, for the first time ever, the value of its gold reserves at the official price
of $35 per ounce, upward pressures erupted in the price of gold on the
London free market – reaching $40 in October – and an informal gold
pool was created (the United States, Germany, France, the United King-
dom, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland) to keep the price of gold
stable at around its official price. In 1964, as a consequence of rapid
growth in the world economy and increasing trade and balance-of-pay-
ments disequilibria, the demand for reserves rose much more swiftly than
the supply of gold. The United States maintained its balance-of-payments
deficit, supplying the dollars necessary to ensure the system’s liquidity,
and its liabilities to foreign monetary authorities surpassed the coverage
provided by its gold reserves, valued at the official price of $35 per
ounce. In the following years the problem of long-run confidence in the
dollar’s convertibility was compounded by short-term problems of a simi-
lar nature, derived at least in part from the fact that several European
countries, such as France, insisted on converting their dollar reserves
into gold as a way of pressuring the United States to eliminate its bal-
ance-of-payments deficit. France withdrew from the gold pool in mid-1967
after converting nearly all its reserves into gold. This growing lack of con-
fidence was first evidenced in the system’s weakest point, namely the
p o u n d ,whose devaluation in November 1967 diverted these foreign ex-
change pressures straight in the direction of the dollar. Given the magni-
tude of the speculative pressures unleashed in the early months of 1968,
the gold pool agreed in March to stop intervening in the free market, re-
serving the gold held by the monetary authorities for transactions among
themselves. At the same time, they stated their intention of keeping bal-
ance-of-payments problems in check through co-ordinated fiscal and mon-
etary measures – restrictive in deficit-running countries and expansionary
in those with surpluses – to preserve the prevailing exchange-rate parities.
Despite the relative calm on markets in 1969 and 1970, the system
remained extremely fragile. On the one hand, the attempts to co-ordinate
economic policies ran up against the countries’ different priorities in the
area of economic growth targets and inflation control. On the other hand,
exchange-rate stability was unsustainable at the existing parities which,
given the persistence in balance-of-payments disequilibria, indicated a
substantial undervaluation of several currencies – above all, the German
D-Mark and the yen – against the dollar. It was widely believed that the
capital flows which tended to exert pressure on official exchange rates
were of a speculative nature, and that there was no fundamental disequi-
librium in current-account balances requiring an adjustment in parities.
However, the different cyclical positions of the main industrialised coun-
tries in the period 1969-1971 only sharpened the divergence in economic
policies, eventually causing the collapse of the fixed exchange-rate system.
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The United States, France and the United Kingdom appeared to be drift-
ing towards a recession, while the economies of Germany and Japan
were expanding rapidly. In August 1969 the French franc was devalued
by nearly 11 % against the dollar as part of a policy intended to revive
economic growth in France. In October of that year, after absorbing a
vast volume of dollars in its reserves, Germany revalued the D-Mark by
9.3 % against the dollar. Amid a recession in the US economy in 1970,
Nixon decided to apply a clearly expansionary fiscal policy, backed by the
Federal Reserve, and Britain’s conservative government followed suit.
At the beginning of 1971 an acute crisis set in – reflected in the dol-
lar’s flight towards currencies then considered to be stronger – as a result
of expectations that the United States would record its first trade deficit
that year since 1893. In March, with the main European countries failing
to reach a consensus, Germany allowed the D-Mark to float. The guilder
followed. The Swiss franc and Austria’s schilling were revalued. In August
1971 Nixon ordered the abandonment of the dollar’s convertibility into
gold and established a surcharge on imports in a bid – unsuccessful – to
rein in the US balance-of-payments deficit. In December of the same year
the Smithsonian Agreement on the realignment of parities was reached,
while at the same time the margin of currency fluctuations was widened
from the 1.25 % previously authorised by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to 2.25 %. The dollar was devalued from $35 to $38 per ounce of
gold. Germany, Belgium and Holland revalued. Italy and the Scandina-
vian countries devalued their currencies against gold but not against the
dollar. But these realignments were not enough, especially the devalua-
tion of the dollar, which in early 1972 traded at $44 per ounce on the free
gold market. As a result, the expected return of funds to the United States
failed to materialise. And these funds continued to be the fuel for specula-
tive movements in European markets: in June 1972 freely floated sterling
began to depreciate, and by August the price of gold had risen to $70 an
ounce. In February 1973 Nixon announced his intention of devaluing the
dollar by a further 10 %, triggering a fresh flight of dollars and causing the
price of gold to rise to $90 per ounce by the end of the month. This put
other currencies under extremely heavy pressure, and foreign exchange
markets were shut down for two weeks in early March, when a floating
exchange-rate system was introduced, ending nearly 30 years of fixed
exchange rates.
The conditions for the crisis of the Bretton Woods monetary system,
which had satisfactorily instrumented payments during the period of eco-
nomic growth immediately after World War II, were laid by the excessive
expansion in international liquidity in the sixties, stemming from the ac-
tivist economic policies of the United States and other industrialised
countries, which aspired to keep their economies on a permanent path of
full employment by stimulating growth in demand whenever the pace
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of economic activity flagged. Due to this activism, inhibited only by the re-
strictions imposed by the international monetary system on all countries
except the United States, inflationary strains began to simmer and would
ultimately emerge in full force several years later once the element of
nominal anchorage provided by fixed exchange rates had vanished.
Prices underwent an unprecedented escalation in the seventies, due to
the economic policies applied in the aftermath of the inflationary and re-
cessive shocks produced by the drastic jump in oil prices in the final quar-
ter of 1973. This, too, shattered another of the pillars on which the growth
in industrialised economies had rested in previous decades: the cheap
and abundant supply of energy.
II.2. The crises of the seventies
The long wave of prosperity in the economies of OECD countries,
which had lasted more than a quarter of a century, floundered after the
first oil shock in 1973. The new energy situation – with a major impact on
relative prices, the real incomes of nations and payments balances – was
unquestionably one of the factors that triggered the greater instability and
sharp deterioration in economic activity, in terms of conventional macroe-
conomic indicators, that beset all industrialised countries from then on-
wards. Fundamental imbalances were reflected in inflation, unemploy-
ment, budget deficits, private-sector saving/investment ratios and
current-account deficits. But these imbalances, which intensified in the
seventies, had much earlier origins, and the conditions had been laid by
the activist economic policies of the main industrialised countries.
In the fifties and the sixties, the expansion in the public sector had
been relatively limited and took place in a setting of nominal stability and
high real growth in economies, nourishing a strong optimism regarding
the potential of economic policy, and fiscal policy in particular, to promote
and stabilise high growth rates without causing significant imbalances.
The most common opinion held by economists at the time was that the
size of the public sector in most economies was smaller than desirable,
and that it should be enlarged to further the goals of efficiency, fairness
and stability in the allocation of resources. The stance and the objectives
– and also the risks – of the activist fiscal policy of the sixties were clearly
set out by Walter W. Heller, who chaired the Council of Economic Advi-
sors under Kennedy and Johnson, in his book New Dimensions of Eco -
nomic Policy (New York, Norton, 1967). In his view, by the mid-sixties a
sort of consensus had been reached among economists on at least one
point: “... we agree that the economy cannot regulate itself. We are now
certain that the government must act to provide essential stability to em-
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ployment and growth levels which the market mechanism, on its own,
cannot provide.” This certainty regarding the capacity of government in-
tervention to improve on the play of the market in the area of economic
stability was derived from the belief in the applicability of Keynesian theo-
ries: “In economic policy, the day of the Neanderthal man – in other
words, pre-Keynesian man – belongs to the past.” ... “Today we finally
accept what was accepted by law 20 years ago (the Employment Act of
1946), namely, that the federal government has a much greater responsi-
bility in the nation’s stability and economic growth. We have finally em-
ployed monetary and fiscal policy aggressively to achieve this end.” But,
as the decade of the seventies unfolded, the opinion of economists and
politicians as to the stabilising possibilities of fiscal measures turned pes-
simistic, as the expansion in the public sector gradually swelled to dimen-
sions that many considered excessive and as macroeconomic results, in-
dicating less growth and greater disequilibria, gave rise to doubts
regarding the efficiency of demand manipulation policies to keep the
economy on a path of high and stable growth.
The drastic rise in oil prices, which triggered a recession in industri-
alised economies, had also been brewing during the previous decades of
accelerated growth in energy consumption. From the beginning of the
fifties to the end of the sixties, the world oil market surged extraordinarily.
The growth in crude production was enormous: from 8.7 million barrels
per day in 1948 to 42 million in 1972. The known reserves in non-Com-
munist countries went from 62 billion (thousand million) barrels in 1948 to
534 billion in 1972. The growth in reserves was greater than the growth in
consumption, with consumption coverage increasing from 19 years in
1950 to 35 years in 1972 (see Daniel Yergin, The Prize, the Epic Quest
for Oil, Money and Power, Simon & Schuster, London, 1991, p. 500).
World energy consumption more than tripled in these years, but oil con-
sumption rose by more than five and a half times: it tripled in the United
States (from 5.8 million barrels per day to 16.4 million barrels per day), in-
creased by 15 times over in Western Europe (from 970,000 barrels to
14.1 million barrels per day) and by 137 times over in Japan (from 32,000
barrels to 4.4 million barrels per day). At the same time, the price of crude
oil steadily slid, becoming very cheap, partly due to the pressure exerted
by the producer countries on the concession companies of oil fields to en-
large their market share, producing more crude and generating higher
revenues (pp. 541-542).
Oil consumption showed no signs of slowing in the early seventies
and, despite the enlarged volume of known reserves, effective crude pro-
duction capacity did not rise at the same rate as consumption. The rela-
tionship between supply and demand indicated that the era of abundant
cheap oil on markets was drawing to an end. By 1973 the surplus produc-
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tion capacity actually available was approximately half a million barrels
per day: barely 1 % of the consumption of non-Communist countries. As
the economic expansion of the years 1971 and 1972, simultaneous in all
industrialised countries, and the greater demand for oil led to pressures
on the limited production capacity, market prices began to rise, remaining
for the first time systematically higher than official prices. This was a deci-
sive change in price trends, putting an end to 20 years of surplus supply,
during which the profits from exploiting oil fields were divided up equally
among oil companies and the producing countries. The latest agreements
– 1970 (Tripoli) and 1971 (Tehran) – guaranteed the producing countries
a minimum of 55 % of the “profits”, defined as the official price less all
costs borne by the petroleum companies per barrel of oil placed on the
market. These agreements had been advantageous to the producing
countries as long as market prices tended to be lower than the official
price, but this was no longer the case between 1971 and 1973, when
the market price of crude doubled, moving clearly beyond the official
price. Since the difference between the official and the market price en-
larged the profits of oil companies but not the earnings of the producing
countries, the latter began to call for a revision of the agreements in
f o r c e .
The decision of the petroleum exporting countries to enlarge their
share of the income generated, combined with the agreement to use
crude as a weapon to force Western countries to support Arab interests
in the conflict with Israel, unleashed the first oil crisis, in the autumn of
1973. On October 6, the Yom Kippur war broke out between the Arab
countries (Egypt and Syria) and Israel. On October 14, the Organisation
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced that negotiations
with oil companies had collapsed, and on October 16 the representatives
of the Persian Gulf countries (five Arab countries plus Iran) announced
their decision to raise the official price per barrel by 70 % to $5.12, align-
ing it with the price prevailing on a market where buyers were swept by
panic at the possibility of being left with no supplies. Moreover, the repre-
sentatives of the Arab countries agreed on an embargo that reduced pro-
duction by 5 % with respect to the level of September and would continue
to reduce production by an additional 5 % each month until the United
States met their demands. The embargo had very powerful effects on a
nervous market racked by uncertainty, and led to over-reactions by com-
panies and consumers, who sought to accumulate enough stock to guar-
antee continued consumption, in turn leading to fresh rises in the market
price. Against this backdrop, the oil ministers of OPEC countries met
again in late December and decided to set a new official price per barrel
of “Arabian Light” crude at $11.65. The increases in the official price had
gone from $1.80 in 1970 to $2.18 in 1971, $2.90 in mid-1973, $5.12 in
October and $11.65 in December 1973 (p. 625).
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Together with the problems derived from higher oil prices, the main
industrialised countries’ difficulties in co-ordinating their economic policies
persisted, as did the instability on foreign exchange markets. Until the
end of the decade of the sixties, when the international monetary system
in force since 1944 was weathering severe tensions and disagreement
among the main industrialised countries, which would eventually lead to
the system’s dismantling, there had been no ambitious initiative to ad-
vance towards economic and monetary union in Europe. The differences
among European countries were particularly evident in the case of Ger-
many, whose basic worries were the flow of capital to its economy, with
the resulting upward pressures on the D-Mark and the ensuing difficulties
in controlling the money supply, and the acceleration in domestic prices
induced by imported inflation. It thus aspired to a joint flotation of Euro-
pean currencies – pegged to the D-Mark to prevent a loss of competitive-
ness – that would lead to an appreciation of all these currencies against
the dollar. By contrast, France, more sensitive to the slowdown in the
growth of its economy, was in favour of keeping exchange rates fixed and
revaluing the D-Mark and the yen against the dollar. These differences
had led to a devaluation of the franc in August 1969 and the revaluation
of the D-Mark in October of the same year.
The summit meeting of the EEC heads of state and government held
in the Hague in December 1969 encouraged a further advance in the di-
rection of economic and monetary union in Europe, and the Werner Com-
mittee was given the task of drawing up a report containing a specific
plan for reaching this objective. The Werner Report appeared in 1970,
recommending that said advance be geared towards closer co-operation
in the economic policies of Community countries and towards limitations
on the fluctuation margins of exchange rates. However, no real progress
was made in this direction until the Smithsonian Agreement of December
1971, which sought to restore order in the international monetary system.
It was then that the Basle agreements of April 1972 set in motion the
measures proposed in the Werner Report, with the creation of what
would shortly become known as the European “currency snake“. But in
time none of these agreements proved to be sustainable, and the defini-
tive abandonment of the multilateral system of fixed exchange rates in
the spring of 1973 also doomed the currency snake to failure. 
The Basle agreements required the participating countries to keep
their currencies within a parity grid, so that the central banks had to inter-
vene to ensure that exchange rates fluctuated within a margin of 2.25 %
around the central parity. The system began to function among the six
original member countries of the Common Market, with the United King-
dom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway – candidates for entry into the Com-
mon Market – joining immediately afterwards. The rules were strict, and
interventions would weigh most on the countries with weak currencies,
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whatever the cause might be, although they could receive assistance in
the form of short-term credit between central banks through the European
Monetary Co-operation Fund (EMCF), created in October 1972. These
were very weak underpinnings, because Germany, aspiring to uncondi-
tional management of its money supply in order to control domestic infla-
tion, shied away from any commitment on foreign exchange markets that
would force the Bundesbank to intervene in defence of weak currencies
or jeopardise this control. Consequently, it continued to argue that a gen-
eral floating system was the best one for preventing imported inflation, al-
though it was not opposed to a unilateral pegging of other currencies to
the mark.
The viability of the Basle exchange-rate agreements was very shortly
put to the test. A speculative wave against the dollar inevitably affected
the pound, which was forced to withdraw from the system eight weeks af-
ter joining, with the Danish krone following suit, although it returned to the
system in October. The exchange-rate instability that characterised the fi-
nal months of the Bretton Woods monetary system reached extraordinary
proportions. In February 1973 the lira withdrew, in March and June the 
D-Mark was revalued, followed in September by the guilder and in November
by the Norwegian krone. When the international monetary system of fixed
exchange rates was dissolved in the spring of 1973, the margin of auton-
omy in German monetary policy increased enormously, inflation contin-
ued to be a significant problem, becoming much more acute with the
surge in oil prices at the end of that year, and the Bundesbank did not
want to find itself burdened with exchange-rate commitments. The ab-
sence of economic policy co-ordination strong enough to allow the major
European countries to take a common stand in the economic and finan-
cial adjustments required by the new situation made it impossible to up-
hold the Basle agreements. When the French franc withdrew from these
accords in January 1974, the currency snake languished, gradually trans-
forming itself into an area of the mark, to which the currencies of a few
smaller countries remained pegged, even though France returned to the
system in July 1975, before departing definitively in March 1976.
The abrupt slide in economic growth and the accommodating re-
sponse of economic policy produced a substantial rise in public spending,
which, as a percentage of GDP, in many countries increased in only three
years by more than it had grown in the previous two decades. As a result
of this policy, the situation of general government finances deteriorated
severely. Moreover, there was a general rise in inflation rates and, in
many cases, depreciations in the exchange rate and acute balance-of-
payments problems. The inflationary effect of the rise in oil prices was ex-
acerbated in nearly all countries by greater wage pressures, due to the
resistance of workers to accept reductions in real wages. The wage in-
creases at the time were also accompanied by higher social security con-
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tributions to meet the higher welfare expenses required by the adverse
economic situation, with expenditure not only on unemployment protec-
tion but also on meeting payments for early retirement pensions and job
disability. Amid very substantial cost increases, corporate margins tight-
ened, discouraging investment in fixed capital and accentuating the re-
cession and job destruction. The changes in relative prices, the techno-
logical obsolescence of a sizeable portion of plant equipment and the
shifts in demand between productive sectors required employment ad-
justments that met with strong resistance by workers. Fiscal policy re-
sponded with increases in public spending on subsidies and capital trans-
fers to maintain employment in the sectors affected. At the same time,
governments were unsure as to the most appropriate economic policy
strategy for controlling inflation.
The strategy of controlling inflation could have significant costs in
terms of loss of production and employment, depending on the inflation-
ary expectations of wages and the general credibility of economic policy.
If expectations were rationally formed and the stated intentions of the au-
thorities to eliminate inflation were accepted, workers would expect a
gradual reduction in the wage growth of the immediate past, and the loss-
es in production and jobs would then be minimal. But if, because of past
experience, the inflationary expectations of workers were deeply rooted
and they were certain of a future easing in monetary discipline, then the
policy decision of lowering inflation at any price so as not to lose competi-
tiveness and not to vanish from world trade might have a high social cost.
The definitive abandonment of the fixed exchange-rate system in
1973 left all countries – except the United States – without a nominal an-
chor for the stability of their economies, requiring stricter control of mone-
tary aggregates, which came to be considered a key instrument for
checking inflation. In countries which gave priority to inflation control,
such as Germany and Japan, the setting of quantitative intermediate tar-
gets for monetary policy and the persistence of high budget deficits led to
increases in interest rates and tended to cause currency appreciations,
thus discouraging investment demand and net exports and eroding the
growth potential of their economies. Furthermore, the resistance to pro-
duction adjustments and high interest rates rekindled the deficit and the
accumulation of general government debt, thereby giving rise to a vicious
circle of low growth in activity and employment and rising unemployment
rates.
Other countries gave priority to maintaining employment and adopted
a policy of gradual adjustments, eschewing the risk of an all-out collapse
in productive activity that a radical stabilisation plan might produce. But
this gradualism meant prolonging the adjustments over time and, by ex-
tension, the persistence of the budget deficit associated with the crisis. In
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turn the problem arose of financing these adjustments in the medium
term, at high interest rates, that made it essential to weigh carefully the
possible adverse consequences of such financing on the economy’s
growth and its influence on the still deeply ingrained inflationary expecta-
tions. In this respect, if the real interest rate of public debt exceeds the
real growth rate of the economy, the continuance of a fixed amount of
debt in private hands will make it necessary to raise funds from other
sources to meet interest payments. For a given time path of public rev-
enue and expenditure, generating a sustained deficit, these funds can
only come from the placement of new issues of debt or the enlargement
of the money supply. As the first source seems limited by the availability
of national saving and by the conditions of access to external saving, pri-
vate agents may expect that the authorities will sooner or later resort to
greater increases in the money supply, thus fuelling expectations of high-
er inflation in the future, in turn probably giving rise inflationary behaviour
in the present. Therefore, the strategy of gradual adjustments was not
without its risks, since it threatened to undermine the credibility of the
economic policy proposed if it were interpreted as a lack of political deter-
mination to confront the problems at hand. Even so, most governments
were inclined to adopt gradualist policies by seeking to check inflation
through incomes policy agreements with labour unions and business or-
ganisations and by paying closer attention to the control of monetary ag-
gregates, while fiscal policy was largely geared towards sustaining
growth in private-sector income and aggregate demand.
The slowness of the expected upturn in economic activity after the re-
cession of 1975 and the balance-of-payments disequilibria of the main in-
dustrialised countries, which had deepened depending on the priorities of
each country in the area of inflation control and the sustainment of activi-
ty, suggested the need for a common strategy within the framework of the
OECD to stimulate a swifter pace of recovery. Under this strategy, the
countries with a sounder external position and fewer inflation problems
were to expand their domestic demand, acting as “locomotives” of the
other economies with balance-of-payments difficulties and persistent
losses in competitiveness. The candidates for locomotives (Germany,
Japan and, initially, the United States) resisted adopting more expansion-
ary policies that went against their priorities, but, when the United States
went from locomotive to freight car, it exerted strong pressure in favour of
this strategy, which led to the adoption in 1978, after the Bonn summit, of
fiscal expansion measures inspired by the OECD’s concerted action plan.
Meanwhile, midway through the decade of the seventies, inflationary
tensions and exchange-rate adjustments continued, nourished by the
slowness in the real corrections in industrialised economies and the dif-
ferent priorities pursued by the countries in their macroeconomic policies.
In the area of the European Common Market, the strong swings in the
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real exchange rates of the main countries threatened to distort the condi-
tions of competition and even the rules that governed the trade relations
among the member states. The origin of exchange-rate movements lay
in the differences in their balance-of-payments positions, inflation trends
and economic growth rates. These differences among the main industri-
alised countries gave fresh impetus to the idea of establishing a mone-
tary system among European countries to help stabilise the exchange
rates of their currencies. The motives of the countries were not the
same, but they did concur on this point. From late 1972 to late 1977, the
effective nominal exchange rate of the D-Mark had appreciated by more
than 40 % and, even though its appreciation was less than 10 % in real
terms, the continued weakness of the dollar – whose rate fell from 2.35
D-Marks in June 1977 to 2.06 D-Marks in March 1978– made German
exporters uneasy, since they believed that a European exchange-rate
agreement would halt the D-Mark’s appreciation and alleviate their prob-
lems of competitiveness. Meanwhile, France, Great Britain and Italy
faced the need to apply stabilisation policies to their economies in order
to reduce inflation and their budget and external deficits, and they hoped
that an exchange-rate agreement with Germany would contribute to the
success of these policies. Only the Bundesbank held back, extremely re-
luctant to see exchange-rate restrictions compromise its independence
to implement a monetary policy geared exclusively to controlling inflation
in Germany. Despite these reservations, in December 1977 the Euro-
pean Council accepted the idea of exploring the possibility of establish-
ing a new exchange-rate agreement proposed by the President of the
Council, William Jenkins. Nonetheless, this idea only gained sufficient
political force when Chancellor Schmidt took the initiative in early 1978,
moved by concern over the dollar’s weakness and the emergence of
Transatlantic political and economic disagreements with the Carter ad-
ministration. 
The political initiative of Chancellor Schmidt to relaunch European
monetary co-operation at the end of 1977 – rapidly seconded by Giscard
d’Estaing – was based on a complex strategy, aimed on the one hand at
resisting US pressures on Germany’s economic policy and on the other
at limiting the harmful effects that an excessive appreciation of the
D-Mark would have on German trade abroad. The central elements of this
strategy were to be defined in July 1978 at the European Council meeting
in Bremen, which gave the green light for technical studies to begin for
the creation of a monetary union system in the European Community,
and at the Bonn summit, where agreement was reached on the expan-
sionary fiscal policy measures to be carried out by Germany and Japan,
as well as the restrictive and energy-saving measures that the United
States was planning to introduce, while also giving its backing to the Eu-
ropean monetary co-operation initiative.
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In late July the Council of Ministers of Economy and Finance
(ECOFIN) asked the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Central
Bank Governors to carry out the technical studies to specify the terms of
this greater monetary co-operation in order to ensure that a draft would
be ready for submission to the European Council meeting to be held at
year’s end in Brussels. The points initially agreed by all the countries
were that the new system should clearly spell out the conditions for the
realignment of parities, in order to give the system further flexibility if nec-
essary, and that the success of the new mechanism depended on greater
co-ordination in the economic policies of the participating countries, with-
out which the realignments might be so frequent that the agreements to
support exchange-rate stability would be redundant. Not surprisingly,
there were also numerous points of profound disagreement concerning
the system’s degree of symmetry, in particular the credit facilities and the
obligations, limits and procedures of central bank intervention to defend
the parities. The more restrictive interpretation of the scope and contents
of the political initiatives for creating the new system came, as expected,
from the Bundesbank, which did not want to see its autonomy to set Ger-
man monetary policy affected, either directly or indirectly, by any interna-
tional exchange-rate stability mechanism.
The criteria of the German central bank had a decisive influence on
the final design of the European Monetary System (EMS). The key criteri-
on was that it should be possible to suspend exchange-rate intervention
in favour of weak currencies if this intervention endangered the control of
liquidity. Although the need for certain credit facilities in the system was
acknowledged, the limits would have to be strict. Otherwise such facilities
threatened to undermine the discipline which the system was intended to
impose, by encouraging governments – ultimately responsible for the ex-
change rate of their currencies – to defend, via their respective central
banks, unrealistic exchange rates for overly long periods until draining the
system’s facilities – and, most certainly, the patience of the central banks
with strong currencies on being forced to intervene in support of a trou-
bled currency. The result was the creation of a European Monetary Sys-
tem with an asymmetrical monetary and exchange-rate co-ordination
mechanism: most of the weight of the adjustments needed to maintain
the exchange rates of currencies around the central parity (defined by a
grid of bilateral exchange rates) fell on the weaker currencies, whereas
the obligations of the stronger currencies to provide support, although for-
mally unlimited, were in fact determined by the specific circumstances of
each case. At its meeting in Brussels in December 1978, the European
Council approved the entry into force of the new system, but its effective
start-up was delayed until May 13, 1979, due to several eleventh-hour
discrepancies over the adaptation of the Common Agricultural Policy
schemes to the characteristics of the new monetary system. An ex-
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change-rate link was thus re-established among the participating coun-
tries, and it would considerably influence the development of their fiscal
policies in the medium term.
After the widening in budget deficits brought about by the recession
of 1974-1975 in the majority of the industrialised countries, the accumu-
lated imbalances were not adequately corrected in the years 1976-1978,
when there was a certain recovery in economic growth, albeit without
reaching the rates characteristic of the pre-recession bonanza years. The
conclusion drawn from this experience was that the structural deficit had
risen. In other words, the discretionary measures adopted since the onset
of the recession, especially on the public spending side, had reached a
permanently higher level, which remained high in terms of GDP during
the cyclical upturn. At the same time, there was concern over the possi-
bility that these fiscal measures had not only signified a permanent in-
crease in the level of public and national spending but also may have hurt
the economy’s production potential by reducing the labour supply and,
combined with the restrictive stance of monetary policy that had given
rise to an increase in the real interest rate, by hurting gross fixed capital
formation, at a time when the technological obsolescence of older plant
equipment and the shift in demand from one sector to another called for
particularly strong investment efforts. An example of this type of fiscal
measure to combat unemployment and to sustain demand in a recessive
period was the early retirement of workers in declining sectors, financed
with public debt. Unlike the schemes to sustain income through unem-
ployment benefits and active policies of job recycling, this measure had
the permanent effect of raising demand and reducing supply, by increas-
ing inflation, the external imbalance, the budget deficit and public debt.
Similar effects were produced by the budget financing measures, through
subsidies and capital transfers, of redundant jobs in declining sectors.
This experience had important implications for the design of stabilisa-
tion policies, as it underscored the need for supply policies to make the
allocation of resources more efficient, via structural reforms capable of
improving the incentives to work and to save and of giving greater flexibility
to the workings of the economy. The authorities in charge of economic
policy became more sceptical, and the instruments of analysis them-
selves came under harsh criticism. This was especially true on the t h eo-
retical side, with the studies on rational expectations questioning the Keynes-
i a n focus on economic policy as a problem of optimum control of a
mechanical system, and instead addressing policy as a dynamic game in
which rational agents participate, reacting strategically and not automati-
cally to the decisions of policy-makers.
Both aspects – the scepticism of the authorities about the effective-
ness of traditional stabilisation policies and the objections to the use of
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Keynesian multipliers – were fully reflected in the comments of Robert
Lucas on a report of the OECD (see Paul McCracken et al. Towards Full
Employment and Price Stability. A Report to the OECD by a Group of In -
dependent Experts, OECD, June 1977). Here he reproached the authors
for their vagueness and imprecision, and at the same time yearned for
the authority and forcefulness with which Walter W. Heller had defended
Keynesian ideas in 1966, incorporated in the multipliers of the type devel-
oped by Hansen, in the formulas for calculating the GNP of high employ-
ment, etc. In his critique of this report (published in Karl Brunner and Al-
lan H. Meltzer (eds.). Policies for Employment, Prices and Exchange
Rates, vol. 11 of the Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, Ams-
terdam, North Holland Publishing Company, 1979, pp. 161-168), Lucas
stated: “It is now easy to rule out these formulas as ‘plain and simple’, but
they can be described with more propriety as significant and functional.
Their advantage over a concept such as ‘the path of recovery considered
correct’ is that they provide a quantitative guide and have the property
that, if two different economists are asked to develop their details, both
will arrive at approximately the same answer.” The report was, according
to Lucas, characterised by “undisciplined eclecticism” and by the ambigu-
ity of many of the concepts used, and he added: “It is a sad but true re-
flection of what has occurred in the past decade that Part I of the OECD’s
report is titled: What went wrong? ... Briefly, what went wrong is that Keynes-
i a nmacroeconomic theory failed... I wish to use the term ‘Keynesian the-
ory’ in a restricted sense, concentrating on the quantifiable formulas that
were actually used for giving advice on economic policy, in order to be as
clear as I can on what I mean by failure. The theory failed in the sense
that it produced quantitative answers that proved to be wrong. His central
premises that monetary policy could stabilise interest rates and that infla-
tion could be ignored in situations characterised by high unemployment
rates proved to be such poor approximations to reality that the multipliers
which rested on them were simply and frankly, useless... In 1966, many
believed we had a theory that could quantitatively link fiscal policy and
economic performance with enough precision for it to be responsibly ap-
plied in drawing up economic policy. In 1977, we know we don’t have
one.”
II.3. The change in the stance of economic policy in the eighties
The experience of the difficulties and limitations of economic stabilisa-
tion policies in the seventies and the new focus on rational expectations
led to a radical change in the way economic policy was perceived in the
eighties. On the theoretical level, research based on the idea of rational
expectations had taken an explicitly dynamic standpoint in analysing the
intertemporal decisions of economic agents. According to this view, to
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reach their objectives, agents choose optimum strategies (contingent
plans for the present and future variables which they control), taking as a
given their expectations about the way they believe other economic
agents will behave, and thus the equilibrium of the models is formally
equivalent to the solution of a game in the mathematical sense. As Lucas
said in 1980, this approach led the focus of economic policy to be ad-
dressed once again in terms of stable and predictable rules which the
government should use to achieve its objectives, minimising – but not en-
tirely eliminating – the margin of discretion of the authorities (see “Rules,
Discretion and the Role of the Economic Advisor”, in S. Fisher (ed.).Ra -
tional Expectations and Economic Policy, University of Chicago Press,
1980).
In applied economics, fiscal policy in the seventies was generally di-
rected at maintaining employment, while monetary policy took on a re-
strictive nature for the purpose of controlling inflation. The mix of these
two policies managed to reduce inflation and unemployment rates some-
what, but the authorities had to confront, after the second steep rise in oil
prices, the worsening in budget problems caused by non-stop growth in
the deficit, increased transfer payments to the unemployed, growth in the
disequilibrium between government investment and consumption, and
considerably higher expenditure on servicing debt, due to the shortfall in
saving and the rise in interest rates. The changes in the stance of eco-
nomic policy, primarily in the United Kingdom and the United States but
also in other OECD countries, were partly inspired by the growing misgiv-
ings about fine-tuning policies based on short-term forecasts, whose un-
reliability was patent, and partly by the acknowledgement of the lack of
incentives for capital formation, due to the increasing proportion of private
saving absorbed by the budget deficit, whose sustained increase during
the seventies was simply a manifestation of underlying trends and prob-
lems.
Towards the end of the seventies, it became clear that much of the
deterioration in public finances was permanent and that monetary and fis-
cal measures with short-term effects would not make it go away. The per-
sistence of budget shortfalls in all OECD countries underscored the need
to develop a coherent and systematic strategy for the medium term, by
putting into practice rigorous demand policies, geared towards promoting
macroeconomic stability, and reform-oriented supply policies aimed at
enhancing the growth potential of economies. National savings ratios and
investment had fallen notably in previous years to levels considered in-
sufficient to guarantee economic growth rates capable of reducing unem-
ployment in the medium term. The productivity of the economy and pri-
vate saving had been eroded by the high replacement rates of
unemployment benefits and pensions and by the high marginal rates
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of income taxes. Private investment was hurt not only by the rise in ener-
gy costs but also by lower productivity and wage increases, which raised
unit labour costs in real terms, and by the higher real interest rates need-
ed to combat inflation. Moreover, in most of the industrialised countries,
the view was that public revenue absorbed a very high proportion of GDP
and that tax rates could not be raised without generating significant dis-
tortions in the incentives of private agents. Consequently, a consensus
arose that the consolidation of public finances should be pursued primari-
ly by reducing the weight of public expenditure in output. 
After the first oil crisis, the expansion of Western economies reached
a ceiling in 1979, with the second jump in oil prices, from $13 to $34 per
barrel. The second crisis was triggered by the overthrow of the Shah of
Iran, and the decision by the Ayatollah Khomeini to suspend oil exports in
December 1978, setting off a crisis that continued until the autumn of
1979 (Yergin, p. 685). The loss of Iranian production was partly offset by
the increase in output in other countries. But why did a 4 % to 5 % short-
age of oil lead to a price increase of 150 %? The answer lies in the panic
that swept consumers, owing to five factors: a) demand pressure was ex-
pected to continue due to the economic expansion then under way; b) the
rescinding of Iranian contracts affected oil companies differently, and
buyers left with a supply shortfall rushed to the free market to guarantee
their supplies; c) the co-ordination among oil-consuming countries was
too weak to control the rise in prices, while oil companies gave priority to
their trade interests via price rises; d) exporting countries took advantage
of the situation to increase their revenue, and e) the uncertainty surround-
ing the possible spread of the Iranian revolution to other Moslem coun-
tries, in particular Iraq and Saudi Arabia, led to excessive stockbuilding –
as occurred in 1973 – that exacerbated the temporary shortage of crude
on markets.
After the price hikes imposed by OPEC on oil consumers in 1978 and
1979, the OPEC’s next and last round of price increases was prompted
by the war that broke out between Iran and Iraq in late 1980. On Septem-
ber 23, the second day of the war, Iraq attacked the giant refinery at
Abadan, the world’s largest, and continued to bomb it and other Iranian
oil facilities, causing severe damage. Iran’s response was similar, chok-
ing off nearly all Iraqi oil exports. In its initial stages (Yergin, p. 711), the
war removed almost 4 million barrels per day from the market: 15 % of to-
tal OPEC output and 8 % of the crude sold in non-Communist countries.
Spot prices immediately jumped to $42 dollars per barrel amid the mar-
ket’s nervousness. In December 1980, the OPEC oil ministers met in Bali
and reached an agreement to set the official price of oil at $36 a barrel for
all members except Saudi Arabia. In the time elapsed since the price rise
of late 1978 the Saudis had been increasingly pushing up their production
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and sales on the market in order to keep prices stable and to restrain the
upward pressures of other OPEC members. In the new situation, Saudi
Arabia announced it would raise its daily production by 900,000 barrels to
the very limit of its capacity. At the same time, market trends were not as
buoyant as in 1979 and 1973. Inventories were high and demand was
contracting, and non-OPEC producers, hoping to gain market share, be-
gan lowering their official prices. As a result, OPEC production in 1981
was 27 % less than in 1979, falling to its lowest level since 1970. Finally,
in October 1981, the OPEC came to a new agreement to reunify the
prices of member countries: Saudi Arabia would raise its price from $32
to $34 dollars a barrel, and the others would lower their price of $36 to
$34. This would be OPEC’s last price increase for at least a decade.
The poor performance of the economies of all industrialised nations
as of the mid-seventies contributed, as noted, to the spread of a greater
scepticism regarding the effectiveness of traditional stabilisation policies,
emphasising the need for co-ordinated monetary and fiscal policies to
serve the common aim of macroeconomic stability in the medium term.
The change in the stance of economic policy in the eighties was very
gradual. The recession in industrialised countries in the early eighties had
been accompanied by unprecedented expansion in public spending, de-
rived from the greater volume of transfers (mainly welfare benefits and in-
terest payments on debt) and government consumption to the detriment
of investment.
The medium-term financial strategies applied by various OECD coun-
tries from 1979 onwards involved a combination of monetary and finan-
cial strategies whose objectives were nominal stability and stimulation of
productive supply. Monetary policy, which was given priority, was geared
towards reducing inflation and moderating long-run inflation expectations.
Fiscal policy was primarily designed to support monetary policy objec-
tives, to restore spending controls and to gradually eliminate the budget
deficit. These medium-term strategies were justified not only by their ben-
eficial effects on future growth, but even by their positive consequences
in the short run through various mechanisms: the reduction in real inter-
est rates would stimulate investment and bolster business confidence;
lower inflation rates would enliven consumption thanks to the effect of the
increased financial wealth, in real terms, of consumers; tax reforms in-
tended to promote supply without detriment to government revenue
would encourage saving, capital accumulation and the labour supply. In
any case, it was believed that, once the budget deficit had been trimmed
to a level that was sustainable in the long run and that the positive effects
on supply had had time to run their course, the play of automatic stabilis-
ers would suffice to allow fiscal policy to smooth the normal cyclical fluc-
tuations in the level of economic activity, while discretionary measures
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should be reserved for situations of deep recession and be easily re-
versible once the recessive phase was overcome.
In the first half of the eighties, the supply policies applied in the indus-
trialised countries began to bear fruit, albeit more slowly than expected.
A good example can be found in energy policies. The oil prices that re-
sulted from the increases in 1978 led to a significant change in energy
production and consumption. On the supply side, coal and nuclear power
began to ease the previous excessive dependence on oil in nearly all
countries and, additionally, in the production of crude itself many explo-
ration and drilling projects became profitable at $34 per barrel, whereas
they had not been when the price was $13 per barrel. On the demand
side, the energy-saving policies of governments, the price and tax in-
creases and technological innovations aimed at reducing oil consumption
also helped to ensure a more efficient use of energy.
But above all it was the slackness in economic activity in Europe and
Japan that made it increasingly difficult for OPEC to continue controlling
the world crude market. In 1977 it produced two-thirds of the oil con-
sumed by non-Communist countries. In 1982, for the first time, the pro-
duction of non-member countries exceeded the total output of OPEC. In
March of that year, the organisation, which had placed 31 million barrels
a day on the market in 1979, set a limit of 18 million barrels, establishing
quotas for each member country except Saudi Arabia, which would adjust
its production to support the cartel (Yergin, p. 719). Although the quotas
were meant to be a temporary measure, by the autumn of 1982 it be-
came clear that demand was not recovering, that non-OPEC countries
were gaining a larger share of the world market and that prices could not
be sustained. The quotas would have to be lowered. In February 1983
the British National Oil Company (BNOC) cut the price of North Sea
crude by $3 dollars a barrel, setting the price at $30. In early March 1983,
OPEC reduced the official price per barrel from $34 to $29 and agreed to
limit output to 17.5 million barrels daily. This was the first time prices had
been cut since the creation of OPEC in 1960, and its future stability de-
pended on the honesty of the 12 member countries in complying with
their individual quotas and on the willingness of the thirteenth member
(Saudi Arabia) to act as the regulator of total supply.
Meanwhile, the continental European countries and Japan -whose
demand policies had become more stringent after the last unsuccessful
attempts at both joint and individual expansion, such as the plan agreed
at the Bonn summit in July 1978 and France’s individual efforts in 1981
and 1983 – were weathering very low levels of activity and lacked the de-
termination to carry out such radical supply-side policies as those applied
in the United States and Britain. The goal of these policies was to stimu-
late productive capacity and the efficient allocation of resources by im-
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proving incentives and factor inputs and by eliminating the intervention
and rigidities that hampered the activities of private agents. Nevertheless,
some depicted this medium-term objective in terms of immediate results,
capable of revitalising economic growth in the short run, thanks to tax
cuts, the liberalisation of markets and inflation control, which would swiftly
raise saving and investment, the labour supply and risk-taking. Such
were the promises of the conservative governments of Thatcher and
Reagan on taking office in 1979 and 1980, respectively. To some, the un-
certain results of the policies applied in the United States and Britain,
which combined an improvement in the efficiency and expectations of
growth in the medium term with unquestionable recessive effects in the
short run, counselled greater caution in other economies. This was espe-
cially the case of continental European countries and Japan, where such
policies were undertaken with fewer pretensions in an attempt to make
the economy more flexible and to strengthen job creation through struc-
tural reforms, among which those concerning public revenue and expen-
diture played a leading role.
II.4. Fiscal policy in the past 15 years
In the eighties, the economic policy priority in most of the OECD
countries was to reduce the budget deficit, largely on the basis of trim-
ming public spending as a percentage of GDP (see Howard Oxley and
John P. Martin. Controlling government spending and deficits: trends in
the 1980s and prospects for the 1990s, OECD Economic Studies, num. 17,
1991). Nonetheless, the early years of the decade were marked by an
across-the-board rise in government spending as a percentage of GDP.
Effective budget deficits rose substantially in the OECD countries as a
whole, climbing from 2 % of GDP in 1979 to 4 % in 1983, while the struc-
tural deficits estimated by the organisation’s secretariat narrowed only
marginally. The effects of the fiscal policies applied within the framework
of the medium-term strategies designed by member countries were of
contrary signs depending on the case, but had unquestionable repercus-
sions in the short run. In the United States, budget strategy had been
dominated by tax cuts to encourage supply, but tax receipts were not pre-
served and the budget deficit rose notably, producing positive demand ef-
fects on the level of activity, both in the US economy and in the rest of the
world as of 1983, but also raising interest rates, with negative effects on
investment in all countries. Other economies, such as Japan, Germany
and the United Kingdom, trimmed their structural deficits considerably,
while there was a certain widening in the deficits of the other countries.
Nonetheless, the meagre progress in reducing effective budget
deficits continued to fuel the growth in public debt as a percentage of
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GDP, real interest rates remained high, and real growth was low, espe-
cially in European countries, which appeared to be trapped by the lack of
vitality of highly regulated and uncompetitive economies. Government
spending in the OECD countries as a whole showed no signs of diminish-
ing until 1984, and only gathered force with the economic expansion in
the second half of the decade, albeit without falling below the levels of
1979. This expansion was also a contributing factor in the one percent-
age point increase in the weight of public revenue in GDP, despite the
generally negative effects of the new fiscal reforms on tax collection. To-
gether with the buoyancy of the US economy, another factor in the recov-
ery of growth in Europe and Japan was the fall in the price of oil, which
took place in 1986 but had been in the making for two years.
In 1984 the OPEC’s quota system was still not working, even though
it had become more restrictive. The organisation continued to lose market
share and, moreover, the market was contracting. Infringements of the
established quotas became increasingly evident, and the organisation
even contracted an international auditing firm to supervise accounts and
quotas. Some countries did not furnish the necessary information. Others
resorted to bartering oil for weapons, airplanes, industrial plants, etc.,
thus further flooding the market. By the mid-eighties, OPEC once again
faced the need to lower oil prices. Saudi Arabia could not continue to sus-
tain a quota system that other members were infringing. Saudi Arabia’s
revenues went from $119 billion in 1981 to $36 billion in 1984 and $25
billion in 1985, whereas government spending had soared, generating an
enormous budget deficit that was exhausting its currency reserves. The
situation became so critical that the presentation of the budget was post-
poned indefinitely. After giving numerous futile warnings, the Saudis de-
cided to change their strategy. Rather than defending the official price,
they began to defend their own output on the market through a new
agreement with the oil companies, under which refiners were guaranteed
a profit per barrel sold on the market and the excess obtained on the ef-
fective sales price was the margin left for the producing country. Given
the weight of Saudi Arabia in OPEC and in the world market, the other
countries had to follow suit. OPEC decided to fight to preserve its share
in the world market, and this implied a sharp cut in the price of crude, be-
cause the countries with greater production capacity (Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait) held sway over those who wanted to keep the price at $29 per
barrel by setting lower quotas (Algeria, Libya and Iran) (Yergin, p. 751).
The new strategy led to unheard-of prices. The price of the bellwether
West Texas Intermediate plunged from its peak of $31.75 per barrel in
late November 1985 to $10 a barrel in subsequent months. In April Vice
President Bush, who had started his career in the oil business, comment-
ed during a visit to Saudi Arabia that, if prices remained so low, the Unit-
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ed States would impose a tariff on imported oil to support the national out-
put of crude. The Japanese announced they would follow suit to protect
their own programme of energy diversification and to obtain extra revenue
for the Treasury. Nothing could be more offensive to the exporting coun-
tries than the prospect that the revenue they lost because of the fall in
crude prices would lead not to lower prices for final consumers, who could
stimulate demand, but to higher fiscal revenue for the Treasuries of the
importing countries. In May 1986 various oil ministers meeting in Saudi
Arabia agreed that a price of $17 to $19 a barrel could be sustained under
a new system of quotas, but the Saudis announced that theirs would no
longer be the only output to bear the necessary adjustments to sustain
prices. Finally, at an OPEC meeting in Geneva in December 1986, a ref-
erence price of $18 per barrel was set, based on a composite price of
several different crude oils and a new quota system contemplating a total
of 17.3 million barrels a day. This signified $11 less per barrel than the
previous official price and, in real terms, left the price at the level prevail-
ing before the second great price hike of the seventies in 1978.
This OPEC “tax cut” led to a transfer of $50 billion to the consuming
countries, which served to stimulate economic activity in all Western
countries and, to a lesser extent, also help to alleviate inflationary strains.
The expansionary impetus of this slide in crude prices on industrialised
countries, especially in continental Europe and Japan, was decisive to
the consolidation of economic recovery, which had been very modest in
the early years of the eighties. The medium-term policies pursued until
then had managed to achieve the objectives of restoring the health of
public and corporate finances by raising the profitability of private invest-
ment, thanks to wage restraint and the creation of the foundations for an
upturn in economic growth, but this upturn had not entirely firmed. A ba-
sic instrument in this progress towards nominal stability in European
countries was undoubtedly the smooth functioning of the EMS, as we
shall later see in greater detail, despite various realignments. Neverthe-
less, the EMS was also criticised as an overly rigid corset, preventing
greater expansion in aggregate demand, which many considered neces-
sary to achieve higher economic growth. Lastly, the lack of vitality and
job-creating capacity that had characterised the economies of continental
Europe would also be shaken by the programme for the creation of the
internal single market, scheduled to culminate at the beginning of 1992
with the lifting of all barriers to the free flow of people, goods, services
and capital among EC member countries. All these factors were at play in
the notable advance in economic growth in the final years of the eighties,
which was to last until the recessions of 1991 and 1993 in the United
States and Japan, respectively.
In the history of the EMS, between its creation in March 1979 and the
deep and successive crises it was to weather as of September 1992, two
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stages can be distinguished. The first lasted until 1987 and was charac-
terised by the application of anti-inflationary policies in member countries
and the unquestionable leadership of the Bundesbank. It is generally ac-
knowledged that the EMS functioned satisfactorily during this stage, cre-
ating the conditions for an appreciable downward convergence in the in-
flation of member countries, despite the successive realignments in the
parities of their currencies. The first stage of the EMS was marked by
three main achievements (Padoa-Schioppa, pp. 66-70): free trade was
preserved in a difficult period, the macroeconomic convergence of mem-
ber countries improved, and their currencies were sheltered against the
possible differential repercussions derived from the dollar’s appreciation.
In these achievements, the capital controls of all EMS countries, except
Germany and Holland, were a decisive factor, providing a certain leeway
for the independence of national monetary policies. Nonetheless, the sys-
tem’s very success in lowering inflation also revealed the limitations de-
rived from its lopsided concept, in that the convergence of interest rates
towards German rates was less than expected.
In the second stage, the impossibility of reconciling the requirements
of the free circulation of goods and capital with the autonomy of monetary
policy in a system of fixed exchange rates was to become evident
(Padoa-Schioppa, op. cit., p. 121). Constant exchange rates and perfect
capital mobility among a given number of countries leave only a degree
of freedom for deciding the monetary policy stance that affects all con-
cerned. When there is a hegemonic country which uses this degree of
freedom to set its own monetary objective, the rest have to accept the
consequences of the pursuit of this objective. Alternatively, the objective
may be set by the consensus of all the countries. The French authorities
expressed their growing rejection of the hegemonic solution, but the Bun-
desbank would not agree to relinquish its autonomous monetary policy to
subject it to a joint decision. This second stage began with the approval
of the Single European Act, providing for the creation of an internal mar-
ket with full freedom of movement of people, goods and capital in the
year 1992, and it was characterised by France’s increasingly greater
pressure on Germany for Europe’s monetary policy stance to be decided
jointly by all the EMS member countries, under which the system would
no longer be dominated by the D-Mark but would become the embryo of
monetary union. The Basle-Nyborg agreements of December 1987 were
the turning point in the transformation of the EMS, which would culminate
in late 1991 with the signing of the Treaty of European Union at Maas-
tricht and the system’s subsequent crisis.
In the course of the negotiations leading up to the signing of the
Treaty of European Union, two opposing concepts were clearly ex-
pressed by those who viewed monetary union as a mid-way step towards
the real convergence of European economies and those who believed
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that, only after reaching a satisfactory degree of nominal convergence
(first) and real convergence (later), should the countries willing to ad-
vance towards political union simultaneously undertake the project of
monetary union. The result was a compromise between the two ex-
tremes: on the one hand, it was accepted that monetary union was a nec-
essary step towards promoting greater social and economic integration
among the nations of Europe, but, on the other hand, strict conditions, in
the form of nominal convergence criteria to guarantee macroeconomic
stability, were set for the countries interested in taking part in the union.
As might be expected, the agreement failed to satisfy the advocates of
the two extremes. Consequently, the convergence criteria were viewed
as unnecessary by some and as insufficient by others for the process of
achieving the monetary union which all allegedly desired. The tension be-
tween the two concepts of the monetary union process was left to simmer
for nearly five years, with the EMS appearing to function satisfactorily be-
tween 1987 and 1992, while many viewed the system as the ideal instru-
ment for co-ordinating economic policies and achieving almost automati-
cally de facto monetary union.
At the end of the eighties, partly as a result of the favourable cyclical
situation of the main economies, most industrialised countries had made
solid progress in restoring their public finances to health, and this process
was expected to continue with medium-term fiscal policy programmes
aimed at attaining budgetary equilibrium. In the OECD as a whole, the
budget deficit stood at around 2 % of GDP in 1989 for the first time since
1974: the deficit was somewhat less than 2 % in the United States and a
little higher in European countries, while Japan had a surplus of more
than 2 %. The weight of total expenditure in GDP had fallen since 1984 in
the European OECD countries and Japan, while stabilising in the United
States; at the same time fiscal pressure had risen by three percentage
points in Japan and by approximately one point in the United States, and
remained stable in European OECD countries. The attempt to subject fis-
cal policy to more or less binding rules in the medium term was a com-
mon feature in most of the countries.
In the nineties, the industrialised countries encountered new obsta-
cles in the process of fiscal consolidation. On the expenditure side, de-
spite a certain margin for reducing military spending, it became increas-
ingly difficult to cut aggregate spending, due to the growing weight of
interest payments and programmes providing welfare benefits and ser-
vices on the basis of individual rights recognised by law, such as pen-
sions and health care. On the revenue side, unless tax rates were raised,
the capacity to increase tax receipts was limited, because the reforms un-
dertaken in the eighties had already substantially widened tax bases and
in many countries there were still pressures to reduce tax rates further.
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Moreover, the deterioration in public finances in the early nineties had an
undeniable cyclical component, derived from the slowdown in growth and
from the subsequent recession which, with varying intensity, successively
affected the United States (1991), European countries (1992-1993) and
Japan (1993). The fiscal imbalance in nearly all countries – except Japan–
at the beginning of the last recession limited the use of counter-cyclical
fiscal policy, but fiscal deficits rose as automatic stabilisers started func-
tioning and, in some cases, the structural deficit also rose. In the United
States revenue stabilised as a percentage of GDP, while expenditure in-
creased by three percentage points between 1989 and 1992. In Japan
revenue fell slightly between 1990 and 1993, partly because of the fiscal
reform, but it was once again the expansion in spending that caused its
budget surplus to disappear in 1993 and deficits of close to 3 % to
emerge in 1994 and 1995. In the countries of the European Union, ex-
penditure also rose by somewhat more than one point, causing the bud-
get deficit to increase by nearly four points.
The persistence of swollen budget deficits was viewed from the per-
spective of the decline in national savings ratios in all countries over the
previous 20 years, with exception of the period 1986-1989, and the dise-
quilibrium in public finances was considered the main culprit. The inability
to achieve a satisfactory degree of fiscal consolidation in many countries
had serious macroeconomic consequences: a lower level of potential out-
put due to less gross fixed capital formation, lower growth in productivity,
the sizeable weight of public debt in terms of GDP and of interest pay-
ments in the budget and, against the backdrop of a slowdown in econom-
ic activity, waning confidence of economic agents, due to the uncertainty
surrounding the future course of economic policy.
In the European Union, the onset of the recession in 1992 gave way
to a period of great exchange-rate instability, which shattered the illusion
that the EMS guaranteed the success of the process of monetary union in
Europe. Markets appeared to believe in the soundness of the process un-
til 1992, reflecting a certain short-sightedness in their over-confidence in
exchange-rate stability as the prelude to monetary union. The absence of
realignments since 1987 (except the strictly technical adjustment of nar-
rowing the lira’s fluctuation band), despite diverging inflation rates and
changes in competitiveness, had induced markets to believe the EMS
could be the basic instrument for arriving at monetary union in Europe, as
they assumed that exchange-rate discipline in itself would be motive
enough to produce the real adjustments in the behaviour of private
agents and in government policies that were needed if the convergence
of European economies was to be attained in a framework of stability.
This assumption proved to be false. Exchange-rate stability was seen as
a sign that financial markets were backing a series of policies, which to a
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great extent ignored the conditions for advancing towards macroeco-
nomic stability, trusting the growing mobility of capital to provide a pain-
less way of financing the disequilibria which these same policies were
g e n e r a t i n g .
Too little discipline and a lack of co-ordination in the economic poli-
cies of the major countries amid the problems derived from Germany’s
reunification were to unleash the crises in the EMS. This demonstrated
that the system, if lacking discipline and co-ordination, could not in itself
guarantee exchange-rate stability, not only in the case of currencies
whose economic fundamentals counselled a parity adjustment, but also
in the case of those whose fundamentals were even better than those of
the German D-Mark. Between 1989 and 1992 the policies implemented
were inadequate, because monetary policy alone was made to bear the
full weight of the goal of reducing inflation, without taking into account
that the fiscal policies being applied could make macroeconomic stability
very costly, if not impossible. National policies were not co-ordinated, be-
cause absolute priority was given to internal objectives without heeding
the problems that this signified for the preservation of exchange-rate sta-
bility.
In spite of the difficulties that impeded progress in fiscal consolidation
in the years of scant economic growth after the last recession, the condi-
tions for narrowing the budget deficit were more propitious than in the
early eighties in at least one aspect, because lower inflation rates in
many countries gave monetary policy a greater margin of flexibility for
supporting the recovery in activity. Once the signs of recession became
evident and inflationary pressures began to ease, a more expansionary
monetary policy was implemented and interest rates fell sharply. Later, as
fiscal policy became more restrictive, interest rates were further cut.
Midway through the nineties the successive recoveries in economic
growth in the United States, Europe and Japan have made it possible to
resume the process of restructuring public finances to attain and preserve
budgetary equilibrium in the medium term. Fiscal consolidation pro-
grammes now contain general guidelines that limit the authorities’ margin
of discretion, but the degree of effective restriction that these guidelines
signify for the fiscal policies of the countries varies greatly (see IMF.
World Economic Outlook, May 1996, Chap. III; and OECD Economic Out -
look, December 1996). In the United States and Japan this restriction
does not seem to have increased with respect to the programmes applied
in the decade of the eighties and which did not prove to be as effective as
initially expected. But in the countries of the European Union, the need to
meet strict criteria of sound public finances for participation in economic
and monetary union has signified a very effective limitation on the author-
ities’ discretion in recent years.
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In the current cyclical upturn, it is generally accepted that the econom-
ic policy errors of the eighties must be avoided. As the recovery firms,
monetary policy should take a more neutral stance and fiscal policy will
have to continue applying and reinforcing the programmes aimed at re-
ducing the budget deficit. In the medium term, these measures will ensure
that interest rates remain low, that potential output will grow by releasing
resources for the private sector, and that the public sector will be better
equipped to cope with the longer-run budget problems, such as those de-
rived from the ageing of the population, and with the eventual need for
economic stabilisation in future recessions. There is also a broad consen-
sus that public finances should be made sounder through permanent
spending cuts, especially in programmes whose long-term sustainability is
questionable. Nonetheless, the political power of pressure groups poses
an enormous obstacle to undertaking the legal reforms necessary to
check the increase in this expenditure. In view of these difficulties, new
formulas have been proposed to make such changes possible, by rein-
forcing budgetary discipline through rules that range from writing a bal-
anced budget into the constitution (the United States) to stability pacts
(the European Union) and fiscal responsibility laws (New Zealand).
But, in addition to these points, where economic policy objectives co-
incide (medium-term focus, price stability and sounder public finances as
priority goals in monetary and fiscal policies, more flexible markets and
structural reforms as conditions for enhancing the growth potential of
economies), there are many other points on which economists disagree.
In the area of fiscal policy, debate focuses on the efficiency of its stabilis-
ing function in cyclical fluctuations and the margin of discretion which the
authorities should have to develop their fiscal policy. It is acknowledged
that temporary increases in budget deficits as percentages of GDP,
around a constant average level (which should be determined under cri-
teria of efficiency and equality between generations in the distribution of
taxes and public debt), may be useful to ensure a stable structure of tax-
es and spending, absorbing part of the impact of extraordinary shocks,
such as occurred in the case of Germany’s reunification, and smoothing
normal cyclical fluctuations through automatic stabilisers. But there are
doubts about the discretionary use of short-term fiscal measures to fine-
tune the level and structure of aggregate demand. At the same time, it is
generally agreed that rules should be established to safeguard the long-
run sustainability of public finances by limiting the authorities’ discretion,
but it is acknowledged that governments must have enough margin for
manoeuvre in the short run for responding to unforeseen shocks. The es-
timation of the magnitude of the stabilising effects that fiscal policy has
had in the main industrialised countries in the course of recent decades is
relevant to the discussion of these issues. This estimation is presented in
the chapters that follow.
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III
THE UNITED STATES
III.1. Economic growth and stabilisation policies
The growth and fluctuations in the world economy and the focus of
economic policy in recent decades have been strongly influenced by the
dominant weight of the economy of the United States and its leadership
in the international co-ordination of economic policies. The objective of
the new approach to economic policy with the arrival of Kennedy in the
White House in 1961, and which had a powerful impact on the economic
policy stances of all countries, was to eliminate cyclical fluctuations,
keeping effective economic growth as close to its potential as was com-
patible with price stability. The purpose was to eradicate the “cyclical
mentality“ which, in the view of the president’s advisors, was a barrier to
full employment, because it only considered economic policy capable of
smoothing fluctuations, but not of preventing them (see James Tobin.
The New Economics One Decade Older, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1972, pp. 7-9). However, the expansionary fiscal policy recom-
mended by the president’s advisors was not immediately adopted, be-
cause it did not call for preventing a recession but to stimulate an eco-
nomic expansion already in progress. Nor was it carried out through an
increase in public spending, this being the advisors’ preferred option, be-
cause political opposition prevented the debt-financing of this increase.
Instead a tax reduction was introduced, which offset the automatic rise in
fiscal pressure resulting from income tax progressivity.
As a result of this activist fiscal policy, revenue as a percentage of
GDP fell sharply in 1964, just as economic growth was quickening. By
contrast, expenditure acted as a compensating element – exactly as the
president had promised in order to gain the approval of Congress for the
tax cut – although it was not enough to prevent a small increase in the
deficit in 1964, which was offset the following year. The expansion in the
American economy tended to pick up speed in the first half of the sixties,
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advancing at an average growth rate of around 5 % between 1961 and
1966. However, in the next four years, growth slowed, the average
growth rate of GDP was halved, and the decade ended with the reces-
sion of 1970. On average in the sixties, growth was 3.8 % and its stan-
dard deviation was 1.9 %, marking much more brilliant results than those
of the previous decade, even though they failed to fulfil the aspirations of
the “new economy“ advocated by the president’s economic advisors.
The role of economic policy in driving growth in the early years of the
decade and in the inflationary pressure that followed has been a subject
of great debate between Keynesians and monetarists. For the Keynes-
ians (see R. J. Gordon, in Feldstein, 1980, pp. 102 and 131), the tax cut
of 1964, along with other earlier fiscal incentives, had the merit of taking
the economy to full employment, whereas the increases in public spend-
ing on the Vietnam war and the Great Society programmes of the John-
son administration were the chief causes of price acceleration. Monetary
policy took an accommodating stance, in that interest rates remained fair-
ly stable, allowing the money supply to grow with demand, but a more re-
strictive policy, even keeping the money supply constant in relation to po-
tential GDP, would not have led to the collapse of economic growth. The
monetarists’ interpretation is entirely different. Economic expansion did
not cause, but was caused by, the increase in the money supply. They
acknowledge that this increase took place as a result of budget deficits,
but they argue that its effects would have been the same had the reason
for increasing the money supply been different. The slight rise in interest
rates was due, they say, to the financing of the deficit, the increase in in-
vestment and inflationary expectations (Tobin, op. cit., pp. 64-65).
No matter which interpretation of the origin of economic expansion is
more correct, the growing inflation that accompanied it, which the mone-
tarists attribute to the acceleration in the money supply as of the early six-
ties, and the Keynesians to the subsequent low level of unemployment,
was a serious setback to the reputation of the “new economy“, because
the public had formed huge expectations about the promises of full em-
ployment, sustained growth and price stability, only to find itself disap-
pointed. According to Tobin (op. cit., pp. 34-36), things began to change
course in 1965, when the Pentagon did not inform either the Council of
Economic Advisors, the Budget Office or the Treasury of the rapid pace
of defence contracts and spending. Even so, the Council of Economic
Advisors recommended to the president that a tax increase be an-
nounced and incorporated in the 1966 budget, but Johnson feared that
Congress would cut the spending on his Great Society programmes in-
stead of raising taxes. The burden of the adjustment then fell on mone-
tary policy, which demonstrated its restrictive capacity with a certain de-
lay, albeit convincingly, by subjecting the economy to the “credit crunch“
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episode in late 1966, which reduced economic growth in 1967 to 2.9 %,
one half of the previous year’s figure. In 1966-1967 public spending bur-
geoned, while revenue, which had significantly recovered in 1966, lost its
impetus a year later. It was then that the stop-go policy was developed
with the greatest intensity.
While the White House and Congress were wondering whether or not
to raise taxes, the moderation in growth in 1967 caused an outcry in the
sectors most affected by the credit restrictions, who accused the Federal
Reserve of setting off the recession. The authorities took the easiest way
out: they gave an expansionary turn to monetary policy and, in doing so,
set a precedent of accommodating increasingly higher inflation, which
was to last until the early part of the eighties, because later attempts to
reduce monetary growth in order to control inflation prompted immediate
and irate criticism by those who felt harmed by the measure, and these
protests led the Federal Reserve to abandon its anti-inflationary policy
prematurely. But fiscal policy also took a more activist stance, and the
measures which for some were an example of the stabilising effects of
fine-tuning, such as the successive withdrawal and enactment of tax in-
centives on investment (Tobin,op. cit., p. 35), were for others merely dis-
torting investment decisions and destabilising aggregate demand.
The necessary tax increase to cope with the growth in spending was
not approved until June 1968 and, according to the almost unanimous
opinion of analysts, was an unmitigated failure, in contrast with the gener-
ally favourable opinion of the tax cut of 1964. The Revenue and Expendi-
ture Control Act of 1968 placed a 10 % surcharge on the net amount of
personal and corporate income tax, announcing that it would be eliminat-
ed a year later, and, therefore, by not substantially affecting the perma-
nent income of consumers, the view is that it had no appreciable effect on
consumption decisions. By contrast, fearing an overly deflationary effect,
the Federal Reserve relaxed its monetary policy somewhat, thus con-
tributing to the nominal expansion of aggregate demand, which was al-
ready very intense, and to price acceleration, which caused total revenue
in 1968-1969 to rise substantially in relation to the real situation of the
American economy, which was showing signs of slower growth.
Excessive growth in nominal demand, inflation and the loss of com-
petitiveness led to a gradual deterioration in the surplus on the US econo-
my’s current account in the decade of the sixties. If investment abroad is
included, the American balance of payments was clearly headed towards
a deficit, which undermined the strength of the dollar, heightening the in-
stability of the international monetary system. This system, conceived at
Bretton Woods as a regime of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, in
practice functioned very rigidly. The privileged position of the dollar as the
system’s sole currency of reserve enabled the United States to finance its
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external deficits with national currency, albeit under the restriction of
maintaining its convertibility into gold as the anchor of the system. The
sharp rise in the money supply in the United States in the sixties, price
acceleration and the tendency towards an external deficit together weak-
ened the dollar, gave rise to speculative capital movements and stimulat-
ed monetary expansion in other countries by enlarging their reserves of
dollars, which had to a great extent been used to finance US investment
in these countries.
After Nixon won the elections in 1968 and once the fears regarding
the recessive effects of the temporary tax increase that year had been
dispelled, the Federal Reserve decided it was time to step on the mone-
tary brake once again in order to fight inflation. By the end of 1969,
growth in the money supply (M2) had been lowered to 2 % and aggregate
demand had stopped growing, and in 1970 the US economy entered a
recession. Tax policy also had a restrictive focus in 1969, in that the cor-
porate tax deduction for construction investment was eliminated, the tax
surcharge was extended to the end of 1969 and then again until mid-
1970 (although in the second extension it was lowered to 5 %), and social
security contributions were raised. On the expenditure side, the abrupt
quickening in 1966-1967 was halted in 1968 and then decreased in 1969,
when spending fell by 0.3 percentage points in terms of GDP, which also
contributed to the forces pushing the US economy towards a recession.
The decade of the seventies, with the two oil shocks produced by the
drastic price hikes of 1973 and 1978-1979 that had simultaneous reces-
sive and inflationary effects on the world economy, is known as the
decade of stagflation, because the two recessions associated with these
shocks and the general escalation in prices in the first half of the seven-
ties considerably reduced the average economic growth over these ten
years and greatly increased price levels. However, the opinion of most
analysts is that both recessions were deliberately induced by the authori-
ties in an attempt to control the inflation that economic policy itself had
earlier encouraged (see Tobin: “Stabilization Policy Ten Years After”,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1980, p. 21).
From the Keynesian point of view, the hallmarks of the decade were
of three kinds: first, the increasing opening-up and integration of the
American economy abroad; second, the collapse of the international
monetary system introduced at Bretton Woods and its replacement by a
floating exchange-rate system with non-coordinated interventions by the
authorities of different countries, and, third, the predominance of shocks
in prices, supply and demand, different from the shocks produced by eco-
nomic policy and by the domestic industrial sector (Tobin, p. 26). In fact,
in the Keynesian interpretation of these events, fiscal policy had a gener-
ally stabilising influence in the seventies, in that automatic stabilisers at-
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tenuated the two recessions, especially the severe slide in activity in
1974-1975, and active counter-cyclical policies encouraged the two sub-
sequent recoveries (Tobin, p. 54). The analysis of the cyclical sensitivity
of fiscal variables in these years partly supports this opinion. It is debat-
able whether fiscal policy made a positive contribution to the upturns in
the US economy, but there seems to be no question that it had stabilising
effects, tempering both the recessions and the expansions.
From the standpoint of those who criticised the excessive activism of
economic policy, these interventions created confusion in the decisions of
private agents and they hampered more than helped the recovery of a
stable and non-inflationary growth path. Even though the prestige that fis-
cal policy previously enjoyed in the regulation of aggregate demand had
diminished greatly by the beginning of the seventies, the Nixon adminis-
tration did not abandon it entirely. In fact, when the end of the recession
of 1970 seemed uncertain in 1971, the Council of Economic Advisors
used the now familiar concept of the full employment budget surplus to
persuade Congress of the wisdom of enlarging spending programmes.
A small tax cut, approved at the end of 1971, reinforced this more expan-
sionary focus of fiscal policy, complementing the stimulus to demand pro-
vided by monetary policy. The weight of total public expenditure in GDP
evolved counter-cyclically, exerting a stabilising influence on private-sec-
tor disposable income and on aggregate demand, by falling nearly one
percentage point of GDP during the acceleration of economic growth in
the years 1972-1973 and rising by nearly three percentage points of GDP
in the recessive period of 1974-1975. By contrast, the increase in total
revenue obtained from income taxes in 1974 had a destabilising effect,
which changed sign in 1975.
President Ford, like Nixon four years earlier, implemented an expan-
sionary fiscal policy after deciding to stand for election. In January 1975
Ford sought a tax cut, and in March Congress decided to co-operate with
the president by approving the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, which estab-
lished a 10 % cut in taxes on personal income earned in 1974 to a maxi-
mum of $200 per household, a credit of up to $50 for welfare recipients
and an additional reduction in taxes in 1975. The effects of these mea-
sures began to show in the summer of that year, and, according to R.J.
Gordon (op. cit., p. 154), were positive both in their timeliness and in their
magnitude. However, the analysis of the stabilising effects of fiscal policy,
discussed later in this chapter, reveal that the magnitude of the income
tax cuts was excessive, taking into account the deceleration in the other
government revenue items. In comparison with the cyclical sensitivity of
total revenue in the period 1967-1995 as a whole, the fall in 1975 pro-
duced a negative residual of a magnitude similar to that of 1964, these
being the two most notable years in the sample. Other undesirable con-
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sequences of the economic policies applied to sustain demand, in an at-
tempt to counteract what were actually strains in supply, were the quick-
ening in inflation and the weakening of the dollar.
In later years, the rapid rise in nominal income, caused both by real
economic growth and by inflation, produced a fiscal drag of taxpayers to-
wards taxable income brackets with higher rates. In the opinion of Feld-
stein, this effect of inflation paved the way for the political acceptance of
the tax reforms of the following decade (see M. Feldstein. “American Eco-
nomic Policy in the 1980s: A Personal View”, in American Economic Poli -
cy in the 1980s, University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 5 and 17).
Congress attempted to cushion this drag with fresh tax cuts, despite
which the deficit continued to diminish, and by the end of the seventies
budget equilibrium appeared to be a possibility. In 1977 the rise in total
revenue as a percentage of GDP, which had been fuelled by the econom-
ic recovery of 1976, was halted, and in subsequent years increases of
approximately 0.3 percentage points per year were recorded, regardless
of the economic situation, which was expansionary in 1977-1978 and
slowed in the following two years until the mild recession of 1980. By con-
trast, the weight of public spending in GDP continued to evolve counter-
cyclically, falling in 1976-1978 and rising rapidly in 1979-1980.
The weakness of the dollar stemmed from the worsening in the US
balance of payments, which began under the Ford administration as a re-
sult of the increases in oil prices and later reached worrisome propor-
tions, due to the expansionary policies applied to pull the American econ-
omy out of the 1974-1975 recession and the absence of effective
energy-saving measures. The Carter administration did not seem very in-
clined to support the exchange rate of the dollar, and the massive flow of
dollars flooding international markets, partly from the revenue of oil-pro-
ducing countries, pressured upwards the currencies considered the most
solid – primarily the Swiss franc, the D-Mark and the yen – and even the
pound tended to appreciate against the dollar, given the importance of
London’s City in world financial intermediation. At the same time, also as
a result of the American balance-of-payments deficit and the surplus bal-
ances of Germany and Japan, these countries were being pressured by
their trade partners to adopt a more expansionary economic policy in or-
der to help relaunch economic growth and to correct the imbalances in
world trade, this being a condition which the Carter administration consid-
ered essential to strengthen the dollar.
At the Bonn summit in mid-1978, agreements were reached on the
expansionary fiscal policy measures that Germany and Japan should
adopt and the restrictive and energy-saving measures which the United
States intended to introduce, in addition to giving its backing to the initia-
tive of European monetary co-operation. However, this attempt at interna-
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tional co-ordination of economic policies would immediately encounter
major difficulties. Only two weeks after the Bonn summit the dollar began
to tumble, eventually depreciating by 18 % against the D-Mark over the
following three months. The US authorities initially responded with a com-
bination of interventions on foreign exchange markets and a gradual re-
striction in monetary growth in order to curb the speed of the deprecia-
tion. But, when the downward pressure on the dollar gained greater force
in mid-September, the authorities believed a much more restrictive
stance in economic policy had become necessary in order to check infla-
tion and the budget and external deficits via fiscal measures and recom-
mendations of voluntary limits on income and price increases. However,
the announcement of these measures failed to alleviate exchange-rate
tensions, which only began to recede when the Federal Reserve adopted
severe internal and external measures at the beginning of November,
raising the discount rate by one percentage point to a record high of 9.5
% and establishing a supplementary 2 % reserve requirement for de-
posits of more than $100,000 to limit the growth of domestic credit; and
with swap agreements with other central banks and IMF credits to defend
the dollar’s exchange rate. These measures had an immediate and sub-
stantive impact, causing the dollar to appreciate in the course of Novem-
ber by 11.5 % against the yen, 11.8 % against the D-Mark and 15.5%
against the Swiss franc. The disinflation efforts led by monetary policy
had begun in 1977, in the final months of the Burns mandate, when the
Federal Reserve reduced the growth in M2 to less than 10 %, after nearly
three years of expansion at rates of more than 12 %. Later, during the
Miller mandate, monetary growth held at around 8 %. After the unpre-
dictable lag in the effects of monetary policy which monetarists generally
use in their explanations, the reduction in the inflation rate occurred in
1981, and shortly afterwards the recession of 1982. But it is not easy to
explain why the beginning of the recession was delayed four years after
monetary policy became gradually more restrictive in 1977. In nearly all
previous cases, the fall in activity had been preceded by a significant de-
cline in the growth rate of the money supply a year earlier, and followed
by the effects on prices with an average lag of roughly two more years.
The reason for the abnormal delay on this occasion lies, according to
monetarists, in the increase in the velocity of circulation (more than 12 %)
during these years, which offset the effect of monetary deceleration.
What finally produced the recession was the abrupt fall in the velocity
of circulation, which began in 1981, prompted by the impact of this fall on
interest rates. The rise in rates was now accompanied by a slide in infla-
tion, leading to real rates of more than 10 % for the first time since the
Great Depression. In the past 150 years of American economic history,
the five previous episodes of real rates of more than 10 % were associat-
ed with serious contractions in the economy (such as those of 1839, 1920
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and 1930). This time as well. Rates in real terms remained higher than
10% for five quarters, and the rate of inflation fell to 5 % at the beginning
of 1982. The productive branches more vulnerable to interest rates bore
the burden of the adjustment. On the demand side, capital goods invest-
ment and exports were the components that most fell in the final quarter
of 1981 and in the four quarters of 1982, with rates of –26 % and –15 %,
respectively, because high interest rates induced an inflow of capital and
the dollar’s appreciation. The recession was concentrated in industry and
agriculture, which depended more on investment and exports, and it
hardly affected services. In July 1982 the Federal Reserve was the target
of much criticism, and a foreign debt crisis was brewing. American banks
had loaned heavily to countries in the Third World which, amid the rise in
US interest rates and the dollar’s exchange rate, threatened to default on
their debt servicing and on the repayment of principal. The Federal Re-
serve then quietly decided to lower interest rates once again, abandoning
its money supply target, although it did not officially announce this move
until October, when it had already become obvious. At year’s end, short-
term rates had fallen by six percentage points, and long-term rates by
four points.
US fiscal policy during the decade of the eighties was marked by the
influence of the Reagan administration, in what came to be called
Reaganomics. The central strand of the Reagan economic programme
was less public intervention in the economy and greater incentives to pri-
vate initiative. To place in its historical perspective the economic pro-
gramme proposed by Reagan, who had broad support from voters, it
should be borne in mind that economic policies often exert their effects
with very long lags and that they constitute the reaction to economic
trends which have also developed over the course of several years. The
decade of the sixties was a period of relatively rapid economic growth.
The social programmes begun by Kennedy and Johnson continued to ex-
pand in the seventies. The role of the federal government changed sub-
stantially, with its preponderant function of producing non-market services
for the community losing ground as the function of redistributing national
income and wealth came to prevail. Productivity had slowed in the late
sixties, and this phenomenon continued in the seventies. Although the
causes of this deceleration are hard to understand, one of the reasons
was the erosion of incentives for people to work and to save. In turn this
erosion was linked to the persistence of high and variable inflation rates
and the high and growing marginal rates of income taxes. The Reagan
programme was designed to restore these incentives and to strengthen
economic growth [see Boskin (1987)]. 
Reagan’s economic programme drew on diverse sources: mone-
tarism, which advocated lower growth in the money supply in order to
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control inflation; supply-side economics, which proposed lower taxation to
reinforce the incentives to work and save; rational expectations, which
postulated the superiority of fixed rules over the discretion of economic
policy; and, finally, the deregulation ideas of exponents of the free mar-
ket, who called for reducing government intervention in the economy in
order to enhance private initiative. The policies put into practice by Rea-
gan during his two mandates were primarily the following: a ) he firmly
supported the Federal Reserve’s anti-inflationary monetary policy, de-
spite the pressures for its abandonment during the 1981-1982 recession;
b) he switched the budget priorities by strengthening defence spending
and trimming other programmes; c) he carried out a far-reaching tax re-
form, lowering marginal rates and multiplying investment incentives; d) he
continued the liberalisation and deregulation of markets that Carter had
begun, and e) he changed the concept of what constitutes a reasonable
economic policy for a market economy. This last point is what Boskin
considers the major achievement of Reaganomics, because, only a few
years before, price and wage controls, constant manipulation of aggre-
gate demand via unexpected fiscal and monetary measures, subsidies,
protectionism, financial intervention, etc. were considered effective eco-
nomic policies”
Each of these policies was inspired by one of the “schools” of thought
mentioned above, but none managed to get all it wanted. The mone-
tarists complained that the control exerted by the Federal Reserve on the
money supply was too erratic; supply-side economists said the tax cut
was too late, too little and later counteracted by other measures; fiscal
conservatives applauded the cuts in various spending programmes and
the tax reform, but they were appalled by the magnitude of the budget
deficit; the exponents of a smaller government role in the economy point-
ed out that public spending as a percentage of GDP had risen rather than
declined during the Reagan mandate; and the advocates of economic
policy rules in lieu of government discretion were distressed that not
enough monetary policy rules had been institutionalised for drawing up
the budget and its control or for permanently limiting expenditure, taxes
and the budget deficit. It is perhaps the magnitude and persistence of the
budget deficit where all the critiques of the Reagan administration’s eco-
nomic policy concur.
Although, from the standpoint of stabilisation policy, Reagan was the
first president since Eisenhower to resist the pressures to use short-run
economic policies for electoral purposes, by backing the Federal Re-
serve’s strict monetary policy and raising some taxes during the 1982 re-
cession, the enormous growth in the deficit that year marked a new level
in the disequilibrium of public finances in comparison with the small deficit
of the two previous decades (if the 1975 recession is excluded). Although
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the rise in the deficit in 1982 was less pronounced than in 1975, its cor-
rection during the expansion that followed did not occur: whereas in
1978-1979 the balance of government accounts showed a slight surplus,
the reduction in the deficit from the 4 % of 1983 (similar to the 1975 fig-
ure) was much more gradual and more limited, reaching a low of around
2 % of GDP in 1988 and then climbing again to an all-time high of 4.5%
of GDP in 1992. The roots of the higher level of the American budget
deficit in the eighties have been attributed to three main factors: a) the
Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), which reduced marginal rates in
1981, 1982 and 1983 and established the future indexing, effective as of
1985, of taxable income brackets; b) the increases in several public
spending items, not sufficiently offset by reductions in other budget cap-
tions, and c) the recession.
ERTA was designed to restrain – via cuts in nominal rates – the fiscal
drag towards higher tax rates which inflation was causing in the fixed
brackets until their indexation entered into effect in 1985. It was only in-
tended, therefore, to freeze the direct tax burden. But, in working its way
through Congress in 1981, the measure came to represent a greater tax
reduction than its designers had intended. Reagan had proposed a 30 %
tax cut over three years, but Congress, while lowering the reduction to
25% over two and a half years, altered other aspects of the tax structure
to make it more equitable, which signified a substantial additional loss in
revenue with respect to the initial project. Even though Congress was
also concerned about the jump in the budget deficit in 1982 and approved
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), which raised the
taxes of other sources to offset the additional cut in the ERTA, the deficit
nonetheless continued climbing as a percentage of GDP in 1983.
Part of the slide in revenue to lower-than-expected levels was due to
forecasting errors or to deliberately upward biased estimates of the
growth in nominal income, which exaggerated both the increase in real
income and the future rate of inflation. The continuance of restrictive
monetary policy conditions, despite the incipient recession, led to higher
interest rates (the Federal Reserve had already warned Congress that
this would inevitably happen if it passed a tax cut of the magnitude that
was ultimately agreed) and rapid disinflation. As a result, the economic
policy mix contributed towards the enlargement of the budget deficit, gen-
erating lower tax receipts than forecast (due to disinflation and the reces-
sion) and higher expenditure (due to the recession and, above all, to the
sudden increase in interest expenses of nearly three percentage points of
GDP, resulting from the initial increases in rates and the budget deficit
and their later consolidation at historically high levels).
Other studies emphasise the rise in government spending in real
terms, which in 1984 was approximately 15 % higher than what Reagan’s
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advisors had foreseen at the beginning of his mandate. If this rise in ex-
penditure is discounted, the increase in the budget deficit vanishes. The
spending items that grew most between 1980 and 1984 were government
consumption (defence spending) and social security benefits, with each
of these captions growing by around 1 % of GDP, and interest expenses,
whose weight in GDP rose by three percentage points. From the view-
point of cyclical adjustments, spending advanced in a stabilising manner
in the first half of the eighties, but the big increases of 1980 and 1982
were not sufficiently offset by the small decrease of 1984. Moreover, rev-
enue declined in 1983-1984 (and again in 1988) as a percentage of
GDP, which was not consistent with the more robust pace of economic
a c t i v i t y .
Just when the economy and economic policy-makers appeared to
have adapted to the existence of a trend budget deficit, the Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollis Act (GRHA) was introduced. This law of 1985 fixed a path for
the budget deficit’s reduction over subsequent years, so that, if Congress
failed to reach an agreement on achieving this objective, nearly all expen-
diture items would be automatically cut. Although the majority of welfare
expenses, interest payments on debt and the government’s other legal
commitments with private agents would have to be respected, the rest of
the captions would be sufficiently reduced to meet the target. However, a
large part of the budget planning effort generated by GRHA was devoted
to skirting it, rather than complying with it, through various ways and
means: accounting innovations, privatisations (for cash-basis budget ac-
counts), payments deferrals, the offsetting of federal deficits with loans
from social security funds, etc. Despite all, in 1987 and in 1988 in particu-
lar, total public spending as a percentage of GDP declined, and the bud-
get deficit was lowered to 2 % of GDP in 1988 and to 1.5 % in 1989.
US monetary policy followed a very stable path as from the early
eighties. During the second half of the eight years that Volcker headed
the Federal Reserve until late 1987, and then in the first few years of
Greenspan’s mandate, the Federal Reserve managed to prevent the ac-
celerations in the money supply which had on previous occasions made it
necessary to undertake subsequent restrictive corrections. After giving
the economy two quarters of monetary impulse at the beginning of 1983,
the Federal Reserve held to a moderate growth pattern with a downward
trend until 1989. The annual average increase in M2 was, in fact, less
than 5 % between early 1987 and mid-1989. Real GDP and prices re-
mained on the same path of mild expansion as the money supply. In this
period, the economy had to grapple with the plunge in stock market
prices in October 1987, which ended without any truly serious conse-
quences due to the quick reaction of the Federal Reserve and its injection
of liquidity into financial markets.
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In mid-1988 the unemployment rate was below 5.5 % and plants were
running at almost full capacity. The Federal Reserve decided to act pre-
emptively to slow down aggregate demand to what it called a “soft land-
ing”. To the surprise of many, the initial stages of the process were a suc-
cess. The Federal Reserve brought M2 down to 2.6 % between mid-1988
and mid-1989 in order to achieve zero inflation, even supporting a draft
law presented in Congress that made this a priority target of economic
policy. But with 5 % growth in labour costs, as occurred in 1989-1990,
this objective was not easily attainable. In August 1990, with the uncer-
tainty caused by the Gulf crisis after Iraq invaded Kuwait and the surge in
oil prices to $40 per barrel, consumers became cautious and restrained
their spending. Despite all, the Federal Reserve persisted in its restrictive
policy to the end of the year and the start of the next. The annualised in-
crease in M2 had been 1.1 % in the fourth quarter of 1990 and continued
sliding in January. The Federal Reserve seemed more concerned about
the inflationary impact of the rise in oil prices than about the imminent re-
cession, or else it was only looking at interest rates, which had been
falling during the second half of 1990, especially in the final quarter. Thus
arrived the recession of 1991, whose mildness and brief duration made it
similar to the downturns of 1970 and 1980.
US fiscal policy in the nineties has been characteristised by a focus
on reducing the budget deficit, which again climbed to more than 4 % of
GDP in 1992, partly as a result of the recession of 1991, but also due to
the expansion in total government expenditure in what was an election
year, amid the uncertainties regarding the end of the recessive period
that the American economy had been weathering. From the standpoint of
cyclical adjustments, revenue has followed a path fairly independent of
the economic situation: in 1989 the share of revenue in GDP rose by half
a percentage point, despite the deceleration in real growth, and between
1990 and 1992 it remained constant as a percentage of GDP, without
showing any sensitivity to the recession. Total general government ex-
penditure, which had undergone a downward correction in 1988 and had
held at this level in 1989, once again expanded notably in 1990 and con-
tinued on an expansionary path in 1991 and 1992, when the budget
deficit reached 4.3 % of GDP. In the following three years, coinciding with
the firm recovery in economic growth, the efforts to rein in the budget
deficit continued, primarily through slower growth in total expenditure,
whose weight in GDP returned to the level of the early eighties, thus re-
ducing the deficit to less than 2 % of GDP in 1995.
In the early years of the nineties, the fiscal situation deteriorated no-
tably in the United States largely due to three factors: ) net expenditure
derived from the system of deposit guarantees was revised upwards due
to the crisis that affected many savings and loan institutions; b) the esti-
mates of the tax collection capacity of the current tax system were re-
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vised downwards, and c) economic growth projections were appreciably
lower than what had been foreseen in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings leg-
islation in its original (1985) and revised (1987) forms. Moreover, the diffi-
culties in arriving at an agreement on specific measures for ensuring that
the objectives of trimming the budget deficit envisaged in this legislation
led to a postponement of their fulfilment and ultimately discredited their
effectiveness. A fresh round of negotiations between the administration
and Congress then began for the purpose of defining other medium-term
objectives, which culminated in November 1990 in an agreement to put
into practice a deficit-reducing programme over several years – the Om-
nibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 – whose aim was to reach budgetary
equilibrium, without counting the usual social security surplus, in fiscal
1995. But this objective was again delayed in the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1993, which proposed stabilising the federal government
deficit at around 3 % of GDP in 1997, due to the less optimistic forecasts
for economic growth, the vigorous expansion in several spending items
such as health, and further downward revisions for estimated tax re-
ceipts. Nevertheless, the ongoing strength of the American economy
since 1993 has led to better results than expected at the time, and the
federal deficit for 1996 was estimated at approximately 1.5 % ofGDP.
III.2. Revenue, expenditure and balance of government accounts
Over the past 35 years, the economic scale of the general govern-
ment sector in the United States has risen to a lesser extent than in the
other OECD countries. If measured in terms of the weight of total govern-
ment expenditure in GDP, its behaviour in this period is reflected in the
central part of Chart III.1 (ut supra, I.9, for the conventions used in the
presentation of the charts). In 1960 total general government spending
was slightly less than 27 % of GDP, and it now stands at around 37 % af-
ter reaching a high of nearly 40 % in 1993. Especially notable in this per-
formance are the increases in 1966-1967 arising from the launch of the
Great Society programmes and the spiralling defence spending on the
Vietnam war, the temporary increases linked to the economic crises of
1974-1975, 1978-1982 and 1990-1991, and the consolidation in the early
eighties of the higher total expenditure of the previous recession, primari-
ly due to the defence spending of the Reagan administration. The aver-
age annual increase in total expenditure between 1960 and 1995 was
nearly 0.29 percentage points of GDP, with a standard deviation of 1.14
points.
The weight of government revenue in GDP in the United States con-
tinued to rise with a certain lag and to a lesser extent in comparison with
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government spending, giving rise to recurrent budget deficits, which
climbed substantially during downturns and then disappeared in upturns,
or at least until 1978. However, the expansion in spending between 1978
and 1982 was not financed by an equivalent increase in revenue, and
thus the trend level of the budget balance went from close to equilibrium
to a persistent deficit of nearly 3 % of GDP, as shown in the grey line at
the lower left-hand side of Chart III.1 (the black line represents real GDP
growth in the American economy between 1961 and 1995). This same
chart shows that government revenue, which represented 27.7 % of GDP
in 1960 and approximately 35 % in 1995, fell in 1964-1965 because of
the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut, and later rose swiftly – temporarily in part –
to finance social and military spending in the second half of the sixties.
Thereafter, except for the short-lived impact of recessions and tax re-
forms, the rise in the weight of revenue followed a fairly stable upward
course until 1987, before tapering off over the past ten years. The aver-
age annual increase in total revenue as a percentage of GDP in the peri-
od 1961-1995 was 0.2 percentage points, with a standard deviation of
0.82 points.
The basic results of the estimates of the cyclical sensitivity of total
revenue and expenditure and of general government net lending (+) or
net borrowing (–) in the United States for the period 1961-1995 are pre-
sented in Table III.1. Revenue does not reflect a well defined cyclical sen-
sitivity, and its positive sign (stabilising) can only be said to be different
from zero with a 19 % margin of error. Moreover, this relationship be-
tween government revenue and economic growth was totally unsystemat-
ic, as suggested by the low estimated correlation coefficients. The recur-
sive estimations of the cyclical sensitivity coefficient are stable, but the
RSS test of the residual sum of squares exceeds the 5 % confidence
bands between 1972 and 1977. Total government expenditure, by con-
trast, reflects an appreciable cyclical sensitivity (–0.34) of a stabilising
and systematic nature (R2a=0.37). The residuals of this regression have
an appreciable first-order correlation (0.29) which, if remedied by intro-
ducing an AR(1) term in the equation, produces an estimated cyclical
sensitivity coefficient of –0.39, close to the previous one. The recursive
estimations of the cyclical sensitivity coefficient are stable. General gov-
ernment net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) in the United States shows a
cyclical sensitivity of 0.43, largely due to expenditure. The estimated cor-
relation coefficient is relatively high (0.47), while the residuals of this re-
gression are not significantly correlated. The recursive estimations reveal
that the cyclical sensitivity coefficient of the balance of government ac-
counts has remained stable, at least as of the mid-seventies.
Although the cyclical sensitivities of revenue, expenditure and the bal-
ance of government accounts have not undergone any significant
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changes in the past 30 years, the recursive estimations indicate that their
values were somewhat lower in the early sixties. In order to ensure that
the estimations reflect the cyclical sensitivity of fiscal policy at the present
time, a backward selection was made for the most recent period, during
which this sensitivity remained approximately constant. The following ta-
bles present the estimates referring to the period 1968-1995 which, ac-
cording to the Chow test, is more appropriate than the overall period for
which information is available. Table III.2 gives these estimations of the
cyclical sensitivity of revenue, expenditure and general government net
lending (+) or net borrowing (–) for the years 1968-1995, whose charac-
teristics are very similar to the previous ones. It should be noted that the
autocorrelation of the residuals in the regression of total expenditure sug-
gested by the Durbin-Watson statistic is not appreciable in other tests.
The results obtained for this restricted period are higher and more signifi-
cant than the findings for the sample as a whole, indicating the greater
stabilising capacity of fiscal policy since the late sixties.
III.3. Stabilising effects of disposable income
The stabilising effects on the private sector’s gross disposable in-
come exerted by the redistribution operations of general government,
through its current revenue and transfers, is summarised in Table III.3 for
the period 1968-1995. Both current revenue, whose cyclical sensitivity is
estimated at –0.13, and current transfers in particular, with a cyclical sen-
sitivity of –0.25, have helped to stabilise the gross disposable income of
the private sector by a magnitude of 0.38 points for each percentage
point of the cyclical fluctuations in GDP. In the years 1968-1995 the gross
disposable income of general government is estimated to have had a
cyclical sensitivity of 0.38, with a standard deviation of 0.08 and a 0.41
correlation between its fluctuations and those of real growth. There is a
notable first-order correlation (–0.41) between the residuals of this re-
gression, which may be corrected by introducing a MA(1) term in the
equation, which lowers somewhat the estimated value of its cyclical sen-
sitivity (0.32). According to the estimations in Table III.3, the cyclical sen-
sitivity of private-sector gross disposable income had the same magni-
tude and opposite sign of that of general government, while gross
national disposable income showed no sensitivity at all and its fluctua-
tions were totally independent of the fluctuations in the real growth of the
American economy. The residual autocorrelation which exists in these re-
gressions is remedied by introducing a MA(1) term, without affecting the
values of cyclical sensitivity. The recursive estimations of these coeffi-
cients are stable. In other words, for each percentage point of deviation in
the real growth rate with respect to its average, the real gross disposable
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income of general government deviated in the same direction as growth
by 0.38 percentage points from its average change as a percentage of
GDP. Given that the cyclical sensitivity of gross national disposable in-
come was nil, this signifies that the gross disposable income of the pri-
vate sector deviated in the same magnitude and in the opposite direction
as that of general government, such that these cyclical adjustments
smoothed the fluctuations (in levels) of the gross disposable income of all
resident sectors other than general government.
The balance of the income redistribution operations of general govern-
ment through current revenue and transfers is the sector’s gross dispos-
able income, whose trend behaviour and cyclical fluctuations in the period
1960-1995 are shown in Chart III.2, together with those of the other resi-
dent sectors (or private sector, to abbreviate) and those of the national
economy of the United States. Gross national disposable income only dif-
fers from GDP at current prices with respect to the flows of income and net
transfers from the rest of the world, whose magnitude is not significant for
the United States, and therefore the trends and fluctuations in the gross
disposable income of general government in terms of GDP are strictly
complementary to those of the other sectors that constitute the national
economy. Two periods may be distinguished in the trend behaviour of the
sectoral breakdown of gross national disposable income as of 1960. To
1967 the share of general government held relatively stable around a level
of approximately 20 % of GDP, after which it tended to fall, reaching
somewhat more than 15 % of GDP in 1995, with fluctuations linked to the
economy’s cyclical position. Also worth mentioning with respect to the sta-
bilising effects of fiscal policy on private-sector gross disposable income is
that their magnitude and, above all, their correlation with economic growth
were less to the year 1968 than afterwards. These differences mainly
stem from the behaviour of current taxes on income and wealth.
93
TABLE III.1
UNITED STATES (1961-1995)
CYCLICAL SENSITIVITY OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
Annual change as a percentage of GDP
Total revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.20 0.82 0.09 1.34 2.17 0.02
Total expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.29 1.14 –0.34 4.57 1.22 0.37
Net lending (+) or net 
borrowing (–). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.09 1.29 0.43 5.54 1.94 0.47
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Real GDP(rate). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.98 2.09 — — — —
Average S t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n Sensitivity t DW Ra
2
The structure, trend behaviour and cyclical fluctuations of the princi-
pal components of general government current revenue and transfers are
shown in Charts III.3 and III.4, respectively, following the presentation cri-
teria explained in the last section of Chapter I. In the sixties, the taxes
linked to production and imports, current taxes on income and wealth,
and other current revenue fluctuated around nearly constant levels. The
increase in the weight of current revenue with respect to GDP was some-
what more than two percentage points and is explained by the growth in
social security contributions. In the seventies, the weight in GDP of taxes
linked to production and imports initially continued to rise, reaching 8.7 %
in 1971, but later moved in the opposite direction and their share of GDP
diminished continually until reaching 6.8 % in 1979 before recovering
slightly to 7.3 % in 1981. Current taxes on income and wealth remained
practically constant, with considerable cyclical fluctuations around a sta-
ble level of somewhat more than 13 % of GDP. Social security contribu-
tions gave the greatest upward impulse to the level of current revenue,
rising from 5.7 % of GDP in 1968 to 8.4 % in 1981. In the eighties, the
weight of general government current revenue in GDP continued to in-
crease more or less at the same rate as from the late seventies and pro-
pelled by the same component, namely social security contributions. Cur-
rent taxes on income and wealth and taxes linked to production and
imports recorded flat growth as a percentage of GDP.
The cyclical sensitivity of current revenue in the period 1968-1995 is
estimated at 0.13, which only proves significantly greater than zero with a
10 % margin of error, and the correlation with real economic growth is al-
most nil. The recursive estimations show a diminishing value in the cycli-
cal sensitivity coefficient, never significantly different from zero. It can
therefore be concluded that the contribution of general government rev-
enue to the stabilisation of private-sector disposable income had a posi-
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TABLE III.2
UNITED STATES (1968-1995)
CYCLICAL SENSITIVITY OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
Annual change as a percentage of GDP
Total revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.22 0.86 0.13 1.70 2.19 0.07
Total expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.24 1.17 –0.41 5.40 1.47 0.51
Net lending (+) or net
borrowing (–). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.02 1.38 0.55 7.24 2.42 0.66
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Real GDP (rate). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.58 2.07 — — — —
Average S t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n Sensitivity t DW Ra
2
tive sign, albeit rather weak and disconnected from the fluctuations in
growth. Taxes linked to production and imports had a negative cyclical
sensitivity of –0.03, with a t-ratio of 1.91 and a correlation of 0.09 with
growth. The residuals of the regression have a positive first-order correla-
tion (0.35), which is corrected by introducing a MA(1) term, without affect-
ing the estimated value of the cyclical sensitivity coefficient. The recursive
estimation shows that the cyclical sensitivity of these taxes remained sta-
ble. Current income and wealth taxes have positive cyclical sensitivity
(0.16) of a stabilising sign with a margin of error of less than 1 % and with
a correlation of 0.22 between its fluctuations and those in economic
growth. This regression poses no major problems of residual autocorrela-
tion. The recursive estimation reveals that the cyclical sensitivity coeffi-
cient remained sufficiently stable, although the RSS test of the residual
sum of the squares crosses the 5 % confidence threshold in the years
1974-1977. The weak correlation between the fluctuations of current tax-
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TABLE III.3
UNITED STATES (1968-1995)
STABILISING EFFECT OF DISPOSABLE INCOME
Annual change as a percentage of GDP
GENERAL GOVERNMENT:
Current revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.22 0.86 0.13 1.70 2.19 0.07
Taxes on production
and imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.01 0.20 –0.03 1.91 1.19 0.09
Income taxes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.03 0.67 0.16 2.97 2.23 0.22
Social security contributions. . 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.23 1.40 0.00
Other revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.05 0.56 0.00 0.00 1.44 0.00
Current transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . 0.37 0.63 –0.25 7.45 2.18 0.67
Welfare benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.28 0.56 –0.23 8.82 1.29 0.74
Subsidies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00 0.08 –0.00 0.27 1.88 0.00
Interest payments. . . . . . . . . . . 0.09 0.19 –0.03 1.59 0.75 0.05
Other transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.66 2.99 0.00
Gross disposable income. . . . –0.15 1.20 0.38 4.47 2.72 0.41
PRIVATE SECTOR:
Gross disposable income. . . . 0.14 1.18 –0.39 4.79 2.73 0.45
NATIONAL ECONOMY:
Gross disposable income. . . . –0.01 0.27 –0.00 0.21 2.46 0.00
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Real GDP(rate). . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.58 2.07 — — — —
Average S t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n Sensitivity t DW Ra
2
es on income and wealth and those in growth appears to be due to the
many discretionary changes made in their regulations, giving rise to a
succession of atypical residuals of considerable magnitude, albeit dimin-
ishing over time. Social security contributions in the period 1968-1995 do
not reflect any well defined cyclical sensitivity or any correlation with eco-
nomic growth. As seen in Chart III.3, except in the case of several one-off
adjustments of a discretionary nature (1966, 1973), the fluctuations in this
variable were very limited, despite a notable trend expansion. Lastly, the
group formed by other current income reflected nil cyclical sensitivity and
nil correlation with growth.
In current transfers (see Chart III.4), only welfare benefits – and to a
much lesser extent effective interest payments – recorded any significant
expansion in their weight as percentages of GDP in this period. As oc-
curred in other countries, the growth in welfare benefits, which in the Unit-
ed States was concentrated in the period 1966-1975, was not accompa-
nied by an increase of the same magnitude in current revenue to finance
them without eroding government saving. The general government bor-
rowing requirement generated by this item led to greater indebtedness
and later to the increase in interest payments, which in the United States
occurred in the first half of the eighties. Welfare benefits, after doubling
their level as a percentage of GDP between 1966 (5.7 %) and 1975
(11.7%), stabilised at less than 12 % (except for the temporary rise in the
recessive period 1982-1983) until the downturn at the beginning of the
nineties, rising again to more than 14 % from 1992 onwards. The share of
production subsidies in GDP hardly varied, nor by extension did they
record cyclical fluctuations, as seen in Chart III.4. The effective interest
paid by general government increased their relative weight in GDP by
somewhat more than two percentage points, representing an average of
0.09 per year, with a standard deviation of 0.19. Lastly, other current
transfers, primarily to the rest of the world, also remained very stable, at
0.2 % to 0.3 % of GDP since 1960, with the exception of 1991, when the
United States received external support to finance the expenses caused
by the war in the Persian Gulf.
The cyclical sensitivity of current transfers as a whole in the years
1968-1995 is estimated at –0.25, of an unequivocally stabilising sign, with
a fairly high correlation (0.67) between its fluctuations and those in
growth. The residuals of the regression do not appear to be correlated,
and the coefficient of cyclical sensitivity remained stable. Social security
benefits reflected a cyclical sensitivity of –0.23 and a correlation of 0.74
with growth. A positive first- (0.30) and second-order (0.33) correlation
exists between the residuals of the regression, which is corrected by in-
troducing AR(1) and MA(1) terms in the equation, without affecting the
estimated value of its cyclical sensitivity. This coefficient is stable when
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estimated recursively, ranging between –0.19 and –0.23. Production sub-
sidies had no well defined cyclical sensitivity, because their fluctuations
were of scant magnitude and totally independent of the fluctuations in
growth. The cyclical sensitivity of general government effective interest
payments was –0.03, of a negative sign with a 12 % margin of error and
a negligible correlation (0.05) with growth. There is a strong positive first-
(0.61) and second-order (0.32) correlation between the regression’s
residuals, which can be corrected by introducing an AR(1) term in the
equation, thus reducing to –0.02 the value of the cyclical sensitivity coeffi-
cient. The other current transfers show no cyclical fluctuations worthy of
mention, thus lacking a stabilising effect on private-sector disposable
income.
III.4. Stabilising effects of nominal expenditure and real demand
According to the definitions of the stabilising effects set out in ChapterI ,
fiscal policy directly helps to stabilise the aggregate expenditure (at cur-
rent prices) of the economy if general government spending on goods
and services (consumption and investment at current prices) fluctuates
less than aggregate expenditure or, in other words, than the spending of
other sectors. Given that the behaviour of prices or deflators of expendi-
ture reflect a great inertia, the stabilisation of aggregate spending implies
the stabilisation of demand and output at constant prices. In this section,
therefore, we shall study the stabilising effects of government and private
consumption of goods and services in relation to their respective gross
disposable incomes, i.e. the consumption/saving and investment/financ-
ing decisions of general government and the other resident sectors, as
well as their impact on the stability of output. Table III.4 summarises the
main findings of the estimates obtained for the cyclical sensitivity of the
variables that reflect these decisions in the period 1968-1995.
Chart III.5 shows the trend behaviour of national consumption and its
private and public components as percentages of GDP, at current prices,
in the left-hand column. The column to the right presents the fluctuations
in real growth (in bars, measured in the left scale), and the fluctuations in
national consumption and its components at current prices (grey line) and
at constant prices (black line), measured in the right scale. Note that, ex-
cept in certain years marked by strong relative price adjustments that no-
tably altered the structures of the deflators, the fluctuations in real and
nominal terms show a high degree of conformity. The charts in the left-
hand column show that in the decades of the sixties and seventies na-
tional consumption at current prices fluctuated around a constant level of
80 % of GDP, climbing in the eighties by around four percentage points of
GDP and then stabilising in recent years. The relative shares of private
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Source: European Commission. Figures for 1996 and 1997 are forecasts estimated by the Commis-
sion’s Technical Services.
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and government consumption were more variable in this period. Until
1967 private consumption tended to lose weight in demand at current
prices, while government consumption remained more stable to 1965, but
then increased sharply in the two subsequent years due to the escalation
in military spending on the Vietnam war. These changes were more a re-
sult of the tendency of the deflators than of changes in the structure of
real demand. From 1982 onwards, the weight of private consumption in
aggregate demand tended to rise, a tendency that has continued to the
present. Government consumption remained more stable until 1991, and
since then its share has shown a pronounced decline.
Expenditure in government consumption in the period 1968-1995 re
flected a cyclical sensitivity of –0.17, with a 0.52 correlation with growth,
identical to the results estimated for the cyclical sensitivity of consumption
at constant prices. However, this regression produces residuals with a
high first- (0.57) and second-order (0.47) correlation, which can be cor-
rected by adding the terms MA(1) and MA(2) to the equation, which rais-
es the coefficient of estimated cyclical sensitivity (in absolute terms) to
–0.21. The recursive estimation of this coefficient is stable.
Expenditure in private consumption showed an average cyclical sen-
sitivity of –0.23 in the years 1968-1995, with a standard deviation of 0.05
and a correlation of 0.47 with economic growth. These values, higher and
more significant than those obtained for private consumption at constant
prices, indicate that the fluctuations of the deflator of private consumption
relative to GDP were generally of the same sign as those of the weight of
real private consumption in real GDP. The recursive estimations of these
coefficients are stable. In sum, it can be concluded that, on average in
the period 1968-1995, the stabilising effects of expenditure in private con-
sumption on the aggregate demand of the economy were greater and
more systematic than those of real private consumption on real demand
and output.
Expenditure in national consumption, the sum of private and govern-
ment consumption, recorded a cyclical sensitivity of –0.4 and a high cor-
relation (0.61) with growth. No significant residual correlation is found in
this regression, and the recursive estimation shows that the cyclical sen-
sitivity of this variable remained stable. To summarise, it can be said that
national consumption had a stabilising effect on aggregate demand and
output, offsetting approximately three-fourths of the fluctuations of a con-
trary sign recorded in gross capital formation, while the rest was ab-
sorbed by net external demand (exports minus imports).
The consumption spending decisions of general government and
households and their cyclical fluctuations must be seen in relation to the
trends and fluctuations in their disposable income, resulting in fluctua-
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tions of their gross saving. Chart III.6 illustrates the behaviour of gross
national saving and its breakdown by sector. Until the early eighties, the
national saving rate was stable, because the increase in private saving
counteracted the trend decline in government saving. However, the
change of sign in government saving in 1982-1983, which reached nega-
tive values of close to 2 % of GDP, and the additional slide in private sav-
ing by nearly four percentage points of GDP between 1984 and 1987
gave rise to a considerable fall of some six percentage points in the na-
tional saving rate between 1979 and 1987. Since then national saving
has fluctuated in the region of 16 % of GDP, with offsetting movements in
private and public saving.
As to the private sector’s consumption and saving decisions, the sta-
bilising effects of private consumption expenditure on aggregate demand
and output were approximately proportional to the stabilising effects of
fiscal policy on private-sector gross disposable income, and thus the re-
sponse of expenditure to income took the form of stable marginal propen-
sity to private consumption during the period in question. As a result, pri-
vate-sector saving was also “stabilised” in a proportion similar to the
stabilisation of the sector’s disposable income, and this tended to height-
en the dependence of the private sector on borrowing for its investment
expenditure during cyclical upturns as well as on the lending of its surplus
saving in recessions. The cyclical sensitivity of private saving was –0.16,
which is only significantly less than zero with a 10 % margin of error, and
its correlation with growth is almost nil. The first-order autocorrelation
(–0.3) between the residuals of this regression is corrected with a MA(1)
term without notably affecting the estimated coefficient of cyclical sensi-
tivity (which becomes –0.19). The recursive estimation shows that the
value of the coefficient remained stable, although it was somewhat
greater in absolute value in the seventies.
Meanwhile, the average cyclical sensitivity of government saving in
the period 1968-1995 was 0.56, with a standard deviation of 0.08, and a
correlation of 0.66 with growth. This regression has a first-order residual
autocorrelation (–0.37), which is remedied with an AR(1) term, without af-
fecting the estimated cyclical sensitivity coefficient (0.54). The recursive
estimation indicates that cyclical sensitivity remained stable. Consequent-
ly, gross national saving showed a cyclical sensitivity of 0.40, with a stan-
dard deviation of 0.07, and a correlation of 0.53 with growth. There are no
autocorrelation problems in this regression’s residuals. The recursive es-
timation reveals that the value of the cyclical sensitivity of national saving
was stable. Therefore, the same conclusion drawn above for the stabilis-
ing effect of national consumption on aggregate expenditure and output is
repeated here from the standpoint of saving. The pro-cyclical sensitivity
of national saving facilitates part of the financing necessary to meet the
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pro-cyclical fluctuations in gross national capital formation, thanks to the
stabilising effects of fiscal policy through the twofold channel of the stabil-
isation of private-sector disposable income, which helps to stabilise pri-
vate consumption, and of the direct stabilisation of government consump-
tion expenditure.
The trend behaviour of gross national capital formation and of private
and government investment, together with cyclical fluctuations, are pre-
sented in Chart III.7. As shown, private investment in both the long and
the short run was the determining component in national investment,
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TABLE III.4
UNITED STATES (1968-1995)
CHANGES IN THE BREAKDOWN OF NOMINAL EXPENDITURE AND REAL DEMAND
Annual change as a percentage of GDP
National consumption. . . . . . . . 0.12 1.05 –0.40 6.63 1.94 0.61
Private. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.20 0.69 –0.23 5.03 1.95 0.47
Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.08 0.48 –0.17 5.45 2.03 0.52
Gross national saving. . . . . . . . –0.14 1.11 0.40 5.59 1.96 0.53
Private. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.06 1.01 –0.16 1.71 2.45 0.07
Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.08 1.40 0.56 7.25 2.67 0.66
National investment. . . . . . . . . . –0.05 1.31 0.54 8.49 1.92 0.72
Private. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.01 1.39 0.56 7.63 1.60 0.68
Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.06 0.22 –0.01 0.65 1.13 0.00
National saving/investment
balance (1 + 2 = 3 – 4 + 5). . . . . –0.09 0.71 –0.15 2.45 1.75 0.16
1. Private. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.07 1.75 –0.71 7.99 2.78 0.70
2. Government. . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.01 1.40 0.57 7.82 2.65 0.69
3. Exports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.22 0.62 –0.05 0.79 1.05 0.00
4. Imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.29 0.60 0.10 1.82 2.43 0.08
5. Income and transfers. . . . . . –0.01 0.27 –0.00 0.21 2.46 0.00
REAL DEMAND (a):
Private consumption. . . . . . . . . 0.25 0.65 –0.18 3.43 1.71 0.28
Government consumption. . . . –0.24 0.52 –0.18 5.38 0.85 0.51
Gross capital formation. . . . . . . 0.06 1.28 0.52 8.15 1.54 0.71
Exports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.29 0.41 –0.02 0.44 0.81 0.00
Imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.37 0.49 0.15 4.18 0.98 0.38
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Real GDP(rate). . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.58 2.07 — — — —
Average S t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n Sensitivity t DW Ra
2
(a) Annual change in variables at constant prices, as percentage of GDP at constant prices.
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Source: European Commission. Figures for 1996 and 1997 are forecasts estimated by the Commis-
sion’s Technical Services.
CHART III.5
UNITED STATES
NATIONAL CONSUMPTION AND ITS BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR
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while government investment followed a very stable course in terms of
GDP, ranging between 2.3 % and 3.1 %, with a standard deviation of
0.12 percentage points of GDP, compared with 1.39 for private invest-
ment. The cyclical sensitivity of government investment, i.e. the sum of
gross capital formation and the net acquisition of land of general govern-
ment, in the period 1968-1995 was –0.02, not different from zero, and its
correlation with economic growth was practically nil. The recursive esti-
mation of the coefficient remains stable until 1994, with a small jump to
zero in the last year of the period. It cannot be said, therefore, that gov-
ernment investment exerted any stabilising effect on the aggregate ex-
penditure and output of the US economy. Private investment was the
most significant destabilising element (and, it might be said, also the driv-
ing force) in aggregate demand and output, with an average cyclical sen-
sitivity of 0.56 between 1968 and 1995, a standard deviation of 0.07, and
a correlation of 0.68 with growth. No residual autocorrelation problems
exist, and the recursive estimation of the coefficient is very stable as of
the final years of the seventies. Consequently, it could be said that the
cyclical sensitivity of private investment was very high, particularly from
the mid-seventies onwards, such that, for each percentage point of devia-
tion from the real economic growth rate with respect to its average, the
annual change in the weight of private investment in GDP deviated from
its average by somewhat more than half a percentage point in the same
direction.
Gross national capital formation, i.e. the sum of the gross capital for-
mation of general government and of the other resident sectors (and also
the sum of the investment of both sectors, because net acquisitions of
land are cancelled out when aggregated), reflected average cyclical sen-
sitivity of 0.54, with a standard deviation of 0.06, and a correlation of 0.71
with growth. In turn the cyclical sensitivity of gross capital formation at
constant prices was very similar to that of national investment expendi-
ture, albeit with a slight first-order residual autocorrelation (0.21), which
can be corrected by introducing an AR(1) term in the equation, without af-
fecting the estimated cyclical sensitivity coefficient (0.56). As seen in the
upper right-hand part of Chart III.7, there is a very high degree of confor-
mity between the fluctuations in gross national capital formation at con-
stant prices (black line) and at current prices (grey line).
The notable temporary deterioration in the general government sav-
ing/investment balance during the recession of 1975 (see Chart III.8) be-
came more permanent in the recession of 1982, when an increase in
government consumption combined with a fall in general government
gross disposable income as a percentage of GDP. This rise in current ex-
penditure caused persistently negative values in government saving and
also generated a lasting borrowing requirement, which has ranged be-
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Source: European Commission. Figures for 1996 and 1997 are forecasts estimated by the Commis-
sion’s Technical Services.
CHART III.6
UNITED STATES
GROSS NATIONAL SAVING AND ITS BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR
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tween 2 % and 4 % of GDP since then. The saving/investment balance of
the other sectors of the American economy also underwent pronounced
fluctuations, but only temporarily reaching negative values (1969, 1978-
1979, 1987-1988 and 1995). Therefore, the sharp worsening in the na-
tional economy’s saving/investment balance between 1982 and 1987 is
associated with the deterioration in the budget equilibrium in the early
years of the decade. Furthermore, its subsequent correction, which re-
stored equilibrium in 1991, did not continue in later years, because the re-
covery in government saving to positive values was not enough to elimi-
nate its borrowing requirement, nor was it accompanied by an analogous
recovery in private saving. Hence the expansion in private investment
and gross national capital formation during the recovery of the US econo-
my could not be financed through domestic saving and led to a fresh in-
crease in net external borrowing.
The average cyclical sensitivity of the general government saving/in-
vestment balance in the period 1968-1995 is estimated at 0.57, with a
standard deviation of 0.07, and its correlation with economic growth is
0.69. The residuals of this regression have a first-order autocorrelation of
–0.34, which is corrected by introducing an AR(1) term in the equation,
without affecting the estimated cyclical sensitivity coefficient (0.55). The
recursive estimation of this coefficient shows that its value was slightly
higher (around 0.7) in the seventies, but the RSS test of residuals does
not detect problems of instability. In turn, the private-sector saving/invest-
ment balance showed a cyclical sensitivity of –71 on average in this peri-
od, with a standard deviation of 0.09, and a correlation of 0.70 with
growth. The residuals of this regression have a first-order autocorrelation
of –0.40, which is corrected with an AR(1) term, without changing the es-
timated value of this coefficient. The recursive estimation indicates that
the cyclical sensitivity of this balance remained stable.
The average saving/investment balance of the national economy in
the period 1968-1995, which in accounting terms corresponds to the bal-
ance of current transactions with the rest of the world (exports minus im-
ports plus the balance of external income and current transfers), reflects
a cyclical sensitivity of –0.15, with a standard deviation of 0.06, and a cor-
relation of 0.16 with growth. The recursive estimation reveals that the co-
efficient remained relatively stable. As in the case of the private sector,
for the entire national economy the greater cyclical sensitivity (in absolute
value) of the saving/investment balance in the more recent sub-period is
primarily explained by the increase in the cyclical sensitivity of invest-
ment, which was greater than that observed in saving. Chart III.8 clearly
shows the greater magnitude of the fluctuations in the balance in the sec-
ond part of the sample.
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Seen from the external standpoint, the basic components of this bal-
ance of transactions with the rest of the world are the export and import
flows of goods and services at current prices, because the balance of in-
come and net current transfers with the rest of the world is negligible in
the United States and has nil cyclical sensitivity, as shown when examin-
ing gross national disposable income. Chart III.9 presents the trend be-
haviour and cyclical fluctuations of exports and imports of goods and ser-
vices in the period 1960-1995. The increase in the weight of exports in
GDP at current prices was very limited until 1972, while that of imports
was more pronounced as of 1965. With the dollar’s depreciation, after the
fixed exchange-rate system was abandoned, and the rise in oil prices and
other raw materials, these relative weights rose significantly, due to the
changes in prices more than to the growth in the volume of trade abroad.
In the second half of the seventies, imports rose non-stop, except during
the recession of 1975, whereas the weight of exports as a percentage of
GDP in 1976-1977 declined somewhat, causing a small external imbal-
ance, albeit unprecedented until then, which was absorbed when exports
recovered in 1979-1980.
In the first half of the eighties, the recession of 1982 only temporarily
halted the advance of imports, while the strength of the dollar and the
weakness of economic growth in the rest of the world also affected ex-
ports, whose share of GDP slid by three percentage points to the same
level as in 1974. This gave rise to a deficit in current transactions with the
rest of the world of around 3 % of GDP in 1985, which would reach 3.5 %
in 1987, due to the swift recovery in imports. With the dollar’s deprecia-
tion and the recovery in the European and Japanese economies in the
second half of the eighties and the first half of the nineties, American ex-
ports recovered and managed to re-absorb almost the entire trade imbal-
ance in 1991. In subsequent years, the weight of both exports and im-
ports in GDP tended to increase rapidly, although imports rose with
greater force, causing another significant deficit in current transactions
with the rest of the world (around 2 % of GDP in 1994-1996).
Exports of goods and services at current prices showed little cyclical
sensitivity in the period 1968-1995 (–0.05), not significantly different from
zero, and nil correlation with growth. A high first- and second-order auto-
correlation exists between the residuals of this regression, which can be
remedied by introducing the AR(1) and AR(2) terms in the equation,
whereby the estimated coefficient of cyclical sensitivity is then –0.02. The
recursive estimate of this coefficient was somewhat more negative
(–0.10) to 1981 than in later years, albeit without ever becoming signifi-
cantly different from zero. Nor do exports of goods and services at con-
stant prices reflect a well defined cyclical sensitivity, because the value of
the coefficient estimated can only be considered different from zero with
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Source: European Commission. Figures for 1996 and 1997 are forecasts estimated by the Commis-
sion’s Technical Services.
CHART III.7
UNITED STATES
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION AND ITS BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR
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a margin of error of approximately 67 %, and the coefficient of correlation
with the real growth of the American economy is nil. The positive first-or-
der autocorrelation of the residuals (0.56) can be corrected without affect-
ing the nil value of the estimated cyclical sensitivity coefficient. The recur-
sive estimate of the cyclical sensitivity coefficient always ranges between
–0.05 and 0, and is never significantly different from zero.
The average cyclical sensitivity of imports of goods and services at
current prices was 0.10 in the period 1968-1995, with a standard devia-
tion of 0.05 and a negligible correlation with economic growth. The recur-
sive estimate of the cyclical sensitivity coefficient was in the region of
zero until 1981 and then stabilised at 0.1 as of 1982. These results are
not very different from those obtained for imports at constant prices, but
they are statistically less robust. Imports of goods and services at con-
stant prices had a significant stabilising effect, complementing the cyclical
adjustments in national consumption (private and government), by offset-
ting the pro-cyclical fluctuations in gross capital formation. The cyclical
sensitivity of imports is estimated at around 0.15, with a standard devia-
tion of less than 0.04, and a correlation coefficient of 0.38. An appreciable
first- (0.46) and second-order (0.40) autocorrelation exists between the
residuals of this regression, which is eliminated by introducing AR(1) and
AR(2) terms in the equation, whereby the estimated cyclical sensitivity
coefficient does not vary and its t-ratio becomes 5.44. The recursive esti-
mates reveal that the estimated coefficient remained stable from the mid-
seventies onwards.
In short, the cyclical changes in the composition of aggregate de-
mand in real terms have been characterised in the United States by the
pro-cyclical behaviour of national demand, offset by the counter-cyclical
changes in net exports, primarily via the adjustment in imports. The roots
of the pro-cyclical performance of national demand lie in gross capital for-
mation, whereas both private and government consumption reflected a
stabilising influence of fluctuations in investment.
Government saving, with high cyclical sensitivity, was the component
that most contributed to aggregate expenditure, through the twofold chan-
nel of the stabilisation of gross disposable income of the other sectors of
the national economy and of government consumption expenditure. The
cyclical sensitivity of general government net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
basically depended on that of government saving, because the stabilising
influence of government investment and of net capital transfers was neg-
ligible. The stabilisation of private-sector gross disposable income largely
occurred through the current transfers of general government – mainly
social security benefits – because current revenue made a smaller and
less systematic contribution, in that the stabilising effects of income taxes
were partly offset by those of the other revenue items. The behaviour of
110
111
CHART III.8
UNITED STATES
SAVING/INVESTMENT BALANCE OF THE NATION AND BY SECTOR
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Source: European Commission. Figures for 1996 and 1997 are forecasts estimated by the Commis-
sion’s Technical Services.
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private consumers transmitted the stabilisation of their disposable income
to the cyclical sensitivity of private consumer spending more or less in
proportion to the average weight of private consumption in the gross dis-
posable income of the private sector.
Private investment, with very high cyclical sensitivity, is the variable
that most contributed to destabilise or to determine the dynamics of ag-
gregate expenditure, leading to a notable counter-cyclical sensitivity in
the private sector’s saving/investment balance. Thus net lending is seen
to rise sharply in recessions and to fall with equal intensity in expansions.
The cyclical sensitivity of the national saving/investment balance (or
balance of current transactions with the rest of the world, if viewed from
the perspective of the economy’s external equilibrium) therefore depends
on the cyclical sensitivity of government saving, on the one hand, and on
that of private investment, on the other, while the contributions of govern-
ment investment and private saving are less significant. From the view-
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point of external equilibrium, the cyclical sensitivity of the balance of cur-
rent transactions with the rest of the world essentially depends on the
cyclical sensitivity of imports, with a smaller and less systematic contribu-
tion of exports and a practically nil contribution of income and net trans-
fers from abroad.
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IV
JAPAN
IV.1. Economic growth and stabilisation policies
When Hayato Ikeda of the Liberal Democratic Party took office as
prime minister in 1960, the basic objective he proposed was to double
Japan’s income in ten years. Even though the opposition in parliament
and most economists considered this goal overly ambitious in the belief
that the Japanese economy’s high growth since the end of the Second
World War would tend to slacken, this target was met in only seven
years. The trend growth rate of output, which had held at between 8 %
and 9 % since 1954, steadily picked up in the last two years of the fifties,
reaching more than 10 % by the early sixties, and it remained more or
less at this level for ten consecutive years, despite the brief but sharp
falls in economic growth in 1962 and 1965. Growth began to decelerate
in 1969 and gradually fell to the region of 4 % in the mid-seventies, stabil-
ising around this trend growth rate during the next 17 years until the re-
cession of 1992-1993.
In addition to the reforms introduced by the American military admin-
istration and the greater demand for Japanese products spurred by the
Korean war in 1950 and 1951, the reasons given in the literature to ex-
plain this high rate of economic expansion, which was to last until 1973,
include the low prices of raw materials and farm products, on which the
Japanese economy is very dependent, the high rate of national saving,
which provided the financing for productive investment, and Japan’s fiscal
and monetary policies, whose priority objective was to promote economic
growth (Ito, p. 63). The latter two factors are closely related, and they
constitute the distinctive feature of what is known as Japan’s “economic
miracle“. At the same time, the main constraints on economic growth
came from the Japanese government’s self-imposed restriction of keep-
ing the country’s trade balance close to equilibrium, banning in practice
cross-border capital flows and foreign investment in particular. The
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growth process in Japan sprang from a series of surprising combinations
of contradictory elements which, in economies other than Japan’s, were a
source of inefficiency in the allocation of resources and an obstacle to
economic development. In general this mix was produced by: merging el-
ements of government intervention and meticulous market regulations
with the flexible application of these same regulations; the centralised co-
ordination of corporate strategies and their independent implementation;
agreements to restrict competition in some areas amid ferocious competi-
tion in all others; maintaining an economy with relatively little exposure
abroad and high productive specialisation, which led to a pre-eminent po-
sition in world trade; offering total job security and keeping wages low;
imposing few legal controls on the growth of government spending and
applying firm budgetary discipline; systematically urging private saving
and keeping inflation under control; and having an independent central
bank, with a flexible submission to the government’s economic objec-
tives.
Among the key institutional features, it should be noted that Japan’s
tax system is characterised by low fiscal pressure, the predominance of
direct taxation over social security contributions and indirect taxes, cen-
tralised tax collection and administration, tax regulations developed by
consensus, the proliferation of all kinds of tax incentives (on saving, re-
gional development, environmental conservation, technological streamlin-
ing, internal corporate financing, etc.), systematic cuts in tax rates to off-
set the pronounced structural progressivity of rates, and tax evasion and
the privileged treatment of non-wage income (Ishi, pp. 12, 39, 42, 44 and
68). Japan’s budgetary policy has traditionally rested on three separate
budgets: the general government account, special accounts, and the ac-
counts of autonomous institutions. The fiscal year begins on April 1, and
the Diet (parliament) approves the budgets around this date. Nonethe-
less, the budgets may be revised in the course of the year to adapt them
to changing economic circumstances and, over the past 30 years, they
have been revised at least once each year. In addition to the budgets, the
Fiscal Programme of Investments and Loans plays an important role, in
that it more or less serves as a capital spending budget – whose funds
mainly come from the savings captured by the Postal Savings Bank –
which is formally divided up among the three above-mentioned budgets.
The special accounts budget is the most sizeable, tripling the funds chan-
neled through the general government budget, and its items range from
specific public investment projects to the accounts of the social security
system. The internal transfers between the three budgets are numerous
and large. [See H.T. Shibata (ed.). Japan’s Public Sector, Chapters 3 and
4]. As to the structure of the monetary and financial system, it should be
borne in mind that, under the influence of the United States, both the
Bank of Japan and Germany’s Deutscher Länder Bank, the predecessor
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of the Bundesbank, were started up after World War II with the same in-
dependence of their respective governments as that of the Federal Re-
serve. Since then the Bank of Japan has followed a policy of setting low
interest rates, designed to promote investment and economic growth, and
direct credit controls, via a rationing system applied to the major banks, to
limit the growth in the money supply when absolutely necessary. These
large banks, the flagships of Japan’s leading corporate groups, were
strongly indebted with the Bank of Japan and, in turn, they made their
subsidiary companies strongly dependent on them for credit. This gave
the banks a very powerful role in financial intermediation, and the inter-
bank market was the only developed market for funds (Suzuki, 1980).
In the fifties and sixties, when the economy was expanding at very
high rates, economic policies gave full priority to growth objectives. Tax
policy actively contributed to fuel economic growth: on the supply side
– in close collaboration with industrial policies – this took the form of tax in-
centives and, on the demand side – in combination with monetary policy –
this entailed frequent cuts in tax rates. Budgetary policy centred on not
enlarging the scale of government expenditure with respect to GDP and
on maintaining a balanced budget. By law the government was forbidden
to issue debt to finance the deficit of the general account until 1965,
although it was allowed to do so to finance investments, which were also
financed from the private savings deposited at the Postal Savings Banks.
Spending on goods and services for government consumption and on
transfers in particular remained stable as a percentage of GDP at very
low levels until the early seventies, while government investment was
very sizeable. In monetary policy, the Bank of Japan allowed a stable an-
nual increase of 15 % to 20 % in the money supply, financing growth in
domestic demand in nominal terms at the same rate, until the restriction
imposed by the trade balance required a policy of cooling off demand.
The Bank of Japan normally injected or drained liquidity to or from the
market on the basis of the interbank rate, enlarging or reducing the major
banks’ indebtedness with the central bank. These banks passed through
to their subsidiary companies the changes in credit conditions, thus great-
ly influencing investment decisions and aggregate demand (Takenaka,
p.154).
This set of economic policies achieved spectacular results in terms of
GDP growth through intense investment efforts, financed from domestic
saving, which contributed towards the continued gains in productivity, the
specialisation of industrial exports and the absorption of surplus agricul-
tural labour. Among the reasons behind the high national rate of savings,
which financed growth, were the low levels of welfare benefits, the high
price of housing, fiscal incentives, the low average age of the population,
compensation of wage-earners through twice-yearly complementary
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bonuses, large but not of a fixed amount, which meant that consumers
did not view them as permanent disposable income, and, in sum, the
rapid pace of economic growth (Takenaka, pp. 32-37). Investment efforts
and productive and technological specialisation were co-ordinated by the
powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), through com-
missions that meshed the interests of private corporate groups and the
objectives and restrictions set by the government, offering a framework of
agreement in major decisions, which were then carried out in a setting of
very harsh competition among companies. One area that has been espe-
cially underscored in explaining the success of Japanese firms is the role
of the long-run relations between companies and their employees, on the
one hand, and the relations between companies and the major banks on
which their financing depends, on the other (see M. Aoki, “Toward an
Economic Model of the Japanese Firm”, JEL, 28, num. 1, pp. 1-27, 1990).
Nearly all the fluctuations in the Japanese economy between 1950
and 1970 were derived from balance-of-payments difficulties. Notwith-
standing, Japan invariably tended to record a positive current-account
balance, with a notable trade surplus partly offset by a greater deficit in
services. Japanese imports, largely consisting of oil, raw materials and
agricultural products, rose at the same rate as domestic activity, while ex-
ports varied in line with income from the rest of the world, and particularly
the United States, traditionally the main consumer of Japanese products.
Between 1949 and 1971 the exchange rate was fixed at 360 yen per dol-
lar, and capital controls remained strict, ruling out nearly any foreign in-
vestment in Japan and the flow of Japanese saving abroad. As a result,
the changes in the current-account balance were entirely financed from
movements in currency reserves. These movements affected Japan’s
monetary base, credit expansion and the growth in investment and ag-
gregate demand until the tendency of the current-account balance dise-
quilibrium was corrected. The country’s stop-go policy was therefore de-
termined by the economy’s external restriction, which in turn was
basically influenced by the cyclical position of the US economy.
In the seventies, the structure and workings of the Japanese econo-
my changed substantially, resulting in a reduction in its trend growth rate
and also in its cyclical fluctuations. In addition to the effects of Japan’s
maturing as an industrialised economy, these changes stemmed from a
combination of factors: the new exchange-rate regime of a floating yen,
which altered the external adjustment mechanisms and the determinants
of monetary policy; the development of a welfare state, which fuelled the
rise in the weight of social security benefits in GDP, and by the mid-sev-
enties would translate into a significant tendency in government accounts
to run a deficit; and, lastly, the oil crises, which forced Japan to embark
on a major restructuring of its productive fabric, highly dependent on im-
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ported energy. Towards the end of the sixties, the Japanese economy
still recorded strong growth rates in demand, and its current-account bal-
ance tended towards a surplus, whereas the tendency of US foreign
trade towards a deficit became increasingly pronounced, not only in rela-
tion to Japan but also to Germany. This was a clear sign that the yen was
undervalued at the exchange rate of 360 to the dollar set in 1949. In
August 1971 what is known in Japan as the “Nixon shock” occurred,
when the dollar’s non-convertibility into gold was formally announced. At
the end of August national currencies began to float and the yen to ap-
preciate, and at the end of the year the Smithsonian Agreement was
reached on the stabilisation of the bilateral exchange rates of the main
currencies around new parities, with a certain margin of fluctuation. The
yen’s exchange rate was set at 308 to the dollar. However, the agree-
ment failed to hold, despite the co-ordinated intervention of central banks
on markets in support of exchange-rate stability until late 1972. In Febru-
ary 1973 the dollar was unilaterally devalued, and the other countries de-
cided that the parities agreed in 1971 were no longer sustainable. Thus
the yen has floated freely since 1973, albeit with sporadic intervention by
the authorities.
The main concern of Japanese economic policy in the transition stage
in 1971-1973 towards the new exchange-rate regime of a floating yen
was to avert a swift and excessive appreciation of its currency that would
jeopardise its trade surplus and set off a recession in the economy. It was
then decided to put into practice expansionary monetary and fiscal poli-
cies, shifting policy objectives “away from economic growth towards well-
being” (see Kurosaka, Fiscal Policy in Postwar Japan, Japanese Eco-
nomic Studies, spring, 1989, p. 19) and accepting the inflationary
consequences that these policies implied. The Bank of Japan rapidly in-
creased the money supply in order to keep the yen undervalued, but
failed in the effort, and the current-account surplus widened despite the
expansion in domestic demand that was aimed at easing the surplus.
Meanwhile, domestic inflationary pressures remained subdued as a result
of the fall in import prices derived from the yen’s appreciation. At the
same time, the expansion in government expenditure encouraged by
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was based, first, on the “Restructuring
Plan for the Japanese Archipelago”, which increased government invest-
ment and lowered the discount rate to help its financing, and, second, on
the revision of social security legislation on pensions and health care,
which broadened social benefits to make 1973 “the first year of the era of
well-being” (Kurosaka, p. 19). But 1973 was also the year in which infla-
tion surged by five percentage points over the first three quarters, before
the drastic rise in oil prices in the fourth quarter. In 1974 this led to the
first fall in Japan’s real product since World War II and to the “wild infla-
tion” that raised the growth in the GDP deflator to more than 20 % in the
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course of the year, fed by explosive wage demands in the spring (Ito,
p.241).
The impact of the oil shocks on the Japanese economy was much
greater than in the case of the other main economies due to its lack of
energy resources and its specialisation in energy-intensive industries.
The result was a slide in productivity and in real income and a necessary
reconversion of Japan’s productive fabric. Industrial output fell faster and
more intensely in Japan (by 20 % between the peak of November 1973
and May 1975) than in other countries, and negative current-account bal-
ances were recorded in 1974 and 1975, years when the national invest-
ment rate declined by more than five percentage points of GDP. The
three main factors in the slowdown in Japan’s economic growth as of
1973 were: the oil crisis, the slide in the rate of investment, and weaker
technological progress (Ito, p. 71).
The expansionary fiscal policy of the early years of the decade, de-
signed under the assumption that the strong growth in the Japanese
economy in the sixties would last another ten years, gave rise to the
emergence of a budget deficit in 1975 equal to 2.8 % of GDP, which
would later swell to 5.5 % in 1978. Among the causes given for this finan-
cial disequilibrium in the public sector were: the slowing in economic
growth, contrary to the authorities’ expectations; the increase in welfare
benefits (Ishi, p. 54); the wage increases of civil servants to counter the
effects of inflation; the tax cuts in 1974 (Takenaka, p. 17); and the subse-
quent error of the authorities in their vain attempts to stimulate, via the
budget deficit, an apparently depressed economy, which was actually
running at nearly full capacity (Ito, p. 167). According to Noguchi (“Public
Finance”, in The Political Economy of Japan, vol. I: The Domestic Trans -
formation, Ed. K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba, Stanford University Press,
1987, pp. 205-208, quoted in Ito, p. 170), the social security reform of
1973 made the system overly generous. Free health care was introduced
for the elderly, and costly medical treatment was subsidised. The public
contribution to the medical insurance of self-employed workers went from
50 % to 70 %. Pension payments were also raised. Retirement pensions
were increased from 20 % to 43 % of the average wage. Noguchi affirms
that these reforms were carried out without first arriving at a reliable esti-
mate of their cost, and that they were the cause of the rise in public
spending in the second half of the seventies, because most welfare bene-
fits were indexed to inflation. Noguchi also asserts that the Ministry of
Welfare grossly over-estimated the future growth in social security contri-
butions, failing to take into account that the ageing of the population was
causing the number of social security beneficiaries to rise while the num-
ber of contributors was declining, which would generate sizeable deficits
in the future if the structure of contributions and benefits were left as es-
tablished.
120
After the expansionary monetary policy implemented by the Bank of
Japan in the early part of the seventies, a new policy stance was taken as
of 1975, focusing on the control of the money supply as an intermediate
target (M2 plus certificates of deposit) of a quarterly nature. Although the
Bank of Japan prefers to speak of “forecasts” rather than of “targets”, the
truth is, from then onwards, both trend growth and the fluctuations in the
money supply have been notably reduced, in line with GDP trends at cur-
rent prices, apparently without affecting its growth at constant prices.
Even Milton Friedman has praised the policy followed by the Bank of
Japan, labelling it as monetarist in practice but without boasting of the
fact in flamboyant statements (Ito, p. 130). In addition, cross-border capi-
tal flows grew appreciably in the seventies. Amid fluctuations in the
yen/dollar exchange rate, capital controls were gradually eased with a
view to enhancing exchange-rate stability. When the Japanese authori-
ties wanted to counteract the appreciation of the yen, they relaxed certain
restrictions on capital outflows and, when seeking to halt a depreciation,
they lifted certain obstacles on the inward flow of capital. But, until the
enactment of the Law on Trade and Foreign Exchange Controls in De-
cember 1980, the rule was that no capital transactions abroad were al-
lowed without express authorisation, whereas the rule thereafter was just
the opposite (Ito, p. 321).
In fiscal policy, the government announced a plan in January 1976
designed to eliminate general government borrowing by 1980. However,
weaker-than-expected economic growth and the new wave of recession
prompted by the second oil crisis made it clear that government revenue
would not grow sufficiently to absorb the deficit, unless taxes were raised.
An attempt to introduce a value added tax in 1979 was a total failure,
and, as a result, the government changed its strategy of fiscal consolida-
tion, basing it now on cuts in public spending (Ishi, p. 54). In January
1979 a new plan was announced for the deficit’s elimination in 1984,
based on a general freeze in expenditure, whereby the fiscal drag to-
wards higher brackets in the scale of tax rates on personal and capital in-
come would erase the budget deficit. The imbalance in government ac-
counts was narrowed, but the target set in 1979 was impossible to meet,
and thus in August 1983 the time frame for fiscal consolidation was ex-
tended to 1990, when the objective was finally met. These delays in the
process of fiscal consolidation can only be partly attributed to the reces-
sive impact of the oil price rises as of 1979 and to the weakness of eco-
nomic growth to 1983. The other factor at play was that the fiscal consoli-
dation strategy based on higher revenue was roundly rejected by society.
The second oil shock had much milder inflationary and recessive ef-
fects on the Japanese economy than the first, even though its impact on
the energy bill was considerably higher. The basic reasons behind this
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weaker impact were the more restrictive monetary policy applied by the
Bank of Japan, the slower growth in aggregate demand, the milder infla-
tion expectations (contributing towards wage moderation), and the
progress made in energy-saving per unit of GDP. Japan’s response to
the oil shocks differed from that of the United States and Germany, be-
cause it quickly passed higher energy costs through to domestic prices,
and therefore the cost of energy in relation to labour, and the cost of
labour in relation to capital, rose more in Japan than in the other two
countries – in the United States the sixties baby boom generation arrived
on the labour market, and in Germany imported oil was partly replaced by
domestic coal. Consequently, energy – saving and technological upgrad-
ing were greater in Japan, because energy and labour were substituted
by capital, thus increasing productivity in the long run and improving the
economy’s competitiveness (Takenaka, pp. 23-26).
As a result of the second jump in oil prices, the growth rate of the
Japanese economy fell slightly, but without sliding into a recession, while
inflation continued on a downward course. It also recorded current-ac-
count deficits in 1979 and 1980, not only because of the increase in its
energy bill but also due to the yen’s appreciation between late 1976 and
mid-1978. However, as in the previous oil crisis, exports were the driving
force in the recovery, spurred by the economy’s gains in productivity,
which provided for an ongoing fall in export prices, and by the deprecia-
tion of the yen that continued until 1985. Nonetheless, the recovery was
slower than in the mid-seventies, because the income elasticity of exports
was the predominant factor, and the American economy would not recov-
er until 1983.
The initial strategy of fiscal consolidation based on raising revenue
encountered strong resistance in Japanese society. The tax system had
become increasingly inefficient and inequitable, imposing quite high rates
on very narrow tax bases and distorting saving and investment decisions.
For some time pressure had been building to reform the tax system in
favour of greater equity and neutrality, by eliminating the tax incentives
that had previously proliferated in the form of fiscal exemptions, bonuses
and privileges. The three main complaints of taxpayers traditionally fo-
cused on (Ishi, p. 55): a) the fiscal drag towards higher tax rates due to
the effects of inflation; b) tax evasion of non-wage income, and c) t h e
privileges granted to non-wage earners to lower their tax bases. In partic-
ular, the lack of a single general tax on income led to discriminatory treat-
ment according to the source of income, and the tax burden on interest
earnings, dividends and capital gains had always been very small. These
considerations, coupled with the advantages of a tax on consumption to
help increase tax revenue in order to finance the future disequilibria that
were expected in Japan’s social security system, were the rationale be-
hind the introduction of value added tax in 1989.
The characteristics of Japan’s fiscal policy in the eighties were, to a
large extent, contrary to those of the previous decade. In the seventies,
the weight of government spending in GDP rose substantially, the tax
system became more complex and discriminatory, and the deficit tended
to widen. In the eighties, public spending as a percentage of GDP de-
clined somewhat between 1983 and 1992, tax reforms were introduced to
simplify the system and to make it more equitable, and the budget deficit
went from 5.5 % of GDP in 1978 to a surplus of 3 % in 1990-1991. This
policy of fiscal consolidation meant that general government absorbed a
smaller proportion of private saving, and this was reflected in a larger sur-
plus on Japan’s balance of payments. On the spending side, the main ef-
forts to curb expenditure were made between 1983 and 1985, but they
continued in the second half of the decade and were accompanied by
major administrative reforms to reduce the size of the general govern-
ment sector, privatisations of public-sector firms, and liberalising mea-
sures in certain sectors, which helped to heighten competition and the
economy’s growth potential. On the revenue side, the recovery in eco-
nomic activity as of 1986 permitted a swifter reduction in the budget
shortfall, while at the same time the demand in Japanese society for
changes in the tax system was also addressed. The focus of Japan’s tax
reform in the eighties was the same as in other industrialised countries: a
reduction in the progressivity of personal income taxes and corporate tax
rates by simplifying the tax structure and widening the tax bases, while
shifting part of the burden towards indirect taxation. In the nineties, the
general thrust of tax reforms has been to correct the defects in consumer
taxation by raising taxes on property assets (such as land) and financial
assets, while aligning the tax system more closely to the systems of other
countries (Takenaka, p. 135). In April 1991 the parliament approved a
land value tax that went into effect in 1992. In 1991 temporary surcharges
on corporate tax were also introduced, raising its rate by 2.5 points, and
on oil duties, which rose by 50 % to finance Japan’s contribution to the
Gulf Peace Fund.
A major factor in the development of economic policy in Japan during
the eighties was the performance of the US economy. Restrictive mone-
tary policy and the expanding budget deficit in the United States in the
early years of the decade led to higher interest rates, an increase in the
American economy’s net borrowing requirement, massive capital inflows,
and a strong appreciation of the dollar. The later recovery in the economy
gave strong impetus to Japanese exports to the United States, sustaining
the rate of economic activity in Japan. Because of this divergence in the
economic cycles and policies of the world’s two largest economies, there
was a substantial widening in Japan’s trade surplus and in the US deficit.
To eliminate this disequilibrium, the five major countries reached an
agreement in September 1985, at a meeting at the Plaza Hotel in New
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York, aimed at correcting the dollar’s over-valuation. As a result of this
agreement, the yen appreciated by 60 % over the following nine months.
Between 1985 and 1987 American monetary policy attempted to collabo-
rate with this objective of eliminating the US trade deficit, and Japanese
monetary policy supported the appreciation of the yen. In this period, with
low inflation and a high rate of economic growth, monetary expansion re-
peatedly overshot the Bank of Japan’s “forecasts”, and the price of as-
sets, property assets in particular, soared. Both these phenomena were
also influenced by the process of financial liberalisation and innovation
that was under way at the same time.
Nonetheless, the strong appreciation of the yen and the expansion of
domestic demand in Japan in the second half of the eighties failed to
bring about a balanced current account, which continued to run a surplus
of approximately 1.5 % of GDP at its lowest (1990). In real terms, the
weight of exports in GDP slid from 11.4 % in 1985 to 10.1 % in 1987, but
it then began to rise again and in 1992 reached the same level as its ear-
lier record high. Real imports, by contrast, went from 7.6 % of GDP in
1985 to 10.1 % in 1990, but declined to 9.6 % in 1992 due to the slow-
down in economic growth. In nominal terms, the weight of exports in GDP
fell from 14.5 % in 1985 to 10.4 % in 1987, but imports also decreased as
a percentage of GDP, moving from 11.1 % in 1985 to 7.2 % in 1987, with
both changes more or less cancelling each other. Undoubtedly, the fall in
the price of oil in 1986 also contributed significantly to the decline in
Japan’s energy bill and to the lower weight of imports in GDP at current
prices: in 1980 half of Japan’s imports – measured in yen – were energy
products, in 1985 only 43 % and in 1987 this figure was 21 %. But the
most striking feature of the behaviour of Japan’s foreign trade was still
the ongoing strength of its exports, whose prices decreased by nearly
18% between 1985 and 1987. The most plausible explanation of this ten-
dency was suggested by Krugman (“Long-run Effects of the Strong Dol-
lar”, in R. Marston (ed.). Misalignment of Exchange Rates: Effects on
Trade and Industry, University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 277-294),
who notes that the period of the dollar’s appreciation produced an enor-
mous expansion in the productive capacity, and equally notable gains in
productivity, of Japanese industry. This later allowed Japan to absorb
more than 40 % of the impact of the yen’s appreciation through price re-
ductions, thanks to cost savings and, to a much lesser extent, to a tight-
ening in corporate margins.
Japan undertook major efforts in fiscal consolidation in the eighties.
In 1987 the government closed the year’s accounts with a surplus for the
first time since 1974, and in subsequent years this positive balance
steadily rose until reaching approximately 3 % of GDP in 1991. The struc-
tural reforms undertaken simultaneously helped to improve the efficiency
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of the allocation of resources and the economy’s growth potential. When
the recession arrived in 1992, Japan enjoyed an appreciable margin for
manoeuvre to use fiscal policy for counter-cyclical purposes, which it ap-
plied with very notable stabilising effects. In August 1992, after the first
signs of weakening in economic activity, the Japanese government
adopted expansionary fiscal measures on the spending side, equal to 2.3
percentage points of GDP: 1.2 for government investment, which had
been cut during the process of fiscal consolidation in the previous
decade; 0.5 for the purchase of land, thus sustaining property prices,
which were plummeting after the bursting of the speculative bubble of the
second half of the eighties; and the rest for loans to other agents whose
collateral had been seriously damaged by the plunge in property values.
Meanwhile, monetary policy also became openly more relaxed, and the
Bank of Japan lowered its rediscount rate on six occasions between June
1991, when it stood at 6 %, and September 1993, when it was set at
1.5%. However, real growth declined from nearly 4 % in 1991 to 1 % in
1992, and the Japanese economy entered into recession, with a slight
decline in real GDP on average in 1993.
Amid the strongest absolute fall in GDP at constant prices in 20
years, Japanese fiscal policy responded with two additional packages of
measures designed to sustain the rate of economic activity. In April and
September 1993 further expansion in spending was approved, amounting
to nearly 4 % of GDP (of which 2 points were earmarked for government
investment, 0.4 for the acquisition of property, and the rest for financing
gross capital formation in other sectors). As a result of the recession and
of the discretionary measures adopted in 1992 and 1993, the budget
recorded a deficit of 1.4 % in terms of GDP in 1993. And, when the
Japanese economy began to recover, the rebound in activity was fairly
weak, with real GDP growth rates of less than 1 % in 1994 and 1995, far
below the levels in previous periods of cyclical upturn -a common feature
in most industrialised countries, and apparently little more than a symp-
tom of their increasingly stable behaviour over the course of successive
business cycles. Although monetary policy continued to ease in this slow
cyclical upturn, with the Bank of Japan’s discount rate declining to 1 % by
mid-April 1995 and 0.5 % in August of the same year, the yen’s apprecia-
tion tended to cushion the expansion in exports and the deflation in the
price of assets. At the same time, the losses accumulated by the financial
system discouraged an increase in lending, which led the government to
persist in its application of an expansionary fiscal policy, with further in-
centives to bolster economic activity in February 1994 and September
1995, amounting to approximately 3 % of GDP in each case. In this way,
it combined the earlier expansion in direct government spending and
property purchases and financial intermediation as a lender of funds for
investment projects in other sectors with a tax cut of 1.2 percentage
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points of GDP in February 1994. As a result, the budget deficit rose to
2.4% of GDP in 1994 and to nearly 3 % in 1995, climbing to a level con-
sidered very high by the Japanese authorities from the standpoint of the
long-run prospects of public finances, given the forecasts for the ageing
of the population.
IV.2. Revenue, expenditure and balance of government accounts
In the sixties, when the growth in the Japanese economy was swifter,
the share of government expenditure in GDP rose by barely two percent-
age points until 1965, and then stabilised in the second half of the
decade. The weight of government revenue in GDP remained constant in
the early sixties, and thus the balance of government accounts, which
had recorded a surplus of roughly 2 % of GDP in 1960, ran a slight deficit
in 1966. However, the rise is tax pressure in later years again created a
surplus in the budget which lasted until the recession of 1974. By con-
trast, in the seventies, government expenditure rose strongly, climbing
from somewhat less than 20 % of GDP in 1970 to more than 32 % in
1980, with a faster rate of expansion in the first half of the decade (seven
percentage points) than in the second (five percentage points), as seen in
Chart IV.1. The growth in revenue in this period, though significant, did
not suffice to finance a spending increase of this magnitude, and thus the
balance of government accounts, positive until 1974, rapidly deteriorated
until recording a maximum deficit of 5.5 % of GDP in 1978. The gradual
absorption of this budget shortfall, whose origin will be studied later in
greater detail, was one of the priorities of Japan’s economic policy in the
eighties, and it focused on limiting both the growth in expenditure, to keep
its weight constant as a percentage of GDP, and the trend growth in rev-
enue (primarily personal income tax), to bring it into equilibrium with ex-
penditure.
The weight of government expenditure in GDP continued to rise until
1983, but the trend growth in revenue, largely induced by inflation and the
progressivity of income tax, led to a reduction in the budget deficit to
3.6 % of GDP that year. In 1984-1985, expenditure as a percentage of
GDP declined by some two percentage points, remaining almost stable
until the recession of 1993, whereas the continued rise in revenue pro-
duced a balanced budget in 1987 and then generated a growing surplus,
which amounted to 3 % of GDP in 1991. In the first half of the nineties,
the slowing in economic growth has been associated with a reversal in
the trends in government revenue and spending of the previous decade,
causing government accounts to return to a deficit position as of 1993,
reaching around 3 % of GDP in 1995.
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The results of estimating the cyclical sensitivity of total revenue, total
expenditure and net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) of general govern-
ment in the period 1961-1995 are presented in Table IV.1. Total revenue
reflects zero cyclical sensitivity and nil correlation with the growth in the
economy. However, the recursive estimation of this coefficient indicates
that its value did not remain stable over the sample period, but became
increasingly more negative towards the end of the seventies, later be-
coming close to zero, especially in the early nineties. For the period
1961-1978, the estimated coefficient of cyclical sensitivity is –0.06, signifi-
cantly lower than zero at an 85 % confidence level. For the years 1979-
1995, by contrast, the estimated value is 0.30, with a t-ratio of 3.04, and a
correlation of 0.34 with economic growth. It can thus be concluded that
total government revenue in Japan had a destabilising bias in the decade
of the seventies, but gradually increased its cyclical sensitivity, until exert-
ing a notable stabilising influence in recent years.
The cyclical sensitivity of total government expenditure was negative
(–0.09) on average in the period 1961-1995, of a stabilising sign at a con-
fidence level of 98 %, although its correlation with economic growth was
small (0.13). The positive autocorrelation of this regression’s residuals is
corrected by introducing AR(1) and MA(3) terms in the equation, while
the value of the estimated coefficient of cyclical sensitivity is not greatly
affected (–0.12). The recursive estimates of this coefficient reveal the
existence of a clear break towards the end of the seventies. For the sub-
period 1961-1978, the cyclical sensitivity is very stable at –0.19, with a t-
ratio of 5.63, and a correlation of 0.65 with economic growth. For the sec-
ond half of the sample, the coefficient’s value is –0.26, with a t-ratio of
2.74, and a lower correlation (0.29) with growth. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that total government expenditure has had a relatively modest sta-
bilising influence on the Japanese economy during the past 35 years.
On average, general government net lending (+) or net borrowing (–)
in the period 1961-1995 showed cyclical sensitivity of 0.09, substantially
greater than zero, with a 10 % margin of error, but with a very low corre-
lation with economic growth. The recursive estimation of the cyclical sen-
sitivity coefficient reflects a profile dominated by the changes in the cycli-
cal sensitivity of revenue, as already noted. For the period 1961-1978,
the estimated value is 0.13, significantly greater than zero at a 96 % con-
fidence level, and with 0.2 correlation with economic growth, whereas for
the years 1979-1995 a value of 0.56 is estimated, with a standard devia-
tion of 0.1, and a correlation of 0.66 with economic growth. It can be said
that Japan’s fiscal policy did not exert an important stabilising influence in
the sixties and seventies, but that its stabilising effects later became no-
tably stronger, primarily as a result of the higher cyclical sensitivity of gov-
ernment revenue in the nineties.
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CHART IV.1
JAPAN
REVENUE, EXPENDITURE AND BALANCE OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
-5
0
5
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
15
20
25
30
35
40
15
20
25
30
35
40
-5
0
5
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
15
20
25
30
35
40
15
20
25
30
35
40
-5
0
5
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
TOTAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE
REAL GROWTH AND
BALANCE OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS
% of GDP % of GDP % % of GDP
Source: European Commission. Figures for 1996 and 1997 are forecasts estimated by the Commis-
sion’s Technical Services.
To estimate the cyclical sensitivity of Japanese fiscal policy in more
recent years, the Chow test was used, and it indicates that 1979 was the
year with the least probability of error, if it is assumed that a structural
change occurred in that year. In the analysis below of the stabilising ef-
fects of fiscal policy in Japan, the tables present the estimations of the
variables’ cyclical sensitivity in the period 1979-1995, and the text com-
ments on the most important findings obtained for the sample period
(1961-1995) and for the first half of the sample (1961-1978). Table IV.2
shows the estimations of the previous table but referring to the period
1979-1995. The most noteworthy changes are found in the increases in
the cyclical sensitivity of total revenue and, to a lesser extent, in that of
expenditure (in absolute values). As a result, the estimated cyclical sensi-
tivity of net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) was much higher in the sec-
ond half of the sample. The three equations have a certain positive auto-
correlation in their residuals, which can be remedied without significantly
affecting the estimated values of the coefficients of cyclical sensitivity.
The recursive estimates of these coefficients confirm that the stabilising
effects of fiscal policy became steadily more intense over time, especially
via revenue and during the recession of the nineties.
IV.3. Stabilising effects of disposable income
Gross national disposable income – equal to gross domestic product
plus the balance of income and net current transfers from abroad – and
its breakdown by sector as percentages of GDP followed the trend be-
haviour and the fluctuations represented in Chart IV.2. National income
remained very stable with respect to GDP, given the limited relative im-
portance of the Japanese economy’s flows of income and transfers with
the rest of the world and, consequently, the trends and fluctuations in the
income of general government and the other resident sectors were strictly
complementary. The stabilising effects of Japan’s fiscal policy on the
gross disposable income of the private sector in the years 1979-1995,
through its operations in revenue and current transfers, are shown in
Table IV.3.
In the period 1961-1978, Japanese fiscal policy had no well defined
stabilising effects on private-sector disposable income, mainly due to the
untimely discretionary measures adopted on several occasions. Chart
IV.2 shows the destabilising impact of the expansionary measures of
1972 and 1978, whose correction in 1973 and 1979 arrived late. Like-
wise, the fiscal expansion in the recession of 1974 was also delayed, ex-
erting its greatest effects in 1975, when the economy was already on the
road to recovery, whereas in the deceleration in growth in 1980 fiscal pol-
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icy did not sufficiently adjust, but remained geared towards trimming the
swollen budget deficit generated in the second half of the seventies. This
experience contrasts with the more systematic adjustments in general
government gross disposable income to the economy’s cyclical situation
as of 1981, with notably atypical advances in fiscal consolidation occur-
ring in 1987, when the budget balance was restored, and 1994, when the
rise in the budget deficit was checked, despite the persistent weakness in
economic growth.
The cyclical sensitivity of the gross disposable income of general gov-
ernment in the years 1961-1978 was 0.06, that of national income was
nil, and, as a result, that of the private sector was –0.06, none being sig-
nificantly different from zero or reflecting any correlation with economic
growth. By contrast, during the period 1979-1995, gross disposable in-
come of general government showed average cyclical sensitivity of 0.44,
with a standard deviation of 0.07, and a correlation of 0.72 with the
growth of the Japanese economy. In other words, for each percentage
point of fluctuation in real growth, the general government’s income redis-
tribution operations caused the share of its gross disposable income in
GDP to fluctuate in the same direction by 0.44 percentage points, so that
the weight of the private sector’s gross disposable income in GDP fluctu-
ated in the opposite direction by more or less the same magnitude. Con-
sequently, the stabilising effect of fiscal policy on private-sector dispos-
able income was slightly higher than 0.4. The adjusted coefficients of
determination (around 0.7) indicated the existence of a close correlation
in these variations in the distribution of income between the public and
private sectors, whereas the fluctuations in national income as a percent-
age of GDP did not follow a clear cyclical pattern. The recursive estima-
tions of the cyclical sensitivity coefficients show that their values re-
mained reasonably stable in the period 1979-1995. The negative
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TABLE IV.1
JAPAN (1961-1995)
CYCLICAL SENSITIVITY OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
Annual change as a percentage of GDP
Total revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.36 0.76 –0.00 0.19 1.59 0.00
Total expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.52 0.87 –0.09 2.50 1.15 0.13
Net lending (+) or net
borrowing (–). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.16 1.12 0.09 1.72 1.43 0.06
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autocorrelations of the residuals that appear in the regressions used to
estimate the cyclical sensitivities of general government and private-sec-
tor gross disposable income are corrected by introducing a MA(1) term,
without affecting the estimated values of the coefficients.
In examining the trend behaviour of current revenue – which went
from around 20 % of GDP in the sixties to a peak of 35 % in 1990, then
declining in more recent years to approximately 33 % – the most salient
feature is the relative stability of taxes linked to production and imports,
which remained within a range of 6.5 % to 8.5 % of GDP during the entire
period, trending downwards until 1975 and then recovering their previous
level during the past 20 years (see Chart IV.3). The share of taxes on
current income and wealth in GDP rose little in the first half of the sixties,
but in the second half grew by nearly two percentage points. Nor was
there a sustained increase in income tax pressure in the seventies, be-
cause the strong jump in tax takings in 1973-1974, propelled by the infla-
tionary growth in nominal income, was later offset by falls in tax rates,
which reduced fiscal pressure to its previous level. This neutralisation of
the effects of inflation was not extensive to social security contributions,
whose share of GDP trended invariably upwards, or to income taxes be-
tween 1978 and 1984, in order to lower the budget deficit, as already not-
ed. Between 1978 and 1991, the weight of current taxes on income and
wealth in GDP rose by around five percentage points, although in the
three-year period 1992-1994 they declined by some three points as a re-
sult of tax reforms and the recession. Social security contributions, after
jumping from 4.6 % of GDP in 1973 to 6.4 % in 1975, continued on a mild
upward course, raising their share of GDP by a further two percentage
points until 1989. This tendency became more pronounced in the nineties
and, at present, their relative weight stands at 10.3 % of GDP, albeit
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TABLE IV.2
JAPAN (1979-1995)
CYCLICAL SENSITIVITY OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
Annual change as a percentage of GDP
Total revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.39 0.87 0.30 3.04 1.52 0.34
Total expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.30 0.81 –0.26 2.74 1.49 0.29
Net lending (+) or net
borrowing (–). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.10 1.22 0.56 5.60 2.02 0.66
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much lower than the average level of the OECD countries. Finally, other
current income also tended to rise in terms of GDP, moving from 1.1 % in
1960 to roughly 4 % in the nineties.
As to the components of current revenue, income taxes were the de-
termining factor in its stabilising effects. The average cyclical sensitivity of
these taxes in the years 1979-1995 is estimated at 0.28, with a standard
deviation of 0.06, and a correlation of 0.56 with economic growth. The re-
cursive estimation shows that this cyclical sensitivity coefficient did not re-
main constant, but was nearly equal to zero until 1991, only rising in more
recent years. If this coefficient is estimated for the period 1979-1991, its
value is not significantly different from zero and its correlation with growth
is nil. Moreover, the stability tests run on the cyclical sensitivity coefficient
also suggest that there was a structural change in 1991. When the resid-
uals’ autocorrelation is corrected in the estimation for the period 1979-
1995, the value of the estimated cyclical sensitivity coefficient does not
prove significantly different from zero. It can therefore be concluded that
the increase in the stabilising effects of Japan’s fiscal policy on private-
sector disposable income in recent years is associated with the strong
downward adjustment of current taxes on income and wealth as percent-
ages of GDP in this stage of slow economic growth, as seen in Chart
IV.3. The other current income items show no well defined cyclical sensi-
tivity, and thus their stabilising effects are negligible.
Unlike the case of other countries, Japan’s current transfers reflect
less cyclical sensitivity than current income for the period 1979-1995. The
cyclical sensitivity of total current transfers is –0.15, with a t-ratio of 2,
and their correlation with growth is fairly insignificant (0.16). For the years
1961-1978, cyclical sensitivity is estimated at –0.12, with a t-ratio of 6.4
and an adjusted coefficient of determination of 0.70. Among current
transfers, welfare benefits had the clearest stabilising effect. Their cyclical
sensitivity in the more recent period was –0.12, with a standard deviation
of 0.04 and an adjusted coefficient of determination of 0.31. Between
1961 and 1978, the cyclical sensitivity of welfare benefits was somewhat
lower in absolute value (–0.09, with a t-ratio of 5.42), but was more close-
ly linked to the fluctuations in economic growth (coefficient of determina-
tion of 0.63). The other transfers showed no well defined cyclical sensitiv-
ity, according to the estimations in Table IV.3, except in the case of actual
interest payments, whose coefficient is biased by the strong positive au-
tocorrelation of the residuals. If remedied by introducing an AR(1) term in
the equation, the estimated value of the coefficient is –0.04, with a t-ratio
of 2.20, and a correlation of 0.79 with economic growth.
As to the trend behaviour of transfers, it should be underscored that
their increase explains more than 80 % of the expansion in government
expenditure in Japan during the period analysed. In 1973 total general
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CHART IV.2
JAPAN
GROSS NATIONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME AND ITS BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR
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government current transfer payments represented 7.3 % of GDP, com-
pared with 5 % in the early sixties, but in the ensuing ten years this
weight rose by one percentage point per year. Since 1983 it has tended
to stabilise, fluctuating between 16.2 % and 17.6 %. The growth in trans-
fers between 1973 and 1983 stemmed from the expansion in social secu-
rity benefits (some seven percentage points of GDP) at a much more vig-
orous rate than the growth in general government current revenue, giving
rise to a substantial budget deficit and a rapid accumulation of govern-
ment debt. In turn, as in the other countries, the interest burden generat-
ed by this debt rekindled the growth in current transfers (more than three
percentage points of GDP between 1974 and 1984), making it difficult to
reduce the budget deficit. From 1983 until the strong slowdown in eco-
nomic growth in 1992, social security benefits remained practically stable
as a percentage of GDP, recording small fluctuations, as seen in Chart
IV.4, some of which – as that of 1990-1991 – had a destabilising impact.
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TABLE IV.3
JAPAN (1979-1995)
STABILISING EFFECTS OF DISPOSABLE INCOME
Annual change as a percentage of GDP
GENERAL GOVERNMENT:
Current revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.39 0.87 0.30 3.04 1.52 0.34
Taxes on production
and imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.07 0.28 0.02 0.57 2.55 0.00
Income taxes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.01 0.66 0.28 4.65 1.33 0.56
Social security contributions. . 0.21 0.26 –0.03 0.70 2.25 0.00
Other revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.10 0.34 0.02 0.40 2.48 0.00
Current transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . 0.28 0.57 –0.15 2.01 1.53 0.16
Welfare benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.22 0.36 –0.12 2.88 2.34 0.31
Subsidies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.04 0.13 –0.00 0.21 2.53 0.00
Interest payments. . . . . . . . . . . 0.10 0.23 –0.02 0.70 0.22 0.00
Other transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00 0.00 –0.00 0.60 1.43 0.00
Gross disposable income. . . . 0.11 0.93 0.44 6.56 2.65 0.72
OTHER SECTORS:
Gross disposable income. . . . –0.09 0.88 –0.41 6.09 2.52 0.69
NATIONAL ECONOMY:
Gross disposable income. . . . 0.02 0.16 0.03 1.47 1.50 0.07
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As of 1992, the weight of welfare benefits in GDP again tended to rise as
a result of the sluggishness in economic activity, although this tendency
was curbed in 1994 and 1995 due to the need to restrain the growth in
the budget deficit.
IV.4. Stabilising effects of nominal expenditure and real demand
The stabilising effects of fiscal policy on private-sector gross dispos-
able income are reflected in private consumption spending decisions, as
shown in Table IV.4. The average propensity to private consumption in
Japan remained close to 0.6 as of 1979 and, given that the stabilising ef-
fect of disposable income was –0.41, the cyclical sensitivity of private
consumption should be around –0.24, a value (in absolute terms) some-
what higher than that estimated for the average of the period 1979-1995
(–0.21), but not significantly different, because the associated standard
deviation is 0.09. Moreover, if the cyclical sensitivity of real consumption
is estimated (at constant prices), the result is similar (–0.18), with a t-ratio
of 2.25 and a correlation of 0.2 with economic growth. Nonetheless, it
should be pointed out that the greater stabilising effects of fiscal policy on
private-sector gross disposable income on average in the second part of
the sample did not translate into an increase in the cyclical sensitivity of
private consumption. For the period 1961-1978, the cyclical sensitivity of
real private consumption is estimated at –0.14, significantly different from
zero, with a correlation of 0.46 with economic growth, whereas the cycli-
cal sensitivity of expenditure on private consumption (at current prices)
for the same period is –0.24, with a t-ratio of 4.57 and an adjusted coeffi-
cient of determination of 0.54.
Both private and government consumption remained stable in relation
to GDP during the first half of the sixties, then underwent a severe con-
traction – greater in private than in government consumption – in the sec-
ond half of the decade, and recovered – more in government than in pri-
vate consumption – between 1970 and 1975, as seen in Chart IV.5. This
chart also reflects, in the right-hand column, the fluctuations in these vari-
ables (grey line at current prices, black line at constant prices) and in
economic growth. The higher values in the cyclical sensitivity of private
consumption and its greater correlation with economic growth until 1978
is primarily explained by the contraction-expansion cycle in private con-
sumption as a percentage of GDP between 1965 and 1975.
Government consumption over the past 25 years has reflected a very
stable cyclical sensitivity, estimated at around –0.07 at current prices and
slightly less than –0.10 at constant prices. The fit at constant prices is
somewhat better, and there are no autocorrelation problems in the resid-
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CHART IV.3
JAPAN
CURRENT REVENUE OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT
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uals. If the autocorrelation of the residuals is corrected in the estimation
of the coefficient of cyclical sensitivity of government consumption at cur-
rent prices by introducing a MA(1) term in the equation, the estimated val-
ue for the period 1979-1995 does not change. It can therefore be con-
cluded that government consumption in Japan has exerted a stabilising
effect in respect of nominal expenditure and real demand – and output –
of a magnitude proportional to its weight in GDP and systematically linked
to the cyclical position of the economy. National consumption has had a
stabilising effect of –0.28, estimated at both current and constant prices,
although the magnitude of this effect was somewhat greater (in absolute
values) in the first half of the sample due to the behaviour of private con-
sumption.
These stabilising effects of fiscal policy, both through income redistri-
bution operations and general government demand for current goods and
services, are also found in the changes in national saving and its break-
down by sector, presented in Chart IV.6. The national saving rate re-
mained very high and stable in the first half of the sixties, at around 34 %.
Between 1965 and 1975, it ran a full cycle, pushed upwards by the na-
tional savings ratio until the year 1970 and then falling during the next five
years, initially due to the decline in private saving and later as a result of
the additional impact of a strong slide in government saving in the 1974-
1975 recession. The downward tendency in private saving as a percent-
age of GDP continued to 1990, whereas government saving began to re-
cover as of 1978, following the same profile as gross disposable income
and the net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) of general government. This
has been the predominant pattern in national saving over the past ten
years, with its recovery reaching a high of nearly 35 % of GDP in 1991
and then declining in the years of recession to somewhat more than 30 %
in the mid-nineties. By contrast, private saving has tended to recover
since 1990, and it now stands at approximately the same level as in the
early sixties.
The cyclical sensitivity of national saving and of its private and public
components has been decreasing since the mid-sixties, as shown in the
recursive estimations which begin in the year 1961, and the most notable
jump in the coefficients’ value occurred in the year 1974. However, if the
two periods in which the sample is divided are considered separately, the
values estimated for the cyclical sensitivity of national saving are nearly
identical (0.31), although this stability is due to the offsetting changes in
the cyclical sensitivities of its private and public components. In the first
part of the sample, the fluctuations in national savings as percentages of
GDP were influenced more by private than by public saving, whereas the
contrary is true in the second part of the sample.
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CHART IV.4
JAPAN
CURRENT TRANSFERS OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT
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The cyclical sensitivity of gross private-sector saving was significantly
different from zero and higher (0.18) than that of government saving in
the years 1961-1978. By contrast, in the period 1979-1995, its estimated
cyclical sensitivity was negative (–0.2), negligibly different from zero, and
had very little correlation (0.18) with economic growth. This negative sign
of the cyclical sensitivity of private saving implies a dependence of the
private sector on the saving of other sectors (government or external sec-
tors) to finance the fluctuations in private investment, which, as we shall
later see, has a high and positive cyclical sensitivity in Japan and also in
the other countries. As the stabilising effects of fiscal policy on the fluctu-
ations in private-sector disposable income gradually increased, and at the
same time the adjustments in private consumption failed to exert any
greater stabilising effects on aggregate expenditure, the cyclical sensitivi-
ty of private saving diminished, with its sign eventually changing.
Conversely, the gross saving of general government reflects stronger
average cyclical sensitivity in the second period of the sample in relation
to the first, to the same extent as the sector’s gross disposable income,
because the cyclical sensitivity of government consumption remained sta-
ble. From 1961 to 1978, the average cyclical sensitivity of government
saving was low (0.13), although significantly higher than zero, and its cor-
relation with economic growth was 0.28. By contrast, in the period 1979-
1995, its estimated cyclical sensitivity was 0.52, remaining quite stable,
and its correlation with economic growth was 0.76. The negative autocor-
relation of the residuals of this regression is corrected by introducing a
MA(1) term in the equation, which does not affect the value of the coeffi-
cient of cyclical sensitivity. It may be said, therefore, that the increase in
the stabilising effects of fiscal policy on private-sector disposable income
did not translate into a greater stabilising effect of private consumption on
national expenditure, but instead produced a slide in the cyclical sensitivi-
ty of private saving, whose financial independence declined.
Gross national capital formation and private and public investment in
Japan have followed the trend behaviour and cyclical fluctuations as per-
centages of GDP shown in Chart IV.7. This chart indicates that private in-
vestment was the dominant force in the trends and changes in the short
run in gross national capital formation, because government investment
remained quite stable as a percentage of GDP, fluctuating at around 5 %
until 1991, and only in more recent years has it risen strongly in order to
combat the recession. By contrast, the weight of private investment,
which had fluctuated greatly at around 30 % of GDP in the sixties, de-
clined by some 12 percentage points between 1970 and 1983, moving to
the region of 23 % in the mid-eighties. It has now moved down to approxi-
mately 20 %, after running the course of the cyclical upturn that began in
1986 and touched bottom in 1995.
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The recursive estimates of the cyclical sensitivities of gross national
capital formation and private and government investment since 1961 indi-
cate, as in the case of national saving and its sectoral composition, dimin-
ishing values, with major drops in 1974 and later tending to stabilise. For
the period 1979-1995, the average estimated value of the cyclical sensi-
tivity of gross national capital formation at current prices is 0.47, with a
correlation of 0.6 with economic growth. As indicated by the Durbin-Wat-
son statistic, the residuals of this regression have a significant first-order
autocorrelation (0.54), which can be remedied by introducing a MA(1)
term in the equation without changing the value of the coefficient of cycli-
CHART IV.4
JAPAN (1979-1995)
CHANGES IN THE BREAKDOWN OF NOMINAL EXPENDITURE AND REAL DEMAND
Annual change as a percentage of GDP
National consumption. . . . . . . . 0.15 0.81 –0.28 3.04 1.70 0.34
Private. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.15 0.72 –0.21 2.35 1.89 0.22
Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.01 0.16 –0.07 5.36 1.18 0.63
Gross national saving. . . . . . . . –0.13 0.83 0.31 3.51 1.36 0.41
Private. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.24 0.78 –0.20 2.10 2.00 0.18
Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.11 0.05 0.52 7.14 2.63 0.76
National investment. . . . . . . . . . –0.14 1.07 0.47 5.00 0.66 0.60
Private. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.28 1.23 0.63 9.75 1.66 0.85
Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.15 0.59 –0.16 2.26 1.45 0.20
National saving/investment
balance (1 + 2 = 3 – 4 + 5). . . . . 0.01 1.04 –0.16 1.12 0.96 0.02
Private. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.05 1.79 –0.84 6.18 2.02 0.70
Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.04 1.52 0.68 5.26 2.06 0.63
Exports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.10 1.10 0.06 0.35 1.27 0.00
Imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.08 1.56 0.25 1.15 1.08 0.02
Income and transfers. . . . . . . . 0.02 0.16 0.03 1.47 1.50 0.07
REAL DEMAND (a):
Private consumption. . . . . . . . . –0.02 0.65 –0.18 2.25 2.02 0.20
Government consumption. . . . –0.07 0.21 –0.09 5.70 2.21 0.66
Gross capital formation. . . . . . . 0.01 0.91 0.37 4.17 0.61 0.51
Exports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.23 0.53 –0.06 0.74 1.57 0.00
Imports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.15 0.67 0.04 0.41 1.12 0.00
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(a) Annual change in variables at constant prices, as a percentage of GDP at constant prices.
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CHART IV.5
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cal sensitivity. If the cyclical sensitivity of gross national capital formation
at constant prices is estimated (black line in the upper right-hand part of
Chart IV.7), the value obtained is 0.37, with a correlation of 0.5 with eco-
nomic growth and an autocorrelation of the residuals similar to the above
instance. In introducing a MA(1) term in the equation, the value of the es-
timated coefficient does not change.
Private investment is the destabilising (or revitalising) variable in ag-
gregate demand. For the period 1979-1995, its estimated average cycli-
cal sensitivity is 0.63, with a standard deviation of 0.07, and a very high
correlation (0.85) with economic growth. In turn, government investment
had no stabilising effects on aggregate demand until 1991. Even though
the cyclical sensitivity coefficient estimated for the average of the years
1979-1995 is –0.16, the value of this coefficient until 1991 is positive and
stable, although not significantly different from zero. Therefore, govern-
ment investment appears to have had considerable stabilising effects as
of 1991 only, due to the decision of the Japanese authorities to increase
these expenses to attenuate the recession.
Chart IV.8 shows the trends and fluctuations in the national saving-in-
vestment balance (which is also equal to the balance of current transac-
tions with the rest of the world), as well as its breakdown by sector. The
recursive estimates for the period 1961-1995 reveal that the cyclical sen-
sitivity of the national saving-investment balance did not remain constant,
but was more negative in the sixties and then gradually moved closer to
zero over time, with a significant jump in 1974, due to the fact that the de-
cline in the cyclical sensitivity of gross national capital formation was
greater than that of national saving. The cyclical sensitivity of national
saving in the period 1979-1995 was less than that of national investment,
and therefore the saving-investment balance reflected a negative cyclical
sensitivity (–0.16) during those years, not significantly different from zero,
and with nil correlation with economic growth. The residual autocorrela-
tion in this regression is remedied by introducing a MA(1) term in the
equation, without affecting the estimation of cyclical sensitivity. Seen from
the standpoint of the composition of aggregate expenditure and demand,
the negative value of the cyclical sensitivity of the national saving-invest-
ment balance indicates – with the variables always measured as percent-
ages of GDP – that the counter-cyclical adjustments in private and gov-
ernment consumption were not enough to accommodate the pro-cyclical
fluctuations in gross capital formation, and thus national demand record-
ed pro-cyclical behaviour that was counteracted by the counter-cyclical
adjustments in net external demand (exports minus imports).
The saving-investment balance of the private sector shows similar
characteristics to those discussed for the saving-investment balance of
the national economy. For the years 1979-1995 its estimated cyclical
142
143
CHART IV.6
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sensitivity was –0.84, and it had a high correlation (0.7) with economic
growth. The general government saving-investment balance reflects
more stable cyclical sensitivity over the entire sample. For the second pe-
riod, its average value is estimated at 0.68, with a t-ratio of 5.26, and a
correlation of 0.63 with growth. However, this value did not remain stable,
and instead the recursive estimations indicate the existence of a break as
of 1992, because until then the estimated cyclical sensitivity was less
than 0.4. It can be concluded, therefore, that the stabilising effects of fis-
cal policy in Japan were much weaker until the year 1991 and that in the
past four years they have increased, because of the greater cyclical sen-
sitivity of current income and wealth taxes and government capital spend-
ing during this downturn. In the lower right-hand part of Chart IV.8, the
destabilising effects of Japan’s expansionary fiscal policy are again seen
in the years 1972, 1975 and 1978, as well as the sudden change of
course in 1979, which kept a restrictive sign in the early eighties despite
the weakness in economic growth in this period.
From the viewpoint of the Japanese economy’s relations abroad, the
disequilibrium between saving and investment represents the balance of
current transactions with the rest of the world (exports minus imports at
current prices, plus income and net current transfers received). The for-
eign trade flows between the Japanese economy and the rest of the
world reflect no well defined cyclical sensitivity either at current prices or
at constant prices, and their adjustments were non-systematic, as indicat-
ed in the negligible correlation with economic growth. The cyclical sensi-
tivity of exports at current prices in the period 1979-1995 is estimated at
0.08, not significantly different from zero, and its correlation with econom-
ic growth is nil, whereas for imports at current prices the value estimated
is 0.27 – which can only be considered greater than zero at a confidence
level of 26 % – and the correlation with economic growth is also negligi-
ble. As to income and net current transfers from abroad, cyclical sensitivi-
ty is estimated at 0.02, not different from zero, with nil correlation with
economic growth. In sum, flows of income and expenditure with the rest
of the world have not had a systematic relationship with the growth in the
Japanese economy, but instead the imbalances between national saving
and investment have been compensated at times by exports – when the
external economic setting was propitious – and at times by imports. Chart
IV.9 presents the series on exports and imports in the usual way. The
right-hand column shows the greater scale of the fluctuations at current
prices (grey line) than at constant prices (black line), due to the changes
in the deflators of these variables with respect to the GDP deflator.
Nor did exports or imports at constant prices show any well defined
cyclical sensitivity in the period 1979-1995 on average, with nil correlation
with economic growth, according to the estimates in Table IV.4. There-
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CHART IV.7
JAPAN
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION AND ITS BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
-5
0
5
-4
-2
0
2
4
25
30
35
40
25
30
35
40
-5
0
5
-4
-2
0
2
4
20
25
30
35
20
25
30
35
-5
0
5
-4
-2
0
2
4
PRIVATE INVESTMENT
GROSS NATIONAL CAPITAL FORMATION
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT
% of GDP % of GDP % % of GDP
Source: European Commission. Figures for 1996 and 1997 are forecasts estimated by the Commis-
sion’s Technical Services.
146
CHART IV.8
JAPAN
SAVING/INVESTMENT BALANCE OF THE NATION AND BY SECTOR
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fore, the cyclical changes in the composition of real demand, charac-
terised by an increase in the relative weight of gross fixed capital forma-
tion in upturns and a decrease in recessions, were mainly compensated,
rather unsystematically, by adjustments in the opposite direction in real
private – and, to a lesser extent, public – consumption, with the rest of
the adjustment coming from the stabilising fluctuations – not significantly
different from zero, on average – of real exports and imports, which were
totally non-systematic in the years 1979-1995 as revealed in their nil cor-
relation with economic growth. Nonetheless, these findings on the cyclical
sensitivity of exports and imports must be viewed taking into account the
structural changes in the stabilising effects of fiscal policy previously anal-
ysed and which also affected the cyclical adjustments of the composition
of real demand and the external counterpart of the imbalance between
national saving and investment. In this respect, three periods can be dis-
tinguished.
Between 1961 and 1978, fiscal policy had no stabilising effects on pri-
vate-sector gross disposable income, because the destabilising influence
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CHART IV.9
JAPAN
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
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of current revenue offset almost entirely the effects of a contrary sign of
current transfers. In this stage, the cyclical sensitivity of nominal and real
consumption was well defined and contributed to smooth the fluctuations
in gross capital formation, without offsetting them altogether, as reflected
in the disequilibria between national saving and investment. In the period
1979-1991, fiscal policy had a more stabilising effect on private-sector
gross disposable income, due to the change of sign in the cyclical sensi-
tivity of current revenue, but private consumption continued to contribute,
to more or less the same extent as before, towards the stabilisation of
nominal expenditure and aggregate demand, and thus the cyclical sensi-
tivity of private saving waned appreciably. In more recent years, the sta-
bilising effects of fiscal policy on private-sector gross disposable income
have increased, because the cyclical sensitivity of current income and
wealth taxes has risen. By contrast, the pro-cyclical sensitivity of gross
capital formation has declined somewhat, largely because government in-
vestment has become a stabilising influence. Both changes have helped
to stabilise aggregate demand and to smooth the disequilibrium between
national saving and investment during these years of recession.
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